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PREFACE
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is

now a past history, along with the seventeen previous Committees and commissions which had reported on the Palestine
problem.
But this Committee had several unusual features.

It

was a United Nations Committee and the Big Powers had no
part in it.

It was instructed to complete its work in one

hundred and twenty days.

The Committee visited four con-

tinents, heard many advocates

and collected nearly two

hundred pounds of typed or printed evidence.

Lastly it was

the first international Committee to study the problem of
Jewry inside and outside Palestine.
I was in Palestine during the Committee's hearing in
Jerusalem in 1947 and I was in the United States when the
United Nations, under Pressure of Politics, voted for the
Committee's decision- the partition of Palestine.

Since

then, it was my privilege to give a first hand account of
the Arab-Jewish conflict by all that I saw, read and heard.
I thought it might be useful to share with others the political education which it was my privilege to obtain in my own
country.
I was surprised and irritated, in New York as well as
in California, by the almost complete disregard and ignorance

....
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of the Palestine problem and particularly the Arab case.
Only those few .Americans vrho had actual experience of the
Ifiddle East sho'llred any real understanding of the problem.
It is this ignorance, indeed• on th_e part of the .American
intelligentsia. that.. I.ed me· to·'Write' this narrative. If it
does nothing else, I hope that it indicates the irresponsibility of those who find it easy to make up their minds
far away from the scene of action; and secondly, the need,
on the part of British and .Ame·rican statesmen, for imagination and understanding strong enough to see through official
papers the human problems which they too often conceal.
Through my research I have found that there is in existance already a considerable body of literature in English
and other European languages on the history of the British
mandate and the work of the United Ne.tions' Special Committee on Palestine.

But it has to be used with care, partly

because of the high percentage of open or veiled propaganda,
and partly because the remoteness of the indispensable Arabic
sources has militated against real fairness, even in the
works of neutral and fair minded historians.

Zionist propa-

ganda is active, highly organized and wide-spread; the '"orld
press, at any rate in the democracies of the West, is largely
amenable to it; it connnands many of the available channels
for the dissemination of news, and more particularly those
of the English speaking world.

Arab propaganda is in compar-

ison primitive and infinitely less successful; the Arabs
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have little of the skill and financial resources which
make Jewish propaganda so effective.
Another vast body of information comes from official
British sources, but here, too, the requirements of true
impartiality are not met.

Nor can they be, until the time

comes when the British Government can

rel~ase

more documents.

for publication.
The members of the United Nqtions' Special Committee
on Ealeatine enjoy the benefits of a well-equipped Zionist
office in Geneva, which supplies them with information in
a for.m and a language suited to their comprehension.
is no similar channel on the Arab side.

There

Even such sources

as the Arabic Preas of Paleatine,which provides a valuable
body of comment on the operation of the mandate as it affects
the Arab population, are not used.

Petitions and memoranda

drawn up in Arabic have to be submitted at Geneva in translation.

It requires more than mere transposition to turn

good Arabic into readable English or French, and the Arabs
of Palestine are unskilled in the art of presenting their
case in a foreign language.

The result is that the knowledge

possessed by the members of the Committee is visibly one-sided
and their examination of the working of the mandate reads
as though it was conducted for the most part by advocates of
the Zionist case.
The writer, as a native of that troubled part of the
wprld and as a student of international relations, believes

1V

that the study of the Palestine partition is beset with
peculiar difficulties.

In the first place, the material

is enormous and widely scattered.

In the second place, it

is to an unusual degree conflicting and inconsistent.

Third~

ly, a large proportion of it which on inspection appears
relevant and promising turns out, when sifted, to rest upon
false assumptions or questionable data.

Lastly, the passions

aroused by Palestine have done so much to obscure the truth
that the facts have become enveloped in a mist of sentiment,
legand and propaganda, which acts as a smoke-screen of almost inpenetrable density.
I do not claim that the present study has necessarily
mastered all those difficulties.

But I have been made

acutely aware of their existence by my research, and they
have led me to the conclusion that the most formidable obstacle to an understanding, and therefore to a solution,
of the Palestine problem lies not so much in its inherent
complexity as in the solid jungle of legend and propaganda
which has grown up around it.

To the ordinary tasks of a

student dealing with the facts is thus added an obligation
to deal with the pseudo-facts and dethrone them from their
illegitimate eminence.

It is as much his duty to expose

the fallacies as to assert the truth, and the duty is all
the more imperative as he is dealing with a tragedy, in
i·rhich innocent lives are being sacrificed every day and
human beings kept in anguish and suffering.

T

To discharge my responsibility properly and faithfully, I have presented this paper to the reader in a well
rounded and balanced shape, starting with a short introduction as an essential background to my theme.

The purpose

of this introduction is to orient the reader as to the
nature, origin and the development of the Palestine question.
This part shall be called Palestine and Power of Politics.
Part two is the main theme of this paper.

The United

Nations and the Partition of Palestine -- mainly the work
of the United Nations' Special

Corr~ittee

on Palestine which

offers the students of international relations a good lesson
in pressure of politics.
The first three chapters of this part deal with the
origin, composition, term of references, chairmanship, working committees and the decision of the jury (United Nations'
Special Committee on Palestine).
Chapter four is

viev~oints,

comments and attitudes of

the members of the committees and the parties involved.

It

is a critical evaluation of the United !rations' Special Committee on Palestine's decision.
Chapter five is the considerations and observ-ations.
It is another critical evaluation of the Committee's partition-plan in the light of -- Israel-- in the pattern of the
Hi ddl e East •
Chapter six is the conclusion in which I will elaborate
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the rebirth of Israel and the shifting of balance of power
in the 11iddle East as a result of the attitude of the big
powers who supported the Committee's partition-plan in the
United Nations' final decision.
Whatever the Committee's merits and shortcomings, the
present Israel Stateris a growing concern.

The relations

between Israel and the Arab countries appear to be characterized

b~

a "bad neighbor policy."

'Whether the Arabs

will admit the de facto existence of Israel and come to
settlement remains to be seen.

But time favors Israel, and

the longer it maintains itself the more difficult it will
become for the Arabs to ignore its existence.
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INTRODUCTION
PART I
PALESTINE AND POWER POLITICS
{THE ORIGIN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM}
CH.APTER I

Eal.estine and the Great Powers
Geographically Palestine is the heart of one of the
mQ.st important zones of political conflict in the world-the Near East.

The Ara.b-.Jewish question in Palestine can-

not be considered in a. vacuum.

It is surrounded by many

political forces that must be taken into account in attempting any solution of the problem.

These forces are the old

:famil.ia.r ones -- imperialism,. world politics and nationalism.
In

the Near Eastern area British, Russian, American, .Jewish

and Arab-MOslem interests meet.

As the most troublesome spot

111;f the area, Palestine is ip.evitably involved in any settlement affecting the Near East.
Great Britain and Palesinte
As a world power and empire, Great Britain has been

vitally concerned in the Near and Middle East.

The opening

of the Suez Canal in 1869 was one of the prominent links of
the chain binding England to the Near East.

All along the

Mediterranean-Suez -- Red Sea route to India and the Far East,
England has built and maintained security outposts -- Malta,
. Cy:prus, Egypt, and Aden are prominent examples.

That vital
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Kear Eastern zone she is endeavoring to protect from the
many forces that are today challenging her predominant
position there.
The Near East is strategically located on other communications systems besides the Suez Oana1 route.

Dry land

routes connecting Europe, Asia and Africa traverse this
area.

Russia has historically tried to open windows to the

Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean through the Near Eastern
wall.

Whether she will be successful in the future remains

to be seen.

During and since the recent war, air bases in

the Rear East have become of increasing importance to both
Great Britain and the United States.

Furthermore, the Near

East is rich in natural resources -- Egyptian cotton, Palestinian minerals from the Dead Sea, and petroleum.

Finally,

this area may become in the future an important market.
Great Britain, although facing many demands from a
rising Arab nationalism in recent years, still retains influence in practically every state in the Near East.

Be-

sides being the mandatory power in Palestine, She maintains
a very special position in independent Egypt where, under
treaty, she has;maintained troops since the nineteenth century.

She is negotiating at present time to withdraw from

Egypt and ·f'9r ·that· reason she is all the more reluctant to
surrender her other positions in the Near East.

Iraq and

the recently created independent Kingdom of Trans-Jordan

3

are in special. treaty relations with Great Britain which
per.mit the latter to maintain armed forces in these two
countries.

Klng Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia receives a sub-

sidy from the British government.

British oil interests

dominate southern Iran, Iraw, and KUwait.
France and Falestine
France has been largely squeezed out of Syria and Lebanon by the course of the recent war.

She (France) support-

ed the Zionist cause hoping to get a strategic hold in the
new state.
The U.

s. s.

R. and Palestine

One of the greatest pressures in the Near East is that
exerted by the Soviet Union.

Some have said that Great Brit-

ain might pull out of the Suez canal and come to terms with
Egypt if it were not for the shadow of the U • S.
ing over the Near Eastern lands.

s.

R. fall-

The historic drive of Russia.

towards warm water ports is too familiar to describe here.
There has been a decided change in the Soviet attitude
towards Palestine.

After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917

Zionism in Russia was persecuted more than any other nati. onal
movement.

Hebrew was the only language considered counter-

revolutionary in itself, and it was officially outlawed. AntiSemitism, however, was forbidden.

The reason for this is that

Zionism was looked upon as the ally and spearhead of British
imperialism.

This ally of Great Britain could not be tolerated

4

in the

u. s. s.

R.tl)

Then came the 1939 White Paper and the war.

Zionism

Very

was no longer so closely wedded to the British Empire.

significantly in October 1943,. Ivan Maisky, Vice-Commissar
of Foreign .Af'fairs, paid the first Soviet visit to Palestine.
During the Nazi invasion, for the first time Russian Jewry
was allowed to make contact with and appeal to world JeW!Y•
In january, 1944, an exhibition showing the progress of the
Jews in Palestine was admitted in M0scow.(2)

In February,

1945, at a Trade Union Conference in London the Soviet delegate voted for a resolution supporting Palestine as a home•

•

•

land for the ~ews.(3)

'

II

And so the examples multiply of the

Soviet wooing of Palestine.

That there may be grounds for

cooperation on the Jewish side is seAn in the partly socialized character of the Jewish agricultural economy in Palestine -- the collective and cooperative farms, and in the
fact that so many of the Palestinian jews are from Russia or
other lands at present under Russian control.(4)

(1) Elia.hu Ben-HOrin, "The Soviet· Wooing of Palestine",
Harper's Magaz~ne,_ April 1944, p. 414.
(2}

Ibid., :Pil• 415-416.

(3) Grant s. MCClellan, "Palestine and America's Role· in
the :Middle East," Foreign Policy Reports, july 1, 1945,p.l01.
(4)

Ben-HOrin, op.

cit.~

p. 418.
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Ear have the Soviets overlooked the Mnslems.

The BOl-

sheviks have increased their interest in the MOslem culture,
languages and religion and have stressed the unity of MOslems in Russia. wi th_those abroad.

Russia has recently es-

tablished diplomatic relations with several of the Arab
states.

In 1944 pilgrims for the first time traveled from

the Soviet Union to Meoca.(5)

Verbally, the

u.s. s.

R.

supports Arab demands of independence but distrusts the Arab
League a.s a British creation.
Russia was very concerned with the conflict; For one
thing she could hope to establish a military foothold.

Other

important reasons for their support to the Jews are:
1.

They hoped to win new friends among the
Zionist in the Western World, as well as
in Palestine.

2.

Russia wanted to see British influence and
above all, British Military power weakened
in the Middle East.

3.

Russia
in the
States
Russia

4.

Soviet experts believed that partition was
certain to bring chaos and violence to the
Mlddle East, which it did, and Russia will
benefit from that chaos.

wanted to damage American influence
Middle East by encouraging the United
and backing her in the Jewish support.
is looking for the oil of Saudia Arabia.

The Arab leaders had declared more than once that if
the United States will continue supporting the Jews, sooner

(5)

MeClellan, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
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or

~ater

they will be on the Soviet side.

Zionists are

using the same argument, that unless the United States will
give them fUll support in the form of le,ansl

:$500,ooo,ooo,

arms and political backing, Israel will turn pro-Russian.
Depending on the course of events, either the Arabs or the
Zionists may prove right.

What the Russians are hoping, of

course, is that they will both prove right.(6)
The United States and Palestine
Because of the large and influential Jewish population
in the United States it was natural for the Zionists to turn
their attention to this country almost from the inception of
their movement.

The role which the United States has played

in world affairs since 1914 made it necessary for them to obtain America's endorsement of their program, and if possible,
its active support.

They have succeeded in both.(?)

Politically, the Zionists have secured the American endorsement of their program as expressed in campaign statements which were merely to secure the Jewish votes, and prevailed to throw the weight of its influence on their side
and sponsor

their demands.

On August 31, 1918, President

Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration as contained

{6) Kermit Roosevelt Arab's Oil and History (New York:
Harper Brothers, 1949~, p. 247.
(7)

Ibid., pp. 84, 99, 178, 198.
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in the following letter addressed to Rabbi Stephen

s.

Wise,

•I have watched with deep and sincere interest the
of the Zionist movement in the United States
and in the Allied countries since the declaration by Mr.
::Be.lfour, on behalf o1!. the English Government of Great
Britain's approval of the establishment in Palestine of
a National Home for the Jewish people." (8)

~regress

President Warren G. Earding said on June 1, 1921;
"It is impossible for one who ha• studied at all
the services of the Hebrew people to avoid the faith
that they will one day be restored to their historic
national home and there enter on a new and yet greater
phase of their contribution to the advance of humanity. (9)
President Calvin Coolidge on June 13, 1924, declared:
"I have so many times reiterated my interest in
this great movement that anything which I might add
would be a repetition of former statements, but I afu
nevertheless glad to have this opportunity to express
again my sympathy with the deep and intense longing
which finds such fine expression in the Jewish National Homeland in Palestine," (10)
President Herbert Hoover on September 21, 1928, asserted:
"I have watched with genuine admiration the steady
and unmistakable progress made in the rehabilitation of
Palestine •••• It is very gratifying to note that many
American Jews, Zionists as well as non-Zionists, have
rendered such splendid service to this cause which merits the sympathy and moral encouragement of everyone."(ll)

{8)

(New

·Ray s.

Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Lett ere, Vol. VIII,
!372 ff.

Yo~:k,. 1939) ,pp.

(9) Charles R. Gellent, 'The Palestine Problem, (Washington,
D.C.: The Library of Congress, ~~rch 1; 1947}, p. 111.
(10) Ibid,, p. 112,
(11) Ibid., p. 112.

B
.....

At the time Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York
was campaigning for the presidency in 1932 he wrote to President

~rris

Rothenberg of the Zionist Organization of Amer-

ica clarifying his position aw to the Balfour Declaration and
endorsing it,(l2)
In 1938 President Roosevelt wrote a letter to Mayor
Thomas .T. Spella;cy of Hartford on October 19 in which he expressed his sympathy with the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.(l3)
During the election of 1944, to get the Jewish votes as
usual, the Democratic National Convention announced,
We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted
Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy
as to result in the establishment there of a free and
democratic Jewish Common Wealth. (14)
On October, 1944, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate for president, issued a statement endorsing
the Zionist plans of his party and declaring that he was for
the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and Democratic Jewish Common Wealth,
On October 15, 1944, President Roosevelt announced:
With the Traditional American Policy, I am convinced that the American people should give their
support to this aim, and if reelected I shall help to
bring about its realization. (15)

(12)

!Hl

Ibid,, p. 112.
Ibid,, p. 112.
Ibid., p. 113.
Ibid., p. 113.
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Immediately following President Roosevelt's death,
the Zionists trained their guns on his successor, Harry

s.

Truman and a week later newspaper readers were told that
the problem of Palestine was upper-most in the president's
mind, and was claiming more of his attention than any other.
He declared:

"I am communicating directly with the British
Government in an effort to have the doors of Palestine opened to those displaced persons who wish to
go there. (16)
Yet 1946 was an election year, and some stand would have to
be taken.

On October 4, President Truman again issued a

statement calling for the immediate admission of 100,000
~ews

to Palestine.

He also supported the Jewish Agency pro-

posal for the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of
its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area
of Palestine.(l7)
The story behind this statement is simple and was partially reported at that time.(l8)

Messrs. Mead and Lehman,

good Democrats, were waging a losing campaign for Governor
and Senator respectively in New York State.

Political leaders

believe, though this has never been tested, the Zionist in

(16) R. W. Thompson, The Palestine Problem.(London: Andrew
Melrose, 1947), p. 91.
(17)

New York
Times, Oct. 5, 1946, p. 2.
c

(18)

See the article by James Reston in New York times of

Oct. 7, 1946, :p. 4.

--

--·.
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New York would vote as a bloc and might win or lose an
election.

In the heat of the campaign, Mead and Lehman

informed the White House that a statement favoring Zionism must be made immediately, for Dewey, Mead's opponent,
was reported to be on the point of issuing one himself.(l9)
The White HOuse referred the matter for drafting to the
State Department, but was not satisfied with the State Department's first effort.

Meanwhile New York called again:

if President Truman did not issue a statement, Mead and Lehman would do so, publicly calling upon Mr. Truman to support
it.

Working under great pressure - domestic polititical

pressure logically unrelated to Palestine - the October 4
statement was produced.
It was diwturbing because it emphasized, more dramatically than ever before, but not for the first time, the
blatent way in which local political concerns may determine
American foreign policy.

Even the timing was obvious - not

only close to election day, but on the eve of an important
Jewish religious festival.

Many Jews deplored this appeal

to deep religious sentiment for obviously political purposes.
The final act in the partition of Palestine was played
out at the General Assembly in the fall of 1947.

On October

11, the United States delegation declared itself, with a few

(19)

New York Times, Oct. 7, 1946, p. 5.

,.
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reservations, in favor of the plan for partition as submitted

b,y

the United Nation's Special Committee.

The present course of world crisis will increasingly
force upon Americans the realization that their national
interests and those of the JeWish State in Palestine are
going to conflict.

It is to be hoped that American Zion-

ists and non-Zionists alike will come to grips with the
realization of the problem.(20)

Mr. Kermit Roosevelt has

expressed his concern in these words:
"If the future of our position in the Middle East is
dark, at least the lesson to be learned from the Palestine
case is clear.

The process by which Zionist Jews have been

able to promote American support for the partition of Palestine demonstrates the vital need of a foreign policy based
on national rather than partisan interests.

A Palestine

Zionist, indeed may dismiss the Russian threat to the United
States from his considerations, but an American may not, even
if he is a Zionist, and as every American Zionist should think
of himself as an American first, so should every Democrat and
Republican.

Only when the National interests of the United

States, in their highest terms, take precedence over all other
considerations, can a logical, forseeing foreign policy be

(20) Kermit Roosevelt, "The Palestine Partition of Palestine", The Fuddle East Journal, Jan., 1948, p. 6.
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evo1ved.

Be American political leader has the right to

promiee American interest to gain partisan votes.

eo~~

The role

the United States assumed in the Palestine question is not
the responsibility of Zionists alone, but of each American
citizen."(21)
As to the attitude of the State Department, Crum, a United

States member of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine,
courageously stated that during his mission he was given a
secret file from the State Department, the existence of which
apparently not even president Truman had known.

According to

this file, since 1938, each time a promise was made to American Jewry regarding Palestine, the State Department promptly sent a message to the Arab rulers discounting it and

re~

assuring them, in effect, that regardless of what was promised publicly to the Jews, "nothing would be done to change
the situation in Palestine".

This File, according to Crum,

confirmed the charge of double-dealing that had been hurled
at both the United States and Great Britain.(22)
President

T~uman's

had nothing to lose.

interference is understandable; he

lie receives the gratitude of all the

Jews of America, but none of the Arabs' hatred, for there
are few in the United States.

It is as if Britain, to please

her African Colonies interfered with the

Ame~ican

color ques-

tion.

(21)

Ibid., p. 16.

(22) Bartely c. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain,(Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1947,)p. 36.
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Palestine in Near Eastern Politics
Although small in size, Palestine has been a much
coveted land, together with Syria, of which was a part
until 191.4,

Palewtine has been the meeting places of Asia,

Africa and Europe, the East and the West.

It has been the

bridge of empire, the highway of commerce, the crossroads of
the world.
Palestine is too small a country.
to a county than a country.

It is closer in size

Its total area was ten thousand

four hundred thirty square miles, about the size of the State
of Vermont.

You can circle it in an automobile between break-

fast and dinner.

From 10,000 feet in the air you can see:· all

of it with the naked eye.

It is only 160 miles long, with

?0 miles wide at the broadest point.
Three Faiths
The Pope announced in 194? that Palestine does not belong either to the Jews or to the Arabs, but that it belongs
to every Christian, and every Christian nation, and on behalf
of the Catholics all over the world he demanded that Palestine should be an international state under the United Nations
rule.
But to the Jews of Palestine, it is the land of Israel
and they believe that Jehovah gave it to Abraham;for God
said, "Unto thy seed will I give this Land."
arose the Temple of Solomon.
the prophets.

In Jerusalem

Here was the native soil of

Here are the sanctified places associated with
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their lives.
For the MOslems, Palestine is the second sacred place
after Mecca and Medina.

They believe that their great pro ...

phet, MOhammed, once made a miraculous night-ride on an enchanted steed, from Mecca to the Haram esh-shariff (a holy
place in Jerusalem) and then through the heavens with the
angel Gabriel, back to the Haram, and once more through the
skies to Mecca.
The General Assembly has requested the Special Committee
"to give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity."
The wor4ing of the above request clearly indicates that
the General Assembly had in mind not only the religious interests of three faiths whose millions of believers are
spread over the world.

For those believers Palestine is

Holy Land, because it is

associate~

with the origin and his-

tory of their respective religions, because it contains sites
and shrines which they hold in particular veneration, and because close to and associated with many of those sites and
shrines there are religious, eduqational and

eleemoysna~

establishments which the communities concerned wish to preserve.
Strategically, Palestine is a vital outpost against any
threat to the Suez Canal.

It is in the heart of the oil-rich

Middle East, the mastery of which may well be a decisive factor in the struggle between the Western Democracies and the
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Communistic Slavic Countries.
There is no other section in the world that has the
same amount of minerals as does the Dead Sea.
tassium Chloride.)

(PCL : Po-

If all the nations of the world would

use PCL from the Dead Sea, they would need one thousand
years to exhaust it.
The chief attraction of the Middle East of which Palestine is a part lies, however, not so much in its wealth,
as in its geographic position.

The Eastern Mediterranean,

the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf -- the most vital sea routes
in world trade and communications depend on the Ydddle East.
It is the "Grand Central" of the world.
The Middle East has been a much coveted land.(~3) Russian, German, British, French, and Italian, imperialists of
every brand all turned to the Middle East in their search
for conquest and aggrandizement.
crossroad.

The Middle East is a mighty

He who holds that crossroad, can forbid the pas-

sage of commerce and of military supplies from Europe to Asia
or Africa.

The Middle East invented the wheel on which mod-

ern civilization is built, and it is now supplying oil to keep
that wheel turning.(24)

(23) E. Ben-Horin, The }liddle East, (New York:
Co., Inc., 1943),p. 11.

w.w.

Norton &

(24} F1fty percent of the world's oil is in the Middle East
and thirty-two percent in the United States. The production
of one barrel is $.06 in the Middle East, while it is from
$1.50 to %3.00 in the United States. One well in Iran produces as much as 800 wells in the United States; one well in
Saudi Arabia produces as much as 1,000 wells in the United States.
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No European aggressor, whether Germany or Russia nowt
can march its armies into the oil lands, and the Dead Sea,
or the treasure house of Africa, except through the Itiddle
East.
The sea route from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean
passes through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the
Red Sea..
Two of the three major Asiatic routes run through the
Arab East.(25)

They are the shortest, cheapest, and safest

routes -- Suez and the Palestine-Syrian Seaboard.
is through Turkey.

The third

Hence, the Arab East provides one of the

world's most important routes.
The air routes which link Europe with India, Ceylon,
Burma, Malaya, South China, and Australia are dependent on
refueling bases in Syria, Egypt, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.
To paraphrase a geopolitician of the past generation,
lfWho controls the Middle East, controls the World Islands; and
who controls the World Islands, controls the world."

(25) The Arab East consists of the Arabian Peninsula, the
countries of the fertile crescent and Egypt; see, Problems
of the Middle East,-American Christian Palestine Committee,
New York University, 194?, p. 1.
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CHAPTER II
WAR PROMISES
Conflicting Promises -- The Creation of the Problem
When World War I began, the British Government immediately realized that the Turks and their German Allies could
attack its life line with a double-barreled weapon.

They

could make Palestine the base for a military campaign against
the Suez Canal.

They could get the Turkish Sultan who was

also Caleph, or religious leader, of all Mohammedans to proclaim a holy war against the Allies.

Thus all MDslems from

11orocco to India might be induced to take up arms against
Great Britain in the hope that, dying, they would win eternal salvation.

For was it not written that,

Whosoever falls in b~ttle, his sins will be forgiven; at the day of judgment his wounds shall be resplendent as vermilion and ordoriferous as musk and
the loss of his limbs shall be supplied by the wings
of angels and cherubims.(l)
The Turks fired both barrels, and the call was issued
in the first month of Turkey's entry into vrar.

First came

the Fetva ( a Fetva, in Arabic is FatiwaJ it is a formal
pronouncement made by the appropriate theological authority
on matters involving the interpretation of the Canon Law)(2)

(l)

Caught from memory.

(2)

Dr. Shiek Abo-Elusser Abideen, Issool Ashariha,(Islamic

Law), (Damascus: Syrian University Press, 1939), p. 3.

18

rendered by the Sha.ikhal-Islam on the seventh of November,
in which that dignitary, the highest theological official
in the Ottoman Empire, declared it a sacred personal duty
on all MOslems in the world, including
the rule of Great Britain, France, or

tho~e
Ru~sia,

living under
to unite a•

gainst those three enemies of Islam; to take up arms against
them and their allies; and to refuse in all circumstances,
even with the death penalty, to assist the governments of
the Entente in their attacks on the Ottoman Empire and its
German and Austro-Hungarian defenders.

Then came the Sul-

tan proclamation to the army and the fleet, issued on the
eleventh, in which he e.xhorted them to fight for the liberation of enslaved Islam as well as in the defence of a
threatened Empire; lastly, there was the manifesto to the
MOslem world, issued on the twenty-third over the signatures
of the Shaikhal-Islam and of the twenty-eight other religiouw
dignitaries.

The Sultan stated in the manifesto, "I command

that his manifesto be distributed in all the Moslem countries."

It called upon all the Moslems of the world, whether

subjects of the Entente Powers or not to obey the injunctions

.

of the Holy Book as interpreted by the sacred Fetva, and participate in the defence of Islam and the Holy Places.

But

the attack on the Suez Canal fell flat and the holy war,when
it was proclaimed, proved to be a dud.
One reason for this failure was that the Arabic-speaking
inhabitants of Syria and Arabia were discontented under the
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Turkish yoke and were therefore not at all eager to fight
for their masters.

Thus when the Sultan-Caleph proclaimed

the Holy War, the Arabian King Hussein refused to allow it
to be preached in the mosques of the Holy Cities.

He took

no further action and the next move came from the British
side.
The British.hoped they might persuade the Arabs and
their King Hussein to start a rebellion against the Turkish
Government.

For that reason Britain opened negotiations with

King Hussein.

She promised that the independence of the Ar·

abian Peninsula and Syria would be assured when peace was made.
Sir Henry McMahon, then High Commissibner in Egypt, on
behalf of the British Government, wrote to Sharif Hussein and
assured him in return for his help and pledge, that England
had promised to recognize an independent and united Arab
State east of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
entered the war in 1916.

The Arabs

They worked from Arabia under Fei-

sal (Hussein's son) and Lawerance.

That the Arabs rendered

the Allied cause valuable assistance and completely fulfilled their side of the bargain has never been questioned.

The

only point under dispute is whether the British pledge included Palestine or not.
and

Mc1~on

The correspondence between Hussien

which began in July,l915 and ended in January,

1916, is too long and complicated to examine here.

For over

twenty years the British Government refused to publish the
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correspondence.

The correspondence was finally released to

the world in 1939.(3)
Part of the publication is as follows:
wrote Sir Henry on

~uly

King Hussein

18, 1915, outlining the terms on

which he was willing to lead an Arab revolt against Turkey.
His first condition was the following:
England was to acknowledge the independence of
the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Messina
and Adana up to the 370 of latitude, up to the borders of Persia, on the sofith by the Indian Ocean,
with the exception of Aden to remain as it is, and
the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.
England is to approve of the proclamation of an Arab
Khalifate of Islam.(4)
::art O·f the McMahon letter of October 24, 1915 to King
Hussein is as follows:
I am empowered in the name of the Government of
Great Britain to give you the following awsurance and
make the following reply to your letter. Subject to
the above modification Great Britain is prepared to
recognize and support the independence of the Arabs
within the territories included in the limits and
boundaries proposed by the Sheriff of 1-!ecca. (5)
The Sykes-Picot Agreement
NO sooner had Sir McMahon clinched his bargain with
Sheriff Hussein than conversations were opened by Great Britain with France and Russia.

The French delegate was F. George

Picot, who had served in Syria as consul prior to the War, and

(3)

Maugham Robin, op. cit., p. 29.

(4) Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39, The Hussein-McMahen
Correspondence, "Antonius," pp. 164-183. See Appendix I.
(5)

See Appendix. Ne: I.
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and Sir

V~rk

Sykes.

The two delegates together with Russia

drew up a scheme dividing what they had promised to be an
independent country under Hussein.

It was thus divided up

into what we call today Syria, Lebanon (which was given to
France); Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan (which was given
to Great Britain).

White Russia obtained Eryerum, Trebizond,

Van Bi ttis and tae Southern Part of Kurdi stan.
The Sykes-Picot Agreement has two aims:

(1)

It was t.o cut up the Arab land in such a
manner as to place artificial obstacles
in the way of unity.

(2)

Another aim was self interest in a land
full of riches and oil. (6)

So everyone of the three powers had helped himself to
generous slices of the Sultan's dominions.(?)

Teachers al-

ways make it a point when they teach history in the Middle
East to say that "England has betrayed the Arabs".

I was

told tlus in the fourth grade.
The Balfour Declaration
England had made a third agreement as a promise.
1917 the AJ.lied cause was desperate.

In

Russia ,.;as dropping out

(6) Library of Congress, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 50,
The Palestine Problem (Washington, D.C., March 1, 1947), p. 20.
D. George, The Truth_Abo~t the Peace Treaties, Vol. II,
London, 1938, J;>,.. 1038.
See: H. W''~Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference
of Paris, Vol.~ (London, 1926), pp. 13-17.
(7) Russia's part in the agreement was terminated by the Bolshevik Revolution. See Library of Congress, Palestine Problem,
p. 20.

of the War, and the United States had not yet entered the
war, and Britain and France needed every ounce of available aid.

As a result Britain wanted to secure the propa-

ganda support of the Zionists and the wholehearted support
in Europe and the United States.

More than this, Britain

was trying to get in on the ground floor by fore-stalling
the enemy, for Germany too was holding out tempting bait to
the Zionists.
estine.

It was proposed that the Jews should have Pal-

But it was too late for Germany and Britain had al-

ready captured Palestine.
the Zionists.

Britain made another bargain with

Arthur James Balfour, as a foreign secretary

on behalf of Britain and Dr. Chaim Weizmann as the Zionist
spokesman made an agreement as follows (from Balfour to Lord
Rothschild), Nov. 8, 1917:
I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf
of his Majesty's Government the following declaration of
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been
submitted to and approved by the cabinet. His Majesty's
Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will
use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement
of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious
right of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,
or rights and political status enjoy~ by Jews in any
other country. I should be grateful if you would bring
this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. (8)

(8)

Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, p. 6.
United Nations World, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May, 1947).
See: Parliament Debate, House of Commons, p. 1248.
See: W. Henry Cooke and Edith l?. Stickney, Readings in
Euro ean International Relations Since 1879, (New York: Harp·er Brothers Publishers, 1931 , p. 5 3 8 . -
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The United States Government for a while waw prevented
from publicly endorsing the Balfour Declaration because it
was not at ,.rar with Turkey.

But after the necessary break

vd th· Turkey was made, President Wilson endorsed the Balfour

Declaration in a letter to Rabbi Stephen

s.

Wise on August

31, 1918, in which he indicated his approval of the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Falestine.(9)
Whether the President was correct or not in his assumptions regarding the agreement of the "Allied Nations", he at
least made perfectly clear that the United States Government
was interpreting the phrase "national home 11 in a sense much
desired by the Zionists, that is, that Palestine should eventually contain a Jewish state.
In this connection there is often quoted as- favoring the
Arab side the twelfth of President Wilson's famous Fourteen
Points, outlined on January 8, 1918, concerning the Ottoman
Empire (which included Palestine).

It ran as follows:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the
other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous developl;lent •••• (10)

------------------'"-(9) Ray s. Baker; Woodrow Wilson, Life

and Letters, Vol.

Viii, (New York:. 1939), pp. 372-373.

(10) W. ~acDonald, Documentary Source Book of American His-

1Q.n:, (New York, 1926), p. 672. ·
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The Arabs have claimed that Wilson's promise of "autonomous development" applied to them and that this promise was
in conflict with the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour
Declaration.
The plain fact is that contradictory promises, of equal
importance, to the people concerned, were made by the British authorities and that in each case they were accepted in
good faith by the recipient.

The fears aroused, by both the

Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot agreement, caused a
group of seven representative Arabs in Cairo to address a
memorandum to the British Government.

In reply, the British:

Government quoted the proclamation made by the commander-inchief on the occasion of the capture of Jerusalem in December, 1917, only a month after the issuing of the Balfour Declaration.

In this proclamation it was officially stated:

That the policy of the British Government towards
Palestine was that the future government of that territory should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed. The Arab leade~s were assured
that this would always be the policy of his Hajesty'e
Government. (11)
On JUly 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great ends for which the
associated peoples of the world were fighting:
The settlement of every question, whether of

(11) The Future of Palestine, Arab Office, Imperial Central,
Geneva, 1947, p. 106.
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territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement,
or of political relationship upon the basis of the
free acceptance of that settlement by the people
immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the
material interest, or advantage of any other nation
of people which may desire a different settlement for
the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.(l2)
England hailed Wilson's Points but went ahead and divided
the country with France and promised the Zionist t.he National Home without consulting any of the inhabitants of that
country.
The Arabs protested against the allies' acts and the
division of their land into so many separate governments.
"Both measures were temporary expedients,"

General .Allenby

told,and assured the Arabs, "In the final settlement your
wishes shall be respected."
The news of the Balfour Declaration reached the Arab
world first in Egypt where it provoked a wave of protest.
When it reached Hussein, who by this time had assumea the
title of King of the Jejaz, he was greatly disturbed and asked for an explanation.

The British sent Commander David G.

Hogarth to confer with King Hussein in January, 1918, at
Jeddah.

Commander Hogarth's message was delivered orally,

but King Hussein wrote it down.

The Englishman assured the

King that "Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be
allowed in so far as would be consistent with political and

(12)

W. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 672.
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economic freedom of the Arab population.(l3)
The Meaning of the Balfour Declaration
There is no denying the momentous importance of the
Balfour Declaration.

It has stood, up to the present time,

as the basic document of the whole Palestine problem while
the others were hidden.

Jews, Arabs, the British and other

governments concerned have battled endlessly over its exact
meaning.

It has been interpreted to the advantage first of

one side.and then of the other, as the circumstances of the
situation demanded.

In the comments of the press at the time,

it is clear that some newspapers interpreted Balfour's statement as a promise that Palestine might possibly become, in
time, a Jewish state.(l4)

Such an interpretation has often

been accepted, especially by the Jews.

But as time advances,

interpretation of the Balfour Declaration proved not to be so
simple.

The British Government in particular later saw fit

to attach a more limited significance to its phraseology.
Of one thing there seems to be little doubt -- the document was carefully weighed by all parties concerned and
eve17 phrase and comma deliberated.

If there is vagueness

(13) Charles R. Gallner, The Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, op. cit., p. 11.
(14) See Sokolo'l...r, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 84097, for a selection of newspaper comment favorable to the Balfour Declaration.
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in its terms, it is not accidental •
• • • • In his Zionism. !vir. Leonard Stein says, "The
Balfour Declaration vras by no means a casual gesture. It was issued after prolonged deliberations
as a considered statement of policy." In Temperley's History of the Peace Conference of Paris, it
is stated that "before the British Government gave
the Declaration to the world, it had been closely
examined in all its bearings and implications, and
subjected to repeated change and amendment." M.
Nahum Sokolov, in his History of Zionism, in L.ondon
was tested by the Zionist Organization in America,
and every suggestion in America received the most
careful attention in London. 11 • • • Mr. Lloyd George
himself, speaking in Wales in 1930, assured his hearers, in curious terms, that the Declaration "was prepared after much consideration, not m·erely of its
policy but of its actual wording." (15)
Prince Faisal and the American Commission
In 191.9 Prince Faisal want to France to attend the
peace conference.

France did not recognize him and made it

clear to him that he was not welcome.

Faisal realized that

imperialism was threatening all the Arab lands.

Becoming

conscious of his own weakness and the big influence of the
Zionist; he told the delegates at the peace conference that
the Arabs wanted complete and immediate independence.

He

suggested an International Commission to be sent to Syria.
The American President supported Faisal according to his
doctrrne.

He named Dr. Henry

c.

King and

~tt.

Charles R.

Crane as United States representative to the proposed commission.

(15)

But Clemeneau and Lloyd George did not agree and blocked
J .1'1.1{. J'effriiis 1 ·~&;}est~_!! ~lte )~e~li ty. (LondoJil: 1939)

P. 172

\
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the move.

President Wilson sent his representatives alone.

They spent the summer of

191~

in Syria .. and Palestine and re-

turned \vi th a report which bears witness to their keen foresight and coura.ge.(l6)
In the report the Arabs wanted complete independencet
but might accept the mandate for a limited time, on condition
that the mandate will be entrusted to the United States.
A national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent
to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the reaction
of such a. Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest
trespassing upon the civil and religious rights of existing
non-Jewish comr.mnities in Palestine.

There would then be no

reason why Palestine could not be included in a United Syrian
State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places
being cared for by an international and inter-religious commission somewhat as at present, under approval of the mandatory and the League of Nations.

The Jews of course, would

have representatives upon this commission.
On April 25, 1920 at the San Remo meeting of the Allied
Supreme Council, consisting of Great Britain, France, and
Italy, it was decided to give the mandate over Iraq, TransJordan, and Palestine to Britain, and those over Syria and

(16) Memorandom by His }fujesty's Government, Political History of Palestine, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 2.
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Lebanon to France.

This decision was announced on May 5,

in the year of 1920.

In July, 1922, the Council of the

League of Nations, which Great Britain then dominated, ratified the draft mandate for Palestine, and other parts of
the Arab lands, that had been submitted to the League.(l7)
Examining the Palestine mandate itself, we can see
Great Britain has been commissioned by the League to rule
in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration.

The keynote pro-

vision reads:
The mandatory shall be responsible for placing
the country under such political, administrative and
economic conditions as will secure the establishment
of ~he Jevnsh National Home and the development of
self-governing institution, and also for safeguarding
the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants
of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.(l8)
It is not an easy job to get another people to live· in
somebody else's land.

Moreover, the mandatory power was to

encourage local self-government (which she never did).

It

was to recognize an appropriate Jewish agency as a public
body to advise and cooperate with the governing authorities
of Palestine, and to assist the development of the National
Home.

Jewish immigration was to be facilitated, but the

rights and positions of other sections of the population were

(17)

Library of Congress, Palestine Problem, 6p. cit., p. 27.
See UN World, Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947.

(18)

Memorandom by His Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 1.
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not to be injured thereby.

The Jews were to be encouraged

to settle closely on the land, to develop and improve the
soil so that many more people could earn their living on a
given plot.
English, Arabie and
official languages.

Hebr~v

were all declared to be the

Three languages and three Sabbaths, Fri.

day for the }fuslems, Saturday for the Jews, and Sunday for
the Christians -- in a district the size of New Hampshire.
The root of the trouble in Palestine was that England
put its military government in.'force and not a Palestinian
government.

All powers were centered around the British High

Commissioner and his deputies.
cept the mandate.

There was no constttution ex-

England from the beginning never tried to

unite the Arabs and Jews, and to end the division between the
rival races.
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CHAPTER III
IMPERIALISM IN ACTION
Blood Shed, Commissions and White Papers
The Hilitary Committee
Feeling that Great Britain had betrayed them, the Arabs
for the first time in their history resorted to violence against the Jews.

In April, 1920, five Jews were killed and

over 200 injured. in a clash between Telavi v and Jaffe.

A

Ydlitary Committee of Inquiry (the Civil Administration was
not then established) found that the causes of the outbreak
were:

(1)

The disappointment of the Arabs at the nonfulfillment of the promises mf independence
which had been given to them during the first
war.

(2)

The belief of the Arabs that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of selfdetermination.

(3)

A propaganda from outside with the growth of
nationalism.

In May 1921, a year later, more serious attacks made by
the Arabs on the Jews of Jaffa and five rural settlements.
On this occasion forty-seven Jews were killed and 146 wounded.
A commission of inquiry, headed by Sir Thomas Haycraft, reached
the conclusion that:
(1)

Great Britain, when she took over the administration,
of Palestine, was led by the Zionists to adopt a
policy mainly directed toward the establishment of a
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national home for the Jews and not to the equal
benefit of all Palestinians. (1)
In 1922 Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, issued
a statement of policy, The White Paper of 1922, in which his
1'1ajesty's Government pointed out and defined the limits of
the Jewish National Home and the functions of the Jewish Agency, assuring the Arabs that it was not the intention of Great
Britain to submerge them or their language and culture, or
saddle them with Jewish nationality.

But the Arabs remained

unreconciled to Zionism.
In 1924 violence flared again, and again it was quickly
put down by the British.

The Arabs refused to be reassured

by statements of principle which failed to face the implications of incessant immigration of Zionist influence.

But

still nothing was done to remove the cause of trouble.
In August, 1929, Arabs and Jews again clashed.

Before

the British could restore order 135 Jews and 116 Arabs had been
killed, and 339 Jews and 232 Arabs wounded.
London at last took notice of the weriousness of the situation and appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir Walter Shaw to study the situation and the cause of the trouble.
The commission went to the Holy Land, surveyed conditions
there, listened to both Arabs and Jews, questioned government

(1) Memorandom by His Britannic Majesty's Government, The
Political History of Palestine under British AdministratiOn,
Palestine: 1947, Presented to the UN Special Committee~on
Palestine, p. 3.

33

officials, then returned to London.

The commission said:

The fundamental cause of violence and fighting
is the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards
the Jews, the disappointment of their political and
national aspiration and fear of their economic future.{2)
In less than ten years three serious attacks have been
made by the Arabs on the Jews.

Eighty years before the first

of these attacke there is no recorded instance of any similar
incidents.

The Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigra-

tion not only a menance to their livelihood but a possible
overlord of the future.
In October, 1930, the British Government issued a White
Paper in which they pointed out the following:
The capacity of the country to absorb new immigration ~ust be judged in relation to Arab as well as
Jewish unemployment. fhe obligation to facilitate
Jewish immigration and to encourage close wettlement
by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of
the mandate. His Majesty's Government does not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories.(3)
In its report to the Council of the League of Nations,
the mandat.es commiseion criticized the mandatory gover:runent
for not having concerned itself more actively with the social
and economic development of the country.

The increase in

Jewish immigration from 1933 was accompanied by an intensification
.

.

(2)

Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1930, cmd. 3530,p.3.
~UN World Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947.

(3)

See Britannic l~jesty's Government, op. cit., p. 13.
Great Britain ~arliamentary Papers, op. cit., pp. 11-14.
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of Arab political activity. (4)
In October 1933, the ArGb Executive proclaimed a gen-

eral strike and organized a demonstration outside the
ernment offices in J·erusalem.

go~

The demonstrators clashed

with the police and during the next few weeks other riots
took place in Jaffa, Nablus, Haifa, and again in Jerusalem.
The disturbance of 1933 differed from those of 1920 and 1929,
in that they were directed not against the Jews but against
the mandatory government which was accused of tilting the
balance against the Arabs in its administration of the mandate.
It was hoped that sooner or later the Arabs would be
reconciled to Zionism, thus the British and Zionists policy
was based upon that hope.

So it

~ms

desirable to postpone

the grant of self-governing institutions until such time as
the Arab attitude had changed.

Its genuine self-government

was est8,blished immediately while the Arab majority was inflexible OPI)osed to Zionism, that would make impossible the
fulfillment of British obligation to the Zionist.
In 1936, the Arab national committee ordered a general
strike to begin April 22, and to continue until Great Britain altered its policy.

Two weeks later the same committee

called on the Arabs to refuse to pay taxes.

Violence flared

in many parts of Palestine; the pipe lines which carry the
Iraq oil to Haifa was punctured repeatedly.

Hundreds of
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Arabs were herded into ordinary jails and collective fines
were levied against villages.

The seemingly unsuccessful

strike, in which the entire Arab population, MOslem as well
as Christian, participated, continued.
Military reinforcements began to ar'riv e in May, and by
\

September there were two British divisions in the country.
The high commissioner was empowered to establish a military
tribunal.

The government refused to listen to the "Arab

case" or to offer any concession in return for the cessation
of the strike and the restoration of order.
A Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Peel,
was appointed in August 1936, with the task to investigate
and recommend a way out of the dilemma.

It also sent Gener-

al Dill with an additional division of troops to quell the
disturbance. (4)
The Royal Commission reported that the underlying causes
of the disturbance were:
(1)

The desire of the Arabs for national independence.

(2)

Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the
Jewish immigration and the national home.(5)

(4) The Round Table (A Quarterly Review of the Politics of
the British Commonwealth): "Palestine the Wider Hope", Vol.
L{IX, December 1938, pp. 252-277.
{5)
97.

L

Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1937, op. cit., PP• 89,
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As a solution, the commission offered a complicated

plan to partition the country into two separate and independent states -- one Arab, one Jewish, with a British zone
between•

The Arab State was to be set up in Samaria and

Judea and the Southern desert.

The Jewish Sta.te was to be

set up in Galilee and on the Philistine Plain. The British
area was to include Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with a corridor
to Jaffa on the coast.

This suggestion was hailed by the

British Government as an excellent way out of the Palestine
dilemma. (6}
On September 14, 1937, the British Foreign Secretary
requested the council of the League of Nations to approve
the proposed partition of Palestine.

On September 16, the

League Council adopted the resolution, and asked the mandatory to prepare a detailed plan for the partition of Palestine.
In February 1938, a technical commission was appointed
under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead.

The commission

arrived in Palestine on the 27th of April and left on the
3rd of August.

In a White Paper issued vii th the report of

the partition commission, his

~~fu.jesty's

Government announced:

They have reached the conclusion that his further
examination has shown that the political administrative
and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to

(?)

For convenient summary of the Peel Report See Great BritPalestine Royal Commission, SummaEY of Report (Colonial
135), London 1937.
a~n~
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create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem
is impracticable. (7)
The British

Gove~nment

announced a policy which accom-

panied the publication of the Woodhead report, that suggested
an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews might be possible.
On February 17, 1938, the London Conference was attended
on the one side by representatives of the Arabs of Palestine
and of the Government of Egypt, Iraq, Saudia Arabia, and Yemen, and on the other hand the Jewish Agency for Pa.lestine.
Since the Arabs maintained.their refusal to recognize the Jewish Agency, it was necessary tq organize two separate conferences, an Anglo-Arab and the other Anglo-Jewish.

The British

Delegation presented proposals similar to those which were
subsequently published in the White Paper

(}~y

1939).

They

were rejected by the Jews in principle, and no agreement t·tas
reached. (8)
The Arabs were aroused by the partition plan and they
were driven to des?eration with the policy of the mandatory
and with the continued influx of the Jews and the passage of

(7)

Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1937, op. cit., p. 3.
See also Round Table: "Palestine A Leaf Turned", ll1'arch
1939, p. 457.
See Congressional .Records - House, February 24, 1947. Vol.
93, Part 1, p. 1392.
( 8)

Memorandum by His lvfaj esty' s Government, op. cit • , p. 26.
See New York Times, Feb. 3, 1947, pp. 8, 4.
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land into Jewish hands.
a final showdown.

They decided to stake everything on

Bands of men attacked the British in var-

ious parts of Palestine.

Considerable numbers of young men

from the neighboring states crossed the borders to join the
Arab guerrillas in the hills of the Holy Land.
The British a.ns'\ltered with a mighty show of force.

The

police and the army timi ts in the country were thrown into
action, more troops arrived in Palestine, military la'd was
declared, and curfew imposed.

}fure Arab leaders were arrest·

ed or exiled.
The guerrilla Arab bands became more organized, and arms
and money were smuggled across the frontiers into Palestine.
Rebel courts were established for the trial of Arabs accused
of disloyalty to the national cause.

Travel was forbidden by

the mandatory without prior authorization.

The imposition of

a collective fine on Arab communities became more frequent.
Innocent men were shot on the slightest suspicion.
homes were destroyed by British troops.

Over ltOOO

The Arabs continued

to resist by conducting a psychological campaign which proved
both annoying and embarrassing to the British.

In an endeavor

to win the sympathy of the British tommies, the Arabs told
them the reason for their :cebellion and assured them that
their only quarrel with the British was the pro-Zionist policy
of the Government.

This appeal was so successful that sold-

iers were forbidden to associate

\~th

the Arabs.

The Arabs
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found other ways to present their case to the troops.

Little

boys managed to enter the army camps and sell the soldiers
fruit ,.,rapped in paper containing a printed statement of the
Arab case.

School children wearing tin pans for helmets and

using tin kettles for drums mimicked the troops as they went
through their drill and maneuvers, making them acutely conscious of the fact that they (British) were fighting an unarmed and helpless people.
In some

to\~s,

the Arabs conducted funeral services for

"British Justice" and solemnly escorted the coffin to its
grave in a fitting procession.
Thousands of English soldiers disagreed with the government on her policy.

They sent many letters back to Eng-

land telling how they were sent there to be killed for the
cause of Zionism.

H. G. 'Nells described British feeling in

these weirds:
In England there is a growing irritation at the
killing and wounding of British soldiers and Arabs in
pitched battles fought because of this Zionist idea.
They are beginning to feel that if they are to be history-ridden to the extent of restoring a Jewish State
that was extingu1shed nearly two thousand years ago,
they might just as well go back another thousand years
and sacrifice their sons to restore the Canaanites and
Philistines.(9)
Finally on May 1939, England feared an anti-English movement in the Middle East.

(9)

His MB.jesty's Government determined

Liberty, December 24, 1938, p. 67.

I.
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to put an end to the bloodshed in the Holy Land.

She de-

cided to impose her own solution on both Arabs and Jews.
This solution \-ras outlined in the White Pauer.

The British

Government stated that from 1922-38 the population had increased 90 percent.

The Jews increased from 55,000 to 316 1 -

018 from 1914 to 1938 •. (The non-Jewish increase was a 55
percent increase, while the Jewish increase was 47 percent).
Two tlurds of the Jewish
The

~aite

i~~igrants

came from Western Europe.

Paper dealt with the cause of the trouble and

made public the Hcl'1ahon-Hussein letters for the first time+
(1)

The T#hite Paper zoned the land into three
categories.
a. Areas '1.-rhere Jews could buy.
b. Areas where Jews could buy, but only
with government sanction.
c. Areas where J e\is could not buy.

(2)

Immigration: The \Vhite Paper limited the Jewish
immigration to Jewish population, plus 75,000.
"No further immigration \vill be permitted unless
the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce
it." (1.0)

In June 1939, the permanent mandate commission of the
League at their 36th session examined the White Paper of 1939.
The commission reported:
The poticy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the

(10)

Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 28.
See also Great Britain Pa~1iamentary Papers 1939, Cmd.
6019• pp. 6-11; UN World, Vol, I, No. 4, May 1947.
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mandatory :power and the council, the commission had
always placed upon the Palestine Mandate. (ll)
Three out of seven members were unable to share this
opinion, they considered that existing circumstances would
justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the council
did not oppose it.(12}

(11)

Ibid.~

p. 29.

(12) League of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, Minutes
of the Thirty Sixth Session, (Geneva: 1939), p. 275.
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CH.Al?TER IV
I:MJ?ERI.ALIS1<1 .BEG.li.'TS · TERRIORISM

The Zionist Revolution
We shall fight with Great Britain in this war
as if there were no White Paper and we shall fight
the White Paper as if there were no war •
• • • Ben Goruin
The Arabs first attacked the policy presented in the
White

Pa~er,

migrants.

objecting to the additional 75,000 Jewish im-

Eventually the Arabs became reconciled to it.

Now it was the turn of the Jews to fight the mandatoryt
by bombing, assassinating and kidnaping against the British.
The Jewish terrorists were better armed, better organized,
and possessed greater technical skill than the Arab guerril·
las of 1936.

Government buildingw, trains, railroads, shops,

and highway bridges have been repeatedly blown up.

The Jews

declared that the solution of the White Paper was unacceptable to them.

They insisted on unlimited immigration and the

postponement of democratic government until the Jews had become a majority.

Later they specifically demanded the estab-

lishment of a Jewish State.
In 1942 a small group of Zionist
extremists, led by
.
Abraham Stern, came into prominence with a series of politically motivated nrurders.(l)

The high commissioner narrowly

(1) Washington Star, January 2, 1947. and New York Times,
January 2, 1947, March 3, 1947, pp. 7,8.
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escaped death in an ambush outside Jerusalem.

On November

6, 1944, the British Minister of State in the Middle East
(Lord Mayne) was awsassinated in Cairo by two members of the
Stern group.
The ijagana (an illegal military formation controlled by
the Jewish Agency) and the Irgun Zvai Leumi {another illegal
Jevnsh organization) were responsible for much destruction of
government property during 1944.(2)

The King David Hotel in

Jerusalem containing the officers of the government, was
blown up killing 86 public servants.
a British Judge and British officers.

The terrorists kidnapped
British civilian and

military families were evacuated from Palestine.
Due to the continuation of Jewish terrorism in Palestine, Lieut. General Sir Alan G. Cunningham, the High Commissioner for Palestine, issued a strong statement on June 29,
194o, denouncing lawlessness in Palestine and expressing fir.m
determination to restore order.

The premises of the Jewish

Agency in Palestine were occupied and members of the Jewish
Agency Executive were arrested.

This was followed by the

publication of a British White Paper on July 24, which, on
the basis of various intercepted messages, claimed to link

(2) Arthur KOestler, Rise of the Hagana (New York: Mc1lillan
Book Co., 1947), pp. 66-98. ~New York Times, Nov. 14, 1945.
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the Jewish Agency to terrorist activity in Palestine.

The

Hagana, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern gang were all
accused of violence on the basis of the evidence presented.($)
The Anglo-American Committee of Inqui!Y
When the

~econd

war came to an end, it was not possible

for the mandatory power to give full effect to ;,the policy set
out in the White Paper of 1939.

The traiic fate of the Jew-

ish people in Europe had created a demand that the Palestine
problem should be examined again.
the United States.

The demand was strong in

In August 1945, President Truman wrote

to Mr. Attlee suggesting that the concession of 100,000 immigra~ion

certificates for Palestine would be an important

contribution to the settlement of displaced European Jews.(4)
Speaking at Bournemouth, England, on June 12, 1946, Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin said, in regard to Palestine:
I hope it will not be misunderstood in America
if I say, with the purest of motives, that that was
because they did not \>rant too many of them in New
York. (5)
The British Government did not adopt this proposal but
accordingly obtained the agreement of the United States to

( 3) Text given in Ne\v York Times, July 25, 1946. The above
quoted frore the Library of Congress, Palestine Problem.
(4)

Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 18, 1945, p. 790.

{5)

New York Times, June 13, 1946, p. 1.
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the appointment of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.
The twelve members of the Anglo-American Committee after
a work of 120 days recommended a new plan.

Under this plan

the greater part of Palestine would be divided into Arab and
Jewish provinces.

Each province would have an elected legis-

lature and an executive.

The one hundred thousand Jews shoUld

go to their province.(6)

Here we see England has won a great

game of politics by getting America to take part in the deal.
During those days I was in Damascus and the Syrian Uni versity's students went to the English delegation to protest
against the admitting of 100,000 immigrants to Palestine. The
English Consul told the students "that is Mr. Truman's suggestion.

We have nothing to do with it."

The result was the

the American Consulate was burned that day in Syria, Egypt.
and Iraq.
The London Conference
It had been the intention of his Majesty's Government
to consult the interested parties before reaching a final
decision on their policy on Palestine.

Invitations to a

conference in London were issued on the 25th of July to the
governments of the Arab League, to the Jewish Agency for
Palestine, and to the Palestine Arab Higher Executive.(?)

(6)

See map next page.

(7.)

New York Times, January 7, 17: 1, 3.

"
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The conference opened on September 9, 1946.

The Brit-

ish Delegation put the provincial autonomy plan before the
conference.

The Arab Delegates at once made it clear that

they were opposed to this plan in principle and could not
accept it as a basis for disaussion as it would eventually
lead to partition.

The Arab Delegates propounded their so-

lution that Palestine would be a unitary State with a per-.
manent Ara.b majority and would attain its independence afte:r
a short period of transition (two or three years) under British mandate. (8)
The Zionist congress met at Basle and denounced the
plan of provincial autonomy.

The congress announced that

Palestine be established as a Jewish

~ommonwealth

integrated

in the structure of the Democratic World.(9)
On February?, 1947, the British Delegation at the
Anglo-Arab conference submitted ne\v proposals, which \vere
also communicated to the JewisL Agency.

These provided for

a five-year period of British trusteeship over Palestine.
with the declared object of preparing the country for independence.
The latest British proposals were rejected both by Arabs

(8)

New York Times, September 12, 1946.

(9) Washington Star, January 6, 1947 ~ \vashington Post, Dec.24, 1946. New York Times, Dec. 29, 1946. The Nation, Jan. 25,
1947. Baltimore Sun, Dec. 9, 1946.
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and by the Jews.

The situation in Palestine became so

dangerous, that tl1e British ordered the evacuation of Brit·
ish women and children.

Even the presence of 100,000

Brit~

ish troops in the country has failed to end the reign of
terror wllich Jewish leaders insist is the work of a small
faction of Palestine Jews.(lO)
Finally, realizing that England was blamed by both
Arabs and Jews; and partly because of the pro-Zionist atti·
tude of the United States

go~ernment

and the continued prod-

ding by Washington, the British Government, in September 1947
dramatically told the United Nations A$sembly that it was
planning to terminate the mandate and to evacuate its troops
and civil servants from Palestine as soon as possible; thereupon the mandatory decided to refer the problem to the United
Nations. (11)

(10)

Congressional Record~,.; House, Vol. 93, Part 1, 'P• 1392.
See United Nations World, 'Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947.
New York Times, Feb. 5, i947, 1:24.

(11)

United Nat ions World, Ibid. 1
New York Times, Feb. 3, 8:4.
Congressional Record!, Ibid., p. 1392.
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PART II
"PRESSURE OF POLITICS"
(The Solution of the Problem)
CHAPTER I
THEL UNI.TED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITT:EE ON PALESTINE
The Fir8t MOve
It has been said that:
The United States Department of State on March 28,
1947, informed the British Ambassador in Washington, D.C.,
that the United States would support a request by Great
Britain for the convening of a special eession of the Gen..
eral Assembly at its regular session in September 1947.(1)
His Majesty's Government considered that these proposals
were consistent with the terms of both the League Mandate,
and the United Nations Charter.

On February 18, 1947, a de-

cision had been announced to the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary of State.

In the course of his speech he

said:
His Majesty's Government have been faced with an
irreconcilably conflict of principles. There are in
Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. In
1914 there were 55,000 Jews in Palestine. For the Jews,
the essential point of principle is the creation of a
Sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs the e,~ential
point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of a Jewish Sovereignty in a~ part of Palestine. His l~jeejy's Government have of themselves no

(l) Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel (New York: McCaryHill, 1950), p. 75.
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~·

:p0wer, under the terms of the mandate, to award the
country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even
to partition it between them. We shall then·ask the
United Nations to consider our report, and to reccommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend
ourselves to recommend any particular solutions.(2)
Here we see the significance of the British (tactics)
in politics; to save her face,sa.ve her interest in the Near
East, England handed the problem to the United nations and
stepped out of the deal leaving a black page of her history
in the eyes of the Arabs, MOslems, and the Zionists all over
the world.
The United Nations was called at a critical moment in
the history of' Palestine to accept the challenge as a last
chance for the solving of this problem in a :peaceful and fair
manner.

If' this chance was misned, chaos and disorders might

result in Palestine more than what happened and what is happening (as we see later).
The Battle of the Agenda
On April 2, 1947, Great Britain requested the United
Nations to place the Palestine question on the agenda of the
next regular session of the General Assembly and to call a
special session as soon as possible for the purpose of appointing a committee to study the problem.

The request was prompt-

ly granted, and the special session opened on April 28, 1947.(3)
(2) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, Political Historr
of Palestine, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 40. United Nations Bulletin,
April 15, 1948, p. 305;
(3)

New York Times, April 3, 1947, 1:7.

L

50

Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudia Arabia, Syria, and Yemen requested that a proposal for the termination of the mandate
over Palestine and the declaration of independence also be
placed on the agenda.

When the American delegate objected

vigorously the Arab request was rejected.(4)

Russian del-

egates asked that the proposed committee be instructed to
submit a plan for the independence of Palestine.

This re-

Quest was also opposed by the Americans and was accordingly
rejected. (5)
Andrei Gromyko, the Russian Delegate

a~~ounced

that

partition is the best alternate solution for Palestine, and
here (for the first time) the United States Delegate hailed
the solution and added such as the inclusion of question of
displaced European Jews within the scope of the inquiry. The
Arabs were convinced that the United States, the most influential member of the United Nations was already committed to
uphold the demand of the Jewish Agency for the Jevnsh State.
From the start the Arab Delegates tried to prevent the
Jewish Agency from getting a hearing.

Austin, the United

States Delegate, argue<! that the "sacred" charta' of the
United Nations must be upheld

an~

the Jewish Agency be per-

mitted to appear before the General Assembly.

Poland, the

(4) United Uations Special Committee on Palestine, Report
to the General Assembl~, London Office, 1947, p. 1.
(5)

New York Times, April 3, 1947, 1:7.

51
country which for many a decade has been expelling Jews in
large mumbers, put considerable pressure on the United Nations to give careful consideration to the point of view of'
the Jewish people in the Palestine question.
solution was made.

A compromise

Spokesmen of both the Arab Higher Com-

mittee and the Jewish Agency were permitted to appear, not
before the General Assembly itself but before the Politicaland Security Committee of the General Assembly.(6)
In the middle of' the general debate

¥~.

Gromyko

~ossed

a diplomatic bombshell into the deliberations of the United
Nations General Assembly by supporting a plan which all Arab
spokesmen had repudiated as imperialism.

Russia did this be-

cause two thirds of the immigrants that entered Palestine
were from' the eastern part of' Europe, and also to get a foothold in the }fiddle East.
Thus the battle of the Agenda was a long one.
It took four meetings of the General Committee and
two meetings of the General Assembly until a decision
on the Agenda was reached to grant a hearing to two nongovernmental agencies before one of its main committees.(?)
HOwever, the primary purpose of the General Assembly was the
constitution and instruction of'a special committee on Palestine.

In this connection the assembly 'I:Jas faced with three

different problems.
tee.

(6)

It has to decide to establish a commit-

This involved a debate on the need for a committee. Two

New York Times, l~y 10, 1947, pp. 4 ff'.,p. 115,

(7) Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United'Nations, Public
Affairs Press, 1947, p. 103. Also see New York Times,April 30,
1947, 1:8.
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other :problems follo\<red logically, the composition of the
committee and its terms of reference.

Some representatives

had doubts whether such a committee would be formed.

Mr. Jamali of Iraq claimed consistently that the :problem of Palestine could be dealt \·ri th directly by the General
Assembly without any previous :preparation by a committee. He
submitted that :
"If these principoles were to be reccommended by the
Assembly the issue \>lould be settled." He insisted, furthermore, that he does not believe there is a necessity
for a committee at all.(8)
Everybody else stressed the necessity of the committee.
Even Dr. Malik emphasized the fact that it is not even going
to be Anglo-American Committee.

It is going to be a United

Nations Committee. Thus it was called a special committee;
not because it was special in its character but because it
was the first such inquiry undertaken by the United Nations.
On

~~Y

15, 194?, the General Assembly adopted by an

affirmative vote of 46, with the five Arab States, Turkey,
and Afghanistan in opposition, with the following resolution:
Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations
has been called into special session for the purpose of
constitution and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration at the next regular wession

(8) mr Official Records of the First Special Session of the
General Assembly. Vol. 1, Plenar:y, }!eatings of the General
Assembly, Seventy Seven Plinary meetin~; April 28~May 15,
194?' p. 125.
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of the Assembly to report on the question of Palestine. The General Assembly resolved that. a special
committee to be created. (9)
The Composition of the Committee
The idea of the Secretary General to have a committee
of neutrals was endorsed by the United States and found favor
runong many other states.

Others opposed it and a third group

was in the middle of the road.

IV.ir. Erikson, favoring neutral-

ity, )advanced .. the.vi~w that:
There is indeed a great need for impartial and
international and authoritive committee. He was suppor~
ed by l•.tr. Parodi who observed that the committee should
be a special impartial comniittee. The idea of impartiality was endorsed by the representatives of Peru and
Honduras.(lO)
lVIr. Austin maintained that the superior advantages are

to have a neutral committee.

Mr. Austin v'las

sui.~ported

by Sir

Alexander Gadogan who expressed the view of his government
in favor of a neutral committee.

The full. meaning of neu-

trality was expressed by Kr. Ponce (Ecuador) as he stated:
vie do not wish to say that it is possible to
assure absolute independence and impartiality, but
we do mean that the countries which are not directly
interested in the problem, the countries which are
not under consideration and who do not have interests
in this matter of a political, economic, strategic,
or of another similar nature, will more closely
approach impartiality and independent judgment than
the others which are defending their rights or attempting to protect their interests.(ll)

(9) UN Official Records of the First Sfecial Session of the
General Assembly; Vol. 11, Meeting 28 doc. A/286, A/293)
April 29, 1947, p. 11.
(10) Report to the General Assembly by the UN Special Committee on Palestine, p. J.
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Mr. Arce {Argentina) at t.he head of the second grou:p,

who opposed it, aoubted that countries to which they were
going to give such a delicate task would make great efforts
and \vould be capable of showing neutrality in the matter.
I1r. KOsanovic (Yugoslavia) attacked the idea of neutrality

more drastically by saying:
Let us be completely sincere. Is it possible
to be neutral in this problem? I do not think there
is any neutrality here. neutrality means no opinion.
Dante, in the Inferno, puts a neutral opinion in the
inferno. Those who are neither with God nor with
the devil are in the inferno.(ll)
He was supported qy Mr. Belt (Ouba) who maintained that it
is very difficult to find neutrals in this question.
Between these two extremes was the view which held that
it *ould fue better to call a committee consisting of members

of the United Nations other than the permanent members of
the Security Council.

Mr. Gromyko (Russia) rejected this

idea.

I do not think the permanent members of the Security Council deserve such punishment. They do not
deserve to be denied the rights possessed by all other
.countries.
Asaf Ali stating his vievTs as an ans\'ler to Nr.

Gromyko~s

statement waid:
So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, by virtue of the fact that the Soviet is in close proximity

r
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to this particUlar area, and possible also interested
in what developments are taking place there, ooth in
the Arab World and in Palestine; it would be much the
best for Russia to stand away.(l2)
In regard to France 1-ir. Asaf said, "France was a mandatory in Syria -- it may be considered an interested party
in some way or another." (13)
Sir Alexander Cadogan expressed his opinion as to the
involved states to be out of the committee.

He went further

and opposed the inclusion of the Ara.b States on the committee.
The resu1t was an American proposal, which suggested a committee made with regard to geographical distribution and

~~.

Austin named seven members.
The counter proposals of Argentina favored a membership
of eleven and was supported by the representative of Australia.

The delegation of Chile added two more governments and

there were two candidates still missing from the proposed
quota of eleven.

As a result two ballots \vere taken by a

show of hands, one on the question of who should represent
the South Pacific group.
and the Philippines.

The choice vras betvreen Australia

Australia won.

India won, as a rep-

resentative for Asia, against the Siams.
Thus the General Assembly on May 15, 1947, "resolved
that the special committee was to be consisted of the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, Netherlands,

(12}

Ibid., p. 146.

(13)

Ibid., p. 146.
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Peru, Sweden, Uruguay (named by the United States), Guatemala, Yugoslavia, (na.medl"by Chile), India, and Australia. (~4)
Analyzing the special committee,it consisted of two
representatives of the Britiwh Commonwealth of nations (Australia and Canada).

Two representatives of Eastern Europe

who have more knowledge of the Jewish affairs than the other
members (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia).

It had three Latin

American countries: Guatemala, Peru and Paraguay.
contained two Asiatic countries:

It also

India and Iran.(l5)

The General Assembly adopted the passage which

~he

rep-

resentative of Venezuela states concerning the qualifications
~f

the committee members.
The state members of the special committee, should
appoint persons of high moral character and of recognized competence in international affairs, and that those
appointed would act impartially and conscientiously in
accordance with the purpose and principles of the charter of the United Nations.(l6)
The terms of references adopted, on Hay 15, 1947, are

wide and in the main general. 'The committee is to prepare,
not later tlmn September 1st, a report for the next session
of the Assembly on the question of Palestine, the future government of Palestine, and to make proposals for its solution.

(14)

Report to the General Assembly by the UNSCOP, p. 3.
~New York Times, }my 14, 1947, 1:1.

(15)

Nev1 York Times, 1-fu..y 4, 1947, 4:3.

(16)

UN Official Records (General Assembly), 57th Meeting,
op. cit., May 13, 1947, p. 333.
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p~~ers

1t ryas given the wident
f~~cts

and invAstigate all

th0 problem

to ascertain and record

~uestion:=;

and issues relevant to

o~ Palesti~e.(l7)

It vras to condnct inve"'ticat:i.on_s in l=lelestine and where8ver it

'Tic"l.Y

c1.ee::'l

u~eful.

It was to receiv'3 and BYI1':11:t':1e oral

an/l written evidences, Y'hichever it :m"l~' consider apnronriate

in eRch case fron the

nnnd~tor:r

novrer, from representat:i.ves

of the population of "?8.lestine, 1.nd fron gove:r>nrrents and such
or,r:anizrtion-; and incUvidun.ls as it may thin1-:: necessary.
It vr'.s to

gi~re

the most 0areful consideratton of the relig-

ions interests in Palestine of Islam, ,Ju0ais·'1, 8.nd Christian-

?a~rr.1ent

~~'le

of exuenses:

Secretar~·

The General Jlssembl;r arthorized

General to:

"reim_burse t:':"'avel anC!. su'bsistence exne·1ses of a
and an aJtcrnate renrese,tative from
each sovern1'1ent renresonted on the spec ia1 CO""T.:':"ci ttee,
on ::ouch basis e.nd in snch f::1r-:n as he inc..,:r determine
"TT.Ost annronri~_te in the c:i.rcu'nstfmces. "- T!J.e al1owance
ryp2 fi~ed at twent~ dolJars.(~R)
·
represe~tative

- enborshin.
'

7

of t:he Cor1:-v:1ittee and Secret.g_rin.t

Australia

~:r.

T~r.

J. D. L. Hood, Delesate.
L. llt:Teo, f\.l ternate.

s.

~1stice

T.lr. Leon

I.

c.

Rand, Dele~ate.
Alternate.

~:s:7ra·...,d,

r. :Carel Lisiclc~:, Delc.[\'lte.
Dr. Richnrd Pech, Alternate.

(17)

'Rep:)rt to the Gerer9.l J\ssemol:.r, on. cit., 9· 2.

(J.O,)
)n. cit., tT?T ')f:"ici8.1 Recor(1s, Vol. 1, ?lenar;r
·~eotipp of tl•.e Second ::~e1:sion, :-r:;. 77, Na:r ~-h, 19L 1 7,
-p. 12!•.

Guatemala

H. E. Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados, Delegp. te
L;. Gonzales, Alternate

I•lr. E.

India

Sir Abdur Rarunan, Delegate.
1-'.lr. Venkata V~svranathan, Alternate.
br. H. Dayal, Second Alternate.

Iran

H. E. l·~r. Nasrollah Entezam, Delegate.
Dr. Ali Ardalan,· Alternate.

Netherlands

Dr. N. S. Blom, Delegate.
E.r. A. I. S;:its, Alternate.

Peru

H. E. Dr. Alberto Ullca, Delegate.
H. E. Dr. Arturo Garcia Salazar, Alternate.

Sweden

Justice Emil Sandstrom, Delegate.
Dr. Paul lVlohn, Alternate.

Uruguay

Professor Enrique Rodriques
Fabregate, Delegate.
~lr. ~ecco Ellauri, Alternate.

Yugoslavia

~1r.

Vladimir Simic, Delegate.
Dr. Jose Brilej, Alternate.(l9)

Four of the representatives were jurists with a background of government representation.

Six of the represent-

atives had a background of long-standing diplomatic services
and government representation.

One was a professor with a

background of government representation.
Chairmanship and the Working-groups
On may 26, 1947, the special committee on Palestine held
its first meeting at Lake Success.

This was called to order

and presided over by the Secretary General.of the United
Nations who welcomed the committee members and handed them the

(19)

Ibid., p. 123.
See also Report to the General Assembly,

Q£•

£11.,

p. 4.
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first three volumes of the working documents on Palestine
prepared by the secretariat.
At the same meeting the committee.exchanged many points
of view on its future work.

After a long discussion it was

agreed to create a Preparatory Working Group which should
produce some suggestions on various organizational matters
for the consideration of the committee.
The working group held three meetings at the
Building.

Em~tre

State

At the second meeting of the special committee, at

Lake Success, it presented what suggestions she had already
done.

At this meeting they made the following decisions:
(1)

It was agreed to postpone until arrival in Palestine any discussion of communications from displaced persons requesting that the committee visit
assembly centers of Europe.

(2)

A tentative work plan was adopted, in the sense
that, upon its arrival in Palestine, the committee
should first, ask the government of Palestine to
furnish factual information; second, request the
Arab and Jewish Lia.ii!JOn officers to prevent observations on this statement; third, make a brief
surve,r. of the country, and fourth conduct hearings. (20)

Work of the Committee in Palestine
On June

14~and

15, 194?, the committee arrived in Pal-

estine, on the 16th it met in Jerusalem at theY. M.

c.

A.

The Jewish Agency requested that permanent liaison officers
should be attached to the committee.

(20)

The committee to avoid

Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 5.
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general problems with the Arabs, the mandatory government,
and the Jewish Agency, informed the said parties that they
may appoint liaison officers to the committee who shall
supply such information or render other assistance as the
committee may require.

The liaison officers may present at

the discretion of the committee such information as they
think advisable.
These liaisons could not and would not sit with the
committee as a member of the committee.

The could not ques-

tion in meetings involving hearings except with permission.
They could not be entitled to be present at the deliberation
of the committee or in the private discussions between members.
On the arrival in Palestine the cornrnittee established
four

sub-com~~ttees

for consideration of specific problems.

(1)

Sub-committee I was established for the purpose of
drawing up an itinerar~r for the committee.

(2)

Sub-committee II was established to deal with requests by organizations or individuals for hearing.

(3)

Sub-committee III \~s appointed later, for the purpose of visiting displaced persons camps.

(4)

Sub-committee IV was constituted to study the questions of religious interests in the Holy Land.

Internal Procedure
The special committee decided its own procedure.

All

committee documents were reproduced by the secretariat and
distributed by the documents office.

Verbatim minutes of
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all the committee hearings were taken and were circulated
to the members on their request.
of the cornraittee meetings.

Summary records were kept

The committee decided that:

Copies of all documents, other than confidential
ones, were to be su:p:r:·lied to the three :partiesJ the
mandatory :power, the Arab Hi~her Committee, and the
Jewish Agency for Palestine.{21)
Decisions were taken by a majority vote.

Owing to tre

complexity of the :problem under investigation, appeals to
the vote were frequent.
The meetings of the committee were held in :public, unless the committee decided otheTivise.

¥~ny

times the commit-

tee conducted its meetings in :private to :prevent harmful :publicity, delay, or embarrassment to its members.

From

I~

26,

1944 to August 31, 194?, the United Nations Special Committee
on Palestine held 13 :public and 38 :private meetings.
The comrni ttee had its own :press officers.

They ";ere

authorized to give the :press verbal briefings of the meetingst
but not vrithout the previous approval of the chairman.

The

press officers used to obtain the approval of the committee
at the end of every meeting, before giving.briefings.
To arrive at an understanding of the issue involved in
the Palestine :problem the committee adopted a two-fold method
of operation.

First, by conducting a survey of the land, its

people and their aspirations, the social, economic, and religious systems.

(21)

The second method of operation was to investigate

Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 1?.
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the parties and their views on the problem of Palestine.
This was carried out by means of oral hearings and written
testimony.

The committee had many informal contacts with

the heads of the religious men, and of.the man-in-the-street.*
The committee at Jerusalem heard 33 individuals, representing 13 political and religious organizations.

It heard

six representatives of the Government of Palestine.

As I

stated before, in Beirut the committee heard representatives
of the Arab States in ten meetings, eight private and two
public.
There were many channels through which the committee
got the #actual information of the problem; first through
oral evidence.

The practice was that the party gave factual

information and vras asked factual questions by the members
of the committee.

Second was written testimony.

The Govern-

ment of Palestine, and the Jewish Agency submitted a big supply of evidence which included background documents, factual
statements, and maps.

A large number of written statements

were also submitted by organizations and individuals who had
not requested or had not been granted a hearing.
There was a third group of materials called informal
evidence.

The committee took all possible steps to ovezrcome

every disability in order to make a successful work.

*

See map on next page.

.

'
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It maintained many informal contacts with political
and religious lec:,ders, vii th the members of the government, with members of illegal organizations, and with
the man-in-the-street.(22)

(22)

Op. cit., Renort to the General Assembl~, p. 22.
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CHAPTER II
THE CASE Al'ID THE JURY

Before the case is carried to the'conrt tne·judges
have to study the case many times before they face it. The
members of the committee, as well as every one who got acquainted with it, were puzzled by the nature of the problem
and how it developed.
The General Assembly had been struck too, by the complexity of the problem.

Here are some of their declarations

and their question-mark statements.

~~.

~ua

Tai Chi stated:

I am afraid that no parliament of man, no statement, no legal formula, no historical equation,. no
political and economic progr~n can singly or altogether
by themselves solve the problem.(l)
.
1-'Ir. Gromyko called it "an acute question and :political

problem. 11

For J:I".Lr. Austin,

11

it is a very grave problem.t' Hr.

Van Raij en spoke of it as ••painful and unfortunately complica-

ted."

1-ir. Asaf Ali declared:

Palestine has become the acid test of human conscience. The United Nations will find that upon their
de~HsioR will depend the future of humanity, whether
humanity is going to proceed by peaceful means or
wheth€r humanity is going to be torh to pieces. If
a wrong decision flows from this assembly, you may
take it from me that the world shall be cut in twain
and there shall be no peace upon earth.(2)

(1)

Op. clt., Re~ort to the General Assemb~, p. 199.

lli.Q.. , p. 200 •·
See also: O;[:.ficiaJ. Records .of the First Special Session
of the Genera) fisemb!y, Vol. 1, Seventy Nine Plenary l·1eeting,
l1ay 15, 1947, p. 126.
( 2)
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The president, I1r. Aranaha, spoke of it as a subject
of the most controversial nature.

He came to the conclusion

that~

The problem of Palestine is one of the most
difficult problems with which anybody can be faced.
The only road left open to us now is to meet this
challenge, and we have to meet it fully, if \'/e are
to survive.(3)
I,

The Arab Case Before the Comnittee
The basic approach of the Arab delegations and States

to the problem was that the rights of the Arabs are derived
from actual and long-standing possession (1,300 years) and
rests upon the strongest human foundation.

These are what

they call "Natural Rights".
Is a claim based on possession established 2,000 years
ago a valid one?

lifo, said :rvrr • .Jam.a.li.

If so Mexico would

be justified in claiming large areas of the United States.
Spain could clain Mexico and the Arabs would have a valid
title to Spain, which they ruled longer than the .Jews ruled
Palestine,
The Arab delegates sought strenously to destroy the Jewish
case.

They emphasized that the small land of Palestine is

a,n integral part of the Arab World.

The tradi tiona arrl cul-

ture are of Arab quality and character.

(3}

Mr. Asaf Ali stated

Op, eit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 200.
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the same idea by saying, "Palestine undoubtedly is an integral part of Arabia.(4)
Thus the argument based on "historical conneetiontt is
not only flimsy but dangerous.

Ancestral possession in an-

cient times is not a basis for a sound case.
In addition to those "natural rights 11 ,the Arabs had acquired specific political rights derived from the Sharif Hussein's compact with Great Britain and the help they gave her.
The thesis that Palestine west of the Jordan \'las excluded
from the British pledges can no

longer be maintained.

The

text now availab:J.e sho\,Ts that Sharif Hussein was given a
general promise relating to its independence in the

l~cl>lahon

letters of 1915, and a specific·promise securing the p6litical
and economic freedom of its Arab population.(5)

In spite of

the circulation of these official letters in the Arab land,
the

Mc~~on

correspondence had remained hidden from public

knowledge in England until 1939.

As for Hogarty's message

and the memorial, they lie buried in the White Hall in a sea
of oblivion. (6)
Once more the Arab representatives attacked the mandate,

(4)

Ibid. I

(5)

See Appendix I

( 6)

See Appendix in Report to the General Assembly.
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and its validity.

J.1r • .Tamali stated:

The \!Thole issue of Palestine is one of conflict
principles derived from expediency, power of politics
and local interest. I believe that the principles on
v1hich the .Tewish claim is based are invalid as being
in contradiction \vith the Charter of the United Nations.
the Government of the League of Nations and the mandate. (7)
As to its contradiction to the United Nations Charter,
E~

• .Tamali meant that the purpose of that organization is

to maintain peace, prevent aggression, and develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Why

should self-determination be granted freely to other peoplee.
and not the Arabs?

Why should the people of Palestine, vrho

were ninety percent Arabs and ten percent Jews (1914-1918).
be asked to live

ind~finitely

in a condition of political

subjection for the sake of the minority who had not been asked to coma to the country, and were not wanted?

Why should

Arabs of Palestine be expected to \vait patiently and subserviently through the years until the minority had become, by
force and shedding of blood, the majority?

This is slavery

forever for the Arab.
I~f.r.

111. Hassan (Egypt) stated before the committee that

England had no legal right to proclaim the Balfour Declaration

(7)

UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the
Assembly, Vol. II, April 29-May 7, 1947, Twenty,_-,ighth l'leeting, Document A Bur/78, p. 27.
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and give away Palestine over the heads of its inhabitants.
She gave something she did not own, or possess.

At the

time of the Dedlaration, Palestine was not yet in their
hands.

lvfr. Kal tan demanded that "an inquiry be made into

the legality, validity and ethics of this document.n(8)

Mr. Asaf Ali sought to dismiss the Balfour Declaration
as a document, which was made under the wtress of the great
war.

He suggested the following:
That the special committee look into it to see
whether the terms of the mandate are consistent with
Article 22 of the eovenant. It is the root of and
the very reason for all the troubles.(9}
In contesting the argument that the mandate was sane-

tioned by the League of Nations, I1r. Jamali said:
The answer to that is that it was one of the mistakes of the League, which waw under the control of the
Allies. The League must have passed it without adequate
study or perhaps ~nthout anticipation of the consequences. Even if the members who passed the terms of the
mandate did so with good intention, experience proved
that they were wrongt just as the Balfour Declaration
itself was wrong.(lOJ
On four different occasions before the committee, Arab
speakers protested against continued Je\-.rish immigration into
Palestine.

They claimed that the right of Jews to immigrate

(8) UN Official Records of the General Assemp]X, Vol. III,
Document A/C (136) Me ting 52, Iviay 9, 1947, p. 193.
(9)

UN General Assembly Special Sessi9n, op. cit., p. 194.

(10) Ul~ Official Records of the First Snecial Session of the
General Assembly, Vol II, April 29 - Hay 7, 1947, Twentyeight meeting, Document A(B~78, p. 15.
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into Palestine is denied by the Charter of the United Nations and the resolution of the General Assembly of December, 15, 1945.

The Arab spokesmen contend further that there

is no more room in Palestine for large scale immigration.
They point to the fact that the density of the country's
population is now 176 persons to the square mile, as compared with 46 in the United states, 22 in Russia, 13 in Brazil
and 3 in Canada.
humanitarian one.

The Palestine question is not a purely
It is primarily political.

It is hot

whether homeless Jews should be allowed a refuge in Palestine.
issue.

It is whether they should rule it; that is the main
Ur. Khouri made the following statement;

We do not underste~d why the displaced persons of
who are searching to resettle somewhere in the
world, should go to Palestine. The United Nations in
the General Assembly had a rewolution as the last session in October clearly stated that the non-self governing territories could not be the place for sending
new displaced persons without the consent of the population of those countries.(ll)
~urope,

}tr. Khouri's view, supported by Mohnond Hassain Pasha, of

the refugee problem in

~urope

as the province exclusively

of the International Refugee organization and, therefore,
outside the jurisdiction of the special committee on Palestine. (12}

(11)

Ibid.• , p. 284.

(12)

The United Nations World, Vol. I., No. 9, Oct. 1944.
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The Arabs presented a case not only against the Jews,
but also against Great Britain.
never accepted the Arab case.

The British Government has
How many lives \•Tere lost as

a result of the policy of enforcing the rrEndate and how much
money has been spent on police posts and fortresses as com-

'

pared with schools and hospitals?

David Hopper states:

Forty percent of the Arab applicants for admission to schools were turned away for lack of space. The
special committee on Palestine reported in 1947 that the
Government System of Public Education covers only 57 percent
of Arab boys and 23 percent of the girls of school age.(13)
1~.

Khouri, though he had much to say, confined himself

only to this:
I am not going to discuss the administration in
Palestine during the mandate. All the taxation and money
collected there from the population was spent in establishing or promoting the Jewish National Home; it is as if the
Arabs of Palestine were asked to help in digging their graves
vri th their own. hands. (14)
Religious groups also appeared before the special committee and defended the Arab case.

They declared that their

religious attachment of Palestine is more extensive and deeper than that of the .rews.
Some Christian supporters of Zionism have approached
the subject from another angle.

They base their stand on the

(1.3) Frank C. Sakran, Palestine Dilemma, (Washington: Public
Affairs Press, 1948), p. 120.
(14) UN Official Records of the first special session of the
General ASsembly, Vol. I, Plenary Meeting 78, May 14, 1947,

p.

144.
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promise to Abraham that his seed shall inherit the land of
Canaan.

Thus it belongs to them and sooner or later they

have to come back to it.

While others stated that,accord-

ing to the Bible, God's promise to Abraham was fulfilled
3,000 years ago when the Jews occupied and ruled Palestine.
They later lost it because of their transgression and since
they rejected Christ as their Messiah, can no longer be con·
sidered by Christians as the heirs of Abraham.

The Bible

says:
If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed,
and heirs according to the promise. There is neither
Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there
is neither male· nor female, for ye are all one in
Christ Jesus.(l5)
MOhammedan supporters of the Arab case also spoke of
Islam's teachings as similar to those of Christianity.

~-

hammed, their prophet, taught that because of their failure
to heed the message of the prophets, including those of Jesus
and of himself, the Jews forfeited any claim to God's favor
despite their descent from Abraham:
Verily the men who are the nearest of kin to
Abraham, are they who follow him; and his prophet, and
they who believe on him; God is th.e patron of the :faithful.(l6)
.

(15)

Ga.lat:ian113 3:28, 29.

(16)

~he

KOran: The family of Imran.

r
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!

Arab spokesmen have also cited the following principles of American Policy outlined by President Truman in a
speech delivered on October 1945.
We believe in the eventual return to sovereign
rights and self-government to all peoples who have
been deprived of them by force. We shall approve of
no territorial changes in any frien~ly part of the
'I.Arorld unless they accord with the freely expressed
wish~ of the people concerned.
;ve believe that all
people who are prepared for self-government should be
penni tted to choose their ovm form of government by
their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe,
in Asia, in .Africa, as well as in the \vestern Hemisphere.(17)
It is not an exaggeration to say that the vie\'TS expressed by Gandhi reflect the attitude of the Asian people and
voice their feeling most truly ,.,hen he said:
Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense
that England belongs to the English or France to the
French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on
the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today can't
be justified by any mor<::1,le code of conduct. Surely it
would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud
Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews
partly or wholly as their national home. The root cause
would be to insist on a just treatment of Jews wherever
they are born and bred.(l8)
Freya Stark, a Britisher, writes:
I have always held that force is a monstrous thing
to use against people long settled on its land to induce it to accept immigration. If the arrival are angels
from heaven, it makes no difference: the inhabitation of

{17) Na~J Day Speech, President Truman Foreign Policy, Congressional Digest, Background, Dept. of Armed Forces, Am~
ican Foreign and Hilitary policies, v/ashington, Oct. 26, 1945,
p. 294.

{18) United Asia, International Ymnthly of Asian Affairs,
1948, :P• 252.

•
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a land for two thousand years gives one a right to
open or close the door, whether it be Italians in
Abayssian or Zionists in Palestine. The Jews have
already admitted close upon half a million Jewish
immigrants within the last 25 years. The Arabs number two thirds, and the Je\vS one third. Thus that
ip proportion of population the Jewish immigration
would correspond to 45 million in the United States.
If America had ad~itted 45 million Jews or Gentiles
or indeed angels s; nll in one lump in less than 30
years, and it wu . ·proposed still to coerce her to
keep her door open, it is easy to imagine what her
reaction would be.(l9)
II.

The Jewish Case before the Committee
The Jevdsh case as a whole v.ras presented by three

spokesmen of the Jewish Agency (Dr. Silver,
Hr. Cussion).

}~.

Shertok,

Na.ny delegates hovrever made statements of

understanding and sympathy for the Jews but nobody identified himself with the cause in the manner in \vhich the
Arab speakers identified themselves with the cause of the
Palestinian Arabs.
The Jewish spokesmen demanded the opening of Palestine
to unrestricted Jewish immigration and the establishment of
a Jewish State.
Jews,

11

was based on :

(ll

~~

The statement, "Palestine belongs to the

The historical connection.
Their religious attac~~ent to it.
The Balfour Declaration and the mandate.

Dr. Silver argued:
The Jewish case is, in the fir.st place a legal
one, based on the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour
Declaration which was issued by His 1-T.a.j esty' s Government as a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist

i

l

(19) Frank Sakran, Palestine Dile!fuua, on. cit., p. 212;
from Arab Island, pp. 69, llOl

--PsDi!'ati.)n. :9:ir- ~Iajes+;::rr s Govermr..ent views nith favor
the estnbl:!.sh"'lent of a nRt:l.o::.al ho:r·1e for the Je,.Yish
peonle. The :nandate in its prear:1ble, recor,nized the
historical connection of the Jewish peonle with Palestine o.nd the grounds for reconstittttl:-J.gc their national
home in tJ:-le country. Generations ar:o t}:e internationaJ.
CO:tnrl'Uni ty o_f the world, of 1'r'1icb the United l'T'ltions today is the politic-::_ cnc spiri tufll heir' d0creed that
the Jewish people shaJl be .rj_ve':'l the right long denied
anc the ormort1.rnJty to reconstitute their national home
in Palestine. That ne.tional ho:me is still in tr.e mak~.ng.
It han not vet been full:r established, no inter-r.at:!.o-:-lal co:'!LmlJnjt~r har cancelled, or even quer-tioned
+:hat r:tght.(20)
Dr. Silver accu8ed the 3nglish Government for failing

tn

fTil~ill he~ pro~ise.

He s8.id:

The ':TI.ancato.,..-r power which was ert;rustecl with the
oblivatior to rqfe~u~~d ~he op~ortunitv for the contj_nu.ou8 P:ro·wth and develon:nent of the ,Je,Nish Hatinnal
rro~e has'~nfortunately in recent vearn crievouslv interfered with n.n cirC1}"'1.Scribed it. That opportunity
'""lust no;,~· be full:"r restored. ( '21)
~Tr.

Shertol( Cl.eY'1.aDded and arr;ued, ab01..1.t thC' historical

connectj_o':1 of the Jews in Palestine, .l'tating:
It ma:",r sound rrnite y>lausible to art_!ue that i f
the right of the Jews to return to Palestine is ad'ni tted 0"1 the ground of ancient histor:':r, t1.J.en the
v7hole man of the vrorlc WO'..lld have to be remade and
c1.,aos woi1ld ensue. But does th'J. t question really
arise? Do tbA descende.nts of the Ro!P..c0 .:r>s, for exa"Ylple,
clai:n. entry into England? Do t~1.ey need Eng'land?
Does the:Lr future, t:teir ver-.:r existence, depend on
settlin~ there? (2'2)

(20) T.JN ')fficial Records of the First Snecial Session of
+::re General Assenbtv, Vol. III, T1ain Comnittee-s, SOth T~ee.t
~.ng, (Docume·1t A./Cl)J 16) T'ay
10):.7, P• 109-110.
1' T-"LY"''e'"'
1 1
~-'e'" v·o-(>
(T·:"-..T
JC1l17 ' IV • 1•.2 e ,)
.. ._
_ .. ,J.u
..
J-

e,

...._~vv

.

--~-

(21~

~-c.,.,-·-

Ihid._, n. 110-111.

(?2) TJJT 0fi'icial Records of t:re First Spec~.8.l Session of
_the Gener-al J~:::se'""lbl·'T, Vol. -;-li, S"l,_th T~eeti'lf': (Document 11./Cl/1.36)
'1 ,~

12, 1°1 7,
1

p.

?. ') 7.
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Then 11r. Shertok applied the same questions to the
Arab delegates:
Do the ~abs for that matter press to return to
Andalusia in Spain? Is it a matter of life or death.
for them? No ••• the analogy is fallacious and misleading.
The Jews as a homeless people should have a home
and their historical connection to Palestine is a
great historic phenomenon, a unique and an international affair. The great historic phenomenon of the
Jewish return to Palestine is unique because the position of the Je1.\rish people as a homeless people, and
yet attached vdth an unbreakable tenacity to its birthplace. It is that phenomenon that has made the problem
·of .Palestine an issue in international affairs, and no
similiar issue has ever arisen.(23)

:Mr. Ben Goroun, concerning the Jewish situation in Pal·
estine, dealt ·with three e.spects: the regeneration of the Jeivish nation, the achievement of the Je\\fS in Palestine and resettlement; using the folloiifing language he said:
In Palestine you are faced not nerely with a
large and g11ovring number of 'Jews, but ivith a distinct
Jewish Nation. In Palestine there is a new and unique
phenomenon, a Jewish Nation, with all attributes, characteristic resources, and aspirations of nationhood.
Palestine, was in the course of centuries conquered and
invaded by many alien peoples, but none of them ever
identified its national fate with it.(24)
Speaking about the achievement of the Jews in the work
of reconstruction he stated:
The growth of this nation and its work of reconstruction must not and cannot be arrested, and this
for two reasons. One is the existence of large numbers
of homeless Jews, for whom there is no other salvation
except in their own national home. The second is that

(23)

Ibid., p. 252.

(24)

~., p.

274.
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more than two-thirds of the land of Pe.lestine is still
\vaste and uncultivated.
We are not like our Arab neighbors, in possession
of vast underpopulated territories; like Iraq, Arabia,
and Syria. We must therefore make use of every bit· of
every free land in our country, even desert land.(25)
The connection of the Je•,.rish immigration with the Palestine :problem was presented by Hr. Shertok.

He emphasized

the fact that:
The need for immigration cannot be ignored. To
treat the issue of Palestine in isolation from the immigrc,tion issue would make as much sense as to study
the beating of a heart in disregard of blood circulation.
'rhe Jev.rish immigrants appealed to the world to say that,
they form part of a people which has a national home
vlill of its own. They want to go to the only country
where they will feel at home, both individually and collectively. (26)
Ben Goroun, answering the representative of Poland who
asked, vras there any cooperation bet\veen the Arab and Jews,
stated:
Yes, there has been on both sides. Arabs and Jews
have cooperated successfully in the \..ride and varied
fields of municipal, corn..'Tlercial, and labor a.ffai:rs.(27)
I can affirm that there is nothing inherent in the
nature of either the native Arab or the immigrant Jew
which prevents friendly cooperation. On the contrary
considering the admitted great difference of background,
they mix remarkably well. We are going to Palestine
not to fight the Arab \vorld, but to live at peace with
it. (2'8)
The Jewish spokesmen attacked the mandatory government
and the White Paper, after Sir Alexander Cadogan had stated

(25)

Ibid., p. 274-275.

(26)

Ibid., p. 254-55,

(27) They did not find encouragement or help from the mandatory ivho kept them apart.
(28) Ibid,, p. 257,

•
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that the British Government tried for years to settle the
problems of Palestine and had failed and that, therefore,
it had brought the problem to the United Nations.

Hr. Ben

Goroun retorts to this:
The mandatory power was charged by the League of
Nations with the carrying out of a definite settlement.
The Balfour Declaration was approved by the League of
Nations and made international law. The settlement was
the restoration of Palestine to the Jews. England had
failed to fulfill that settlement. The failure became
manifest with introduction of a policy set forth in the
White Paper of 1939, w~~ch ~ olated the most essential
terms of the mandate and vitiated its entire purpose.
The ·\mite Paper was condemned by the League, and
dengunced by the most eminent political leaders of the
United Kingdom itself. The Jews all over the world were
disappointed. The White Paper Policy is responsible
for tr~ misery and deaths of a large number of Jews and
for the cruel acts of expulsion of Jewish refugees. It
is responsible for establishing in Palestine a police
state without parallel in the civilized world. This is
the real nature of the failure of the mandatory power.(29)
Dr. Silver went further than that by condemning the maRdatory and stressed that the mandate was without international
supervision.
The administration of Palestine has, since the outbreak of the war, been conducted by the mandatory power
as if it were vested with the sovereignty of Palestine,
vrhereas it is assumed to adr.flinister that country-,-c of
which it was not the sovereign, as a trustee for carrying out the purposes of the mandate which clearly defined its rights and its obligations.(30)
The whole argument revolved around the fu.lfillment of

(29)

Ibid~,

(30)

Ibid., p. 108.

p. 273-274.
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the declaration :promising a national home for the Jews.
YJX. Shertok ended the Jewish case with a strong appeal to

the family of Nations, that: there should be an Israel State
with free immigration and full independence.

"For its attain-

ment "Vre appeal for the assistance of the entire family of
nat ions."
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Sumrnary of Jewish and Are,b Arguments
The summary of arguments gleaned from the debate before
the committee and supplemented from other sources presented
here for both the Arab and Zionist sides of the Palestine

~obM

lem is not intentied: to exhaust all that might be said on behalf of either faction.

It is merely a survey of some of the

main contentions advanced by either side to justify the stands
they have taken.
The arguments of each side, in parallel columns, follow:
Zionist

~

1. Arguing from history, the :
Zionists lay claim to Pales- :
tine on the basis that they
:
occupied Palestine for many
:
9enturies, as witnessed by
:
the Old Testament, and there :
they built. a flourishing He.;. - . :
brew kingdom. After the des- :
truction of Jerusalem in the :
first century A.D. and the
:
subsequent dispersion of the :
Jews, some Jews still remained:
in Palestine. For this reason:
it is just to reconstitute the:
Jewish state in Palestine.
:
••

1. Arguing historically, the
Arabs of :Palestine claim to be
descendants, in part at least,
of the original inhabitants of
P~estine. Partly they are decendants of the Arab conquerors
of the 7th century A.D. The
Hebrews were invaders from the
outside and for the last 2,000
years thare has been no Jewish
state in Palestine and no Je,,.ish majority. It is not reasonable to remake the map in
accordance with a situation
of 2,000 years ago •

2. Palestine 'is a holy land : 2. :Palestine is also a holy
to the Jews, the home of their: land to thE Christians and is
sncient prophets and temple, : the second holy land of the
is closely connected with the : ~fuslems. Jerusalem is Islam's
symbols and practices of the ::third holiest city. ThereJevrish religion and has been : ligious nostalgia of the Jews
the object of their hopes
: does not confer political
throughout the ages. As the : rights. Most Jews now returnJew's unique religious home, ::ing to :Palestine are religthey have a right to return to: iously inspired but are animl?alestine.
: ated by aggressive political
: nationalism.
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Zionist

.•

Arab
A "national home"

3. The Balfour Declaration of: 3.
in Pal: estine does not mean a Jewish
a. "national home" in Pales- : state. The official British
tine. Prominent British
: \fuite Papers of 1922 and 1939
leaders understood that this : confirm this. The Balfour Decmeant, in time, a Je,..rish state: laration contradicts the
approved by the United States: 14:cMahon pledges. Balfour promand the League of Nations.
: to give away something that
: was n~t his to give. The Arabs
: of Palestine are not claiming
: their country on pledges made
: to them, for it belongs to
: them. Nor are the Arabs claim: ing their independence on as: surrances; they are entitled
: to such independence as their
: natur&.l and inalienable right •
••
4. The Jews have brought
: 4. The prosperity of the Jewwestern civilization to Pal- : ish colonies in Palestine is
estine. Astounding agricul- : aftifical because it is supporttural and industrial progress: ed strongly by foreign c~pital.
has been made. Jewish immi- : At one time the Arabs were the
gration has raided the low
: most cultured people on earth.
Arab standard of living and : After four centuries of ottoman
improved health, hospital,and: rule, it was natural their
other services for the bene- : economy should be depressed.
fit of Jews and Arabs alike. : The other independent Arab
The Arab economy is feudal- : states have made remarkable
istie. ~ means of irrigation: progress on their own initetc., Palestine could support: i~tive. It is unfair that propmillions of additional people:-erty acquired by the Jewish
-- both immigrants and
: Agency should be made in·
natives. The White Paper of : alienable and that Arab labor
~939 unjustly restricts Jew- : should be disbarred from it.
ish acquisition of property. :
1917 promised the Zionists

5. The Jews have suffered
:
unspeakable ~ersecution in
:
Europe and all considerations:
bf humanitarian justice de- :
mand that the Jews be permit-:
ted to go to Palestine, a
:
land that has been promised :
them under international law.:
MOst Jewish refugees would
:
:

5. The Arabs pity the sad
plight of the Jews but, after
all, the Arabs were not responsible for bringing about
that sad situation. Palestine, a small, arid country,
cannot solve the Jewish refugee problem, which must be
approached on a world scale.
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Zionist

Arab
the same proportionate

rather go to Palestine than : At
any other place. Nowhere else: rate of Jewish immigration
do Jews have the same oppor- : into Palestine, the United
tunity·to rebuild their lives.: States would have taken in
Law and justice demand that : over 40 million immigrants.
the world answer the Zionist : Let the rest of the world
plea.
: assume its share of the
: refugee burden.
6. The League of Nations
mandate recognized "the historical connection of the
Jewish people with Palestine.

:
:
:
:
:

.•

6. As inhabitants of the
land for centuries, the
Arabs have a right to Palestine on the basis of selfdetermination of peoples.

:
7. Political Zionism is
: 7. I.fany Jews do not support
supported by an overwhelming : Zionism; many others are inmajority of Jews, and qy many: terested only in cultural or
Christian leaders, especially: religious Zionism. The western
in the United States and Great: democracies have been ignorBritain.
: nant of the case •
••

B. The Jews require a state

in Palestine because the
British, as the governing
authority,. have made conces~
sions to the Arabs for strategic, political and other
reasons.

:

: B. The concessions of the 1939
: White Paper merely recognized
: Arab rights in Palestine. The
:British promise to stop immi: gration after five years has
: been broken and now 100,000
: nevr ir.arr.igrants are being reo: commended.
:
••

9. The establishment of a
:
Jewish state in Palestine
:
-vrould help solve the Jewish :
minority problem at the same :
time. Jews v1ould no longer be:
a perpetual minority group
:
but would have a government :
vJ"hich could defend Je\•.rish
:
rights before the internat- :
tional councils of the world.:
All this 'l.vould not prejudice :
the rights of Jewish citizens:
of other countries.

9. Establishment of a Jewish
state might lead to war bet"reen .Arabs and Jews. The Je\'lS
are not a nation but citizens
of man~r countries who profes'1
the same religion. Haey Jewish
citizens of other countries
are opposed to political Zionism because they fear it may
effect their political status.
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Zionist
10. The Jews must attain a

: 10. The Jews have no right to
majority in Palestine because: obtain control over the Arabs
only thus can they cast off : in their own country. The
permanently that minority
: Arabs can be trusted to guarghetto status that has pla- : antee Je1'ish rights: a Moslem
gued them for centuries. An : family, for example, has been
Arab guarantee of their minor-: entrusted by the Christians
i ty rights would not be
: for many years \'Ti th the keys
sufficient.
: of the Holy Sepulchre •
••
:

11. The Arabs have great

stretches of territory and
many millions of people.

12. The United States gov-

:
:
:
:
:
:
••
••

:
ernment has repeatedly ex:
pre~sed sympathy for Jewish
:
aspirations in Palestine.
:
President Roosevelt agreed to:
v.rork for a Jewish co:mmonwealth in Palestine.
:

.•
••

13. The Arabs have accented :
the 600,000 Jews in Palestine:
as a 11 Fai t accompli 11 ; They
:
\rlould probably accept a Je\v- :
ish state if England and the :
United States insisted upon
it. The Arab League is too
:
weak to wage an effective war:
against the western democra-::
cies. The Arab states need
:
Anglo-American friendship in :
the Near East b8cause of the :
threat of Russia.
:

11. Most of the Arab world is
desert. Would the United States,
for example;. be 'wilxing 'to
giv~ up one of its small states
upon the order of a foreign
power?
12. The United States government has been influenced by
American Jewish voters in its
policy towards Palestine. President Roosevelt promised to
take no action i11 Palestine
hostile to the Arabs •

13. A Je\rlsh state in Palestine would meet the o~mbined
resistance of the Arab League.
If England and America support
Zionist aims, oil concessions
might be vri thdrawn. Some Arabs
have hinted that Russian support may be called in if England and the United States
press the Zionist cause too
far.

.•

14. Continued Je\dsh immi-

gration into Palestine is
required if the Zionists
are to construct the Jewish
states which they cl.aim has
been promised to them.

••

: 14. Even \vith Jewish immi-

:
:
:
:

..

gration limited only by economic capacity, they may
never obtain a majority in
Palestine because of the
rapid natural increase of the
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r

: Arab population.(31)

i

••

The arguments for

ea~h

side in the Palestine problem

could be extended indefinitely.

Those just listed, however.

may be accepted as representative of the difficulty involved
in reaching a workable solution.

Since that fateful day in

191? when }tr. Balfour extended his promise to the Zionists,
there have been few.
Proposals Propounded in the Comr.i ttee Hearing for the
Solution of the Problem
A. Jewish proposals:
1.

l~st

Jewish organizations in Palestine and abroad

which submitted written or oral statements to the committee
agreed with the Jewish Agency in demanding Palestine for the
creation of a Jewish State.

The opposition to the creation

of a Jevlish State is represented by a r.1inority.
2. Tie Ihu (union) Association and the Hashemer Worker's Party were in favor of a bi-national state in which the
two (Arab and Je\.rs) communities would have equal status and
political power.

(31) Charles R. Gellenr, The Palestine Problem, The Library
of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Pub. Affairs :Bulletin, No. 50, Washington D.C., }furch 194?, pp. 1?6-1?9.
Report to the Gen. Assembly, The UH Special Com..'llittee on
Palestine, iUs 1itajeety 1 s :StG,tionary Office, London,l94?, pp. 4?-66.
The Future of Palestine, Arab Office, Imperial Central,
Geneva, 194?, p~ 106.
·
Sa.TUy E'l. I'lida.ny, Int ernF..t ional Relations (Arabic), (Damascus: Syrian University Press, 1938),p. 2-23.
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3. The Communist Party proposes a democratic ArabJeivish. State, which might be bi-national or federative.
4. The council for Judaism voiced opposition to
Zionism, and opposed the establishment of a Jewish State.
5. The Jewish Agency: A solution to ensure large
scale immigration and' settlement and leads \vi thout delay to
the establishment of the Jewish State.
B. Arab proposals:
The representatives of the Arab States put forward
much the same constitutional proposals for the future of Palestine.
1. Palestine should be a unitary state, vlith a democratic constitution and an elected legislative assembly.
2. Civil rights provided for all citizens.
3. Protection of religious and cultural rights of
the Jewish community.
4. Strict prohibition of Jmvish immigration.
Here we see two different solutions with no cooperation
from either side, thus the special committee rejected such
solutions.
Palestinian Arabs Boycott of the Comrni ttee During the
Hearing in Palestine.
The United Nations Special Corr,mittee on Palestine \>raw
faced ivi th the non-cooperation of the Palestinian Arabs.
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This in fact effected the entire work of the committee.
On June 13, 1947, the Arab Higher Committee conveyed an official statement of their decision to abstain from collaboration in the work of the United
1\fations Special Committee on Palestine. (32)
Since the success of the United nations Special Committee on Palestine depended upon the co-operation of the parties (Arabs and Jetvs), the co:rmnittee did her best to overcome
this disability.
by

1-fr. Sands tram (chairman) made many appeals

radio and local press for the full co-operation of all

parties.
On June 23, the committee addressed a letter directly
to the
at ion.

~trab

Higher Cor.1mittee inviting them for full co-oper-

In answer the Are,b Higher Committee stated:

The .Arab Higher Committee found no reason to
reverse its previous decision.(33)
To balance the absence of the Arabs, the committee
took special account of .Arab residential, industrial., agricultural and religious

~reas.

The com:dttee adopted another procedure, at a later

(32) Report
Committee on
United
Information,
(33)

..

to the General Assembly, United Nations Special
Pr:tlestine, England Office, 1947, p. 8.
Nations Year Book, 1946-47, Department of Public
United l~ations, Lake Success, New York, p. 304.

Report to the General Assembly, op. cit., p. 8.

t-·
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stage of its w·ork, to invite the neighboring Arab States
to express their views on the question of Palestine.

Letters

were addressed to Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria
and l're,ns-Jordan.

Acceptance followed, with the exception of

Trans-J"ordan.
King Abdulah had his own vietvs of wanting the Arab State

in Palestine to be added to Trans-Jordan.

To obtain King Ab-

dulah' s views and attitude, the chc'J-i-.'nan and some: members of
the committee went to

~~an

ty's representative.

JQl this sLowed the consistent efforts

for a private visit to his majes-

of the committee to obtain all Arab view points on the future
government of Jlalestine.
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CHAPTER III
THE

CO~ThiTTTEE Jur.D

THE DECISION

To prepare the report the chairman, l'Ir. Sandstrom, and
two members presented suggestions as to a working program of
the comrnittee for the pre:pa,ration of the committee at Gene'1ta.
The presentation of this suggestion by the chairman was at
the 42nd meeting.

After an informal consultation, they adopt-

ed a memorandum on the future vlOrk-program of the committee.
It was approved by the committee.

It was also suggested that

another informal memoranda be submitted by delegates or members of the Secretariat.
After many informal discussions two :proposals had emerged.

The first was Federal State Constitutional plan, favored

by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia).
bers voted against this.
an economic;union.
representativ~

Seven mem-

The second plan was partition with

Three members voted against this.

The

of Australia did not vote.

Finally at the 52nd meeting on August 31, 1947, the
representatives signed the approved text of the report and
the covering letter to the Secretary General.

The main

recommendations submitted 'l.ofere as follows:
I.

Reco~~endations

Approved

Unanimousl~

The committee unanimously approved eleven recommendations to the General Assembly:
1.

"Termination of the mandate.

Arabs and Jews are
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in full accord with

(1)

tr~t.

2.

Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the
earliest possible date as the people of Palestine
are sufficiently advanced to goverrr.themselves.

3.

There shall be a transitional period preceding the
grant of independence, which shall be as short as
possible.

4.

During the transitional period the authority entrusted with the task of administering Palestine
and preparing it for independence shall be responsible to the United Nations.

5.

The sacred character of the Holy places.

6.

The General Assembly will undertake immediately an
international arrangement whereby the problem of
the distressed European Jews will be dealt With.

7.

Full protection for the rights and interests of
minorities.

8.

It shall be required that the two parties (Arabs
and Jews) have peaceful relations.

9.

Economic unity. The preservation of a suitable
measure of economic unity in Palestine, under any
type of solution, is of utmost importance to the
future standards of public services, the standards
of life of its people and the development of the
country.

10.

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in
Palestine the privileges ana immUnities of foreigners will have the right to the re-establishment of
such privileges and immunities in an independent
Palestine.

1~.

General Assembly shall call on the peoples of
Palestine to extend their fullest co•operation to
the United Nations in settling the problem .. and
ending the acts of violence which have for too long
beset that country.(l)
l~e

Ibid., p. 66-70; Ne"' York Times, Dec. 6, 1947; See map.

11.

Recon~endations

approved by a substantial majority.

A. Partition and the Economic Union*
In the course of the 47th meeting of the co.rnrnittee on
August 27, 1947, seven members of the committee (Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sv;eden, and
Uruguay) expressed themselves by recorded vote in favor of
the plan of partition witL the Economic Union.

It consists

of the following parts:
1.
2.

3.

Partit ion with the Economic Union.
Boundaries.
City of Jerusalem. 11 (2)
11

Only by means of partition, says the majority group, can
the conflicting parties find a way to solve the problem.

Tha

reasons they gave fort his are as follows:
1.

'rhe partition solution provides thot finality ·which

is a most urgent need in the solution.

Every other proposed

solution would tend to induce the tvm parties to seek modification in their favour by means of persistent pressure.

The

grant of independence to both States, hov,rever, would remove
the basis for such efforts.
2.

Partition is based on a realistic appraisal of the

actual Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine.

Full political

co-operation would be indispensable to the effective functionine of any single state scheme, such as the federal State

(2)

Ibid., p. 73.
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proposal, exce?t in those cases which frankly envisage an
Arab or a Jewish dominated State.
3.

Partition is the only means available by 'tvhich po ...

litical and economic responsibility can be placed squarely
on both Arabs and Je"Vrs, with the prospective result that oo nfronted with responsibility for bearing fUlly the consequences of their own actions, a new and important element
of political amelioration "Vnll be introduced.

In the pro-

posed federal State solution this factor \orould be lacking.
4.

Jewish immigration is the central issue in Palestine

today and is the one factor, above all others, that rules out
the necessary cooperation between the Arab and Jewish communities in a. single State.

The creation:;of a Jewish State un-

der a partition scheme is the only hope of removing this iss~

from the area of conflict.
5.

It is recognized that partition has been strongly

opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that that opposition will be
lessened by a solution which definitively fixes the extent of
territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limitation on immigration.

~1e

fact that the solution carries the

sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should
allay Arab fearw of further expansion of the Jewish State.
6.

In view of the limited area and resources of Pales-

tine, it is essential that, to the extent feasible, and consistent with the creation of two independent States, the economic unity of the country should be preserved.

The partition
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proposal, therefore, is a qualified partition, subject to
such measures and limitations as are considered essential
to the future economic and social well-being of both States.
Since the economic self-interest of each State would be
vitally involved, it is believed that the minimum measure of
economic unity is possible, where that of political unity is
not. (3)
"Palestine within its present borders following a transitional period of two years from Sept. 1, 1947-49 shall
be constituted into an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem.

During

the transitional period, the present mandatory power
shall carry on the

a~~inistration.

During the transit-

ional period a legislative body shall be established in
each state." (4)
B.

Partition with the Economic Union:
A treaty shall be entered between the two states, con-

taining the Economic Union of Palestine.

The objectives of

this Union shall be:
1. "A customs union.
2. Connnon currency.
3. Operation in the common interest of railways, postal and telephone.

(3)

Ibid., P• 73.

(4)

Ibid., p. 75.
New York Times, December 6, 1947.

92

4.

Joint economic development especially in respect
to irrigation." (5)

Commentary on

1.

Partitio~

by the Committee

The primary objectives sought in the foregoing

scheme are, in short, political division and economic unity:
to confer upon each group, Arab and Jew, in its own territory, the power to make its own laws, while preserving to
both, throughout Palestine, a single integrated economy, admittedly essential to the well-being of each, and the same
territorial freedom of movement to individuals as is enjoyed
today.

The former necessitates a territorial partition; the

latter, the maintenance of unrestricted

co~nercial

relations

between the States, together with a common administration of
functions in which the interests of both are in fact inextricably bound together.
2.

The territorial division with the investment of full

political pov1er in the State achieves, in turn, the desire of
each for statehood and at the
ating control of
3.

s~~e

time creates a self-oper-

irr~igration.

The Economic Union is to be administered by a Joint

Economic Board in the composition of vrhich a pe.rity of interest in the two States is recognized by equal representation
from them.

(5)

Ibid.

But in relation to such necessary and convenient
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services day-to-day rulings are imperative; and since in
present

circt~stances

it cannot be expected that in joint

matters they would easily agree, the principle of arbitral
decision is introduced by adding to the Board three independent gutside persons to be chosen by the United nations.
4.

BUt in the larger view here are the sole remaining

representatives of the Semitic race.

They are in the land

in which that race was cradled.

There are no funchmental

incompatibilities between them.

The scheme satisfies the

deepest aspiration of both; independence.

There is a con-

siderable body of opinion in both groups which seeks the
course of cooperation.

Despite, then, the dra\vback of the

Arab minority, the setting is one from which, with goodwill
and a spirit of cooperation, may arise a rebirth in historical surroundings of the genius of each people.

The massive

contribution made throughout the centuries by them in religious and ethical conceptions, in philosophy, and in the entire intellectual sphere, should excite among the leaders a
mutual respect and a pride in their common origin.
5.

The Jews bring to the land the social dynamism and

scientific method of the West; the Arabs confront them with
individualism and intuitive understanding of life.

Here then,

in this close association, through the natural emulation of
each other, can be evolved a synthesis of the h..ro ci vilizations, preserving, at the

s~ae

time, their fundamental
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characteristicu.

In each State, the native genius will have

a scope and opportunity to evolve into its highest cultural
forms and to attain its greatest reaches of mind and spirit.(£)

c.

Boundaries:
"The proposed Arab State will include Western Galilee,

Samaria and Judea with the exclusion of the city of Jerusalem.
The Jewish State will include Eastern Galilee, the Esdraelon
?lain, most of the coastal plain and the whole of the Beershaba Sub-district, \'rhich includes the Hegab.
State has 498,000 mews and 407,000 Arabs.
10,000 Jews and 725,000 Arabs.

The Jewish

The Arab State has

The city of Jerusalem has

100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs.(?)
D.

The City of Jerusalem:
;r

"The city shall be placed under international trustee-

ship system tied to·the United Nations.

It shall include

Abu Dis, the most of Southern Bethlehem, the most of Western
Ein Kar.m.

The city should be included in the Economic Union

of :Palestine. (8)

(6) Report m the General Assembly by the United Nations
Special Committee on ~alestin~1 pp. 86-81.
(7)

Ibid., P• 83.

(8)

Ibid., p. 88.
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J"ustifica.tion
"The proposal to place the City of Jerusalem under international trusteeship is based on the follo\rlng cDnsiderations:
1.

Jerusalem is a Holy City for

~ree

faiths.

Their

shrines are side by side; some are sacred to two faiths.
Hundreds of millions of m1ristians, }fuslems and Jews throughout the world want peace and especially religious peace to
reign in Jerusalem, the sacred character of its Holy :Places
to be preserved, access to them guaranteed to pilgrims from
abroad.
2.

.
The history of Jerusalem, during the Ottoman regime

' has been
as under the mandate, shows that religious peace
maintained in the City because the Government was anxious and
had the power to prevent controversies involving some religious interest from developing into bitter strife and disorder.
The Government was not intimately mixed in local politics and
could, when necessary, arbitrate conflicts.
3.

Reltgious peace in Jerusalem is necessary for the

maintenance of peace in the Arab and in the Jewish States.
Disturbances in the Holy City would have far-reaching consequences, extending perhaps beyond the frontiers of Palestine.
4.

The City of Jerusalem shall be dffinilitarized and its

neutrality shall be declared and preserved and no para-military
formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted ·within
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its borders.
5.

Persons residing in the City of

Jerusale~,

without

distinction as to ethnic origin, sex, language or religion,
shall be ensured protection under its laws \vi th regard to the
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
freedom of worship, language, speech and publication, education, assembly, and association.
6.

Residents of the City of Jerusalem, irrespective of

nationality, may participate in the local elections of the
City and they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the City
in respect of taxation and judicial proceedings.
7.

A Governor of the City of J"erusalem shall be appoint-

ed by the Trusteeship Councll.

He shall be neither Arab nor

Jew nor a citizen of the Palestine States nor, at the time of
appointment, a resident of the City of Jerusalem.
8.

In addition to the Governor, there shall be such

other executive, legislative and judicial organs, bodies and
offices for the government of the City as may be determined
in the Trusteeship Agreement.
9.

The protection of the Holy Places,religious build-

ings and sites in the City of Jerusalem shall be entrusted
to a special police force, the members of \-'lhich shall be
recruited outside of Palestine and shall be neither Arab nor
Jew.

The Governor shall be empowered to direct such bud-

getary provisions as may be necessary for the
this special force.

maintenc~
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1.0.

The City of .Jerusalerr. should be included in the

Economic Union of Palestine.(9)
III.

Recommendations Approved bv the Hinority
A.

Federal State Plan:

It is recognized that Pales-

tine is the common country of both indigenous Arabs and Jews,
that both these peoples have had an historic association with
it· and that both play vi tal roles in the economic and cul tur-

al life of the country.
It would be a tragic mistake on the part of the international community not to bend every effort .of support for
the preservation of the unity of Palestine by the United Nations.

This support vrould be an important factor in encour·

aging cooperation and collaborat'ion bet;.veen the

t'lrro

Semetic

people of Palestine.
Thus the object of a Federal State solution would be to
give the most feasible recognition to the nationalistic aspiration of both Arabs and Jevrs and to merge them into single
loyalty and patriotisn ,,,rhich \vould find expression in an independent Palestine.

The Federal State is also in every re-

spect the most democratic solution.

It avoids the creation of

national minority grou:-ps, and affords an opportunity for full
and effective participation in representative government to

(9)

Ibid., p. 86, 87, 88.

every citizen of the State.

rrhis solution would be most

in harmony with the basic principles of the charter of the
United Nations.

This independent Federal State of Pales-

tine shall compromise an Arab and a Jewish State.

This plan

was supported by three members (India, Iran, and YugoslaviaK'
**(10)

Recorrlil1 endations
The undersigned representatives of India, Iran, and
Yugoslavia, not being in agreement vvith the recommendation
for partition formulated by the other members of the Committee, and for the reasons, among others stated above, present
to the General Assembly the following recornm.endations, which
in their view, constitute the most suitable solution to the
problem of Palestine.
lT IS RECOMMENDED THAT
·1.

The peoples of Palestine are entitled to recog-

nition of their right to independence, and an independent
federal State of Palestine shall be created following a
transitional period not exceeding three years.
2.

With regard to the transitional period, respon-

sibility for administering Palestine and preparing it for
independence under the conditions herein prescribed shall

(10)

Ibid., p. 88-97.
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be entrusted to such authority as may be decided upon by
the General Assembly.
3.

The independent federal State of Palestine shall

compromise an Arab State and a Jewish State.
4.

In delimiting the boundaries of the Arab and Jew-

ish States, respectively, consideration shall be given to
anticipated population grovrth.
5.

During the transitional period a constituent

asse~

bly shall be elected by the population of Palestine, which
shall formulate the constitution of the independent federal
State of Pal est ine.
6.

The govermental structure of the independent fed-

eral State of Palestine shall be federal and shall compromise
a Federal Government and the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States respectively.
7.

Amcmg the organs of government there shall be a

Head of State and an executive body, a representative federal legislative body, a federal court and such other subsidiary bodies as may be deemed necessary.
8.

The federal legislative body shall be composed of

. t v.ro chambers.
9.

Election to one chamber of the federal legislative

bo,dy shall be on,:the basis of proportional representation of
the population as a whole.
10.

Arabic and Hebrevr shall be official languages in

r
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both the Federal and State Governments.
11.

Each State shall be entitled to organize a police

force for the maintenance of law and·order.
12.

The boundaries of the respective Arab and Je\vish

States in the independent federal State of Palestine shall
be as indicated on the map attached to this report.
13.
be dealt

The problem of Jewish innnigration into Palestine
11li

th in the follovring manner:

For a period of three years from the effective
date of the beginning of the transitional period
provided for in the solution to be applied to
Palestine, egen if the transitional period should
be less, Jewish immigration shall be permitted
into the borders of the JevTish State in the proposed independent Federal State of Palestine, in
such numbers as not to exceed the absorptive capacity of the Jewish State, having due regard for
the rights of the population then present within
that State and for their anticipated natural rate
of increase.(ll)

(11)

Ibid., p. 9C!
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CHAPTER lV
VIEhPOINTS,

COELEl~jTS AND ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES
BEFO:C~~E THE GENERAL ASSEJ>~BLY

TO 'i'hE DISPUTE

On September 17, 194 7, v.rhen the regular session of the
General Assembly met at Lake Success the first item on the
Agenda to be discussed and debated was the committee's report.

The first to speak up was the United Kingdom Delegate •

1'he United Kingdom's viewpoint
The representative of the United K:j_ngdom declared that
his government was in substantial agreement with the twelve
general recommendations; in particular, the United Kingdom
Government endorsed and wished to emphasize three of these
recommendations:

The termination of the T•Iandate, Indepen-

dence, the problem of Jewish displaced persons.

As to the

first ones both of which were an exact expression of the guiding principle of British policy.

As to the latter the Unitro

Kingdom Government believed that the entire problem of displaced persons in Europe, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, v.ras
an international responsibility demanding urgent attention.(l)
The United Kingdom representative went on to say that the
attitude of his government remained as then stated.

His

( 1) UN Official Records of the Second Session of the
General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question;
Second Meeting, Lake Success, New York, Sept. 26, 1947, p. 1
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government was ready to cooperate with the assembly to the
fullest extent possible.

He could not easily imagine cir-

cumstances in which the United Klngdom would wish to prevent the application of a settlement recommended b.1 the
A8sembly.

The crucial question for His Majesty's Govern-

ment was, however, the matter of enforcements of such a settlement.

His government was ready to assume responsibility

for implementing any plan on which agreement was reached by
the Arabs and the Jews.
were to

r-6-lJ~omm.end

If on the other hand,~the Assembly

a policy which was not acceptable to both

parties the United Klngdom Government would not feel able to
implement it, and the Assembly Should therefore provide, in
such a case, for some alternative authority to implement:(2)
On September 26, 1947, British Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones told the United Nations that:
"Britain had decided to terminate its mandate and
withdraw from Palestine regardless of whether a settlement was reached or not. The 1ate for complete evacuation was given as August, 1948."(3)
View Point of the Arab Higher Cpmmittee
The representative of the Arab Higher Committee, Mr. G.
Hussein, declared that it was the sacred duty of the Arabs
of Palestine te :-defend their country against all aggressione

(2)

Ibid., p. 3.

(3) Palestine Termination of the Mandate, His Majesty'e Government Stationary Office, London, 1948, p. 11.-
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including the Zionists.

The right and the testimony of

the Arabs in Palestine, stated El Hussein:, had been the subject of more than eighteen investigations within twenty-five
years, and all to no purpose.

Com.·;issions of inquiry had

either reduced the national and legal rights of the Palestine
Arabs or had glossed them over.

The few recomrr.endations

favorable to the Arabs had been ignored by the Ivhndatory Po·wer.

For these and for other reasons already communicated to

the United Nations, it was not surprising that the Arab Higher Committee should have abstained from the nineteenth investigation (UNSCOF) and refused to appear before the Special
Committee. (4)

El Hussein· declared thc.:t England is the one

who created all of their troubles and

~ngland

a lone who is

responsible for the miserable conditions of the Arabs.
urn education, the Jews had control of their own educational system \vhile the Arabs were deprived of th.e right.n(5),
11

In economic fields, discrimination was still more ap-

parent.

The Mandatory power and the Jewish Agency had pur-

sued a policy calculated to place obstacles in the way of

{4) UN Official Records. Ad Hoc Committee, 21?.• cit., Third
meeting, Sept. 29, 1947, p. 6.
(5)

Ibid., p. 8.
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Arab agricultural development while assisting Jewish indust~.

l1r. Hussein cited instances showing how action by the

High Commissioner for Palestine during 1920 {who was a Jew
himself), had compelled the sale of Arab lands by Arab debtora to the Jews and had le'd to the wiping out of many Arab
villa.ges~n{6)

"In the financial field the government's policy of dis·
crimination was common knowledge although the Arabs represented two-thirds of the population, the Jewish minority received one-half of the benefits of the budget, and Jewish
local authorities had received a far greater proportion

or

government leans and special loans for housing and other purposes.

The granting of the Jordan and Dead Sea concessions

were instances of discrimination in favor of the Zionists in
the field of economic development.n{7)

The representative ot

the Arab Higher Committee stated that, yielding to Zionist
pressure, the United Kingdom Government had failed to implement its own decision, made in 1939, that Jewish immigration
into Palestine must cease and then Palestine must become an
independent unitary state within a fixed time.
No comments upon the UNSCOP, declared El Hussein, because the Arab Higher Committee considered that it could not

(6)

Ibid., p. 9.

(7)

~ •• p.

9.
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be used as a basis for discusssion.

Both the majority and

the minority plans contained in the Report vvere inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the Covenant of
the League of Nations.

"The Arabs of Palestine 1-vere sol-

idly determined to oppose with all the means at their disposal any scheme which provided for the dissection, segregation or partition of their country or vvhich gave to minority special and preferential rights and status. 11 ( c3)
Viewpoints of the Jewish Agency for Palestine
The representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine
praised the special committee for its conscientious labors
and good faith.

On behalf of the Jewish Agency he supported

ten of the eleven recommendations unanimously adopted by
UNSCOP.

The exception was recommendation:Vl (Jewish Dis-

placed Persons).

The Jewish Agency, he said, did not dis-

approve of this recommendation but did wish to call atten. tion to the llintense urge" of the overwhelming majority of
Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine, a fact
noted by both the Anglo-American Committee and by UNSCOP.(9)
The solution proposed by the minority of the Special
Committee was unacceptable to the Jewish Agency.

The major-

ity proposal was not really satisfactory to the Jewish

(8)

Ibid., p. 11.

{9)

Ibid., p. 15.

peop~,
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either,

&ccording to the Balfour Declaration the National

HOme implied to Palestine and Transjordan.

Transjordan hadt

nevertheless, been severed from Palestine in 1922 and had
subsequently been set up as an Arab State.

Now a second

Arab State was to be carved out of the remainder of Palestine, with the result that the Jewish National Home would
represent less than one-eighth of the territory originally
set aside for it.

Such a sacrifice, declared Dr. Silver,

should not be asked of the Jewish people.(lO)
The representative of the Jewish Agency also criticized
the UNSCOP majority proposals concerning Jerusalem, saying
that the Jewish section of modern Jerusalem (outside the
walled city) ehould be included in the Jewieh State,{ll)
In conclusion he urged that the transitional period
leading to the establiehment of the Arab and Jewish States
in Palestine be made as short as possible; at any rate shorter than the two-year limit proposed by UNSCOP.

The repre-

sentative of the Jewish Agency favored an international
authority to be entrusted under the United Nations auspices,
with the task of administering Palestine during the transitional period.(l2)

(10)

Ibid, p. 16.

(11)

Ibid,, P• 16.

(12)

Ibid., p. 17-18,
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.A.ttitu<le o! the Representative of Australia .. (Commonwealthl
The representative of Australia abstained from voting
on the plans of partition on the ground that it is out of
the scope of the Committee.

He stated at the forty-sixth

meeting of the Special Committee that he holds the view
"that the primary obligation of the Committee in respect of
the General A8sembly is that of a recording, reporting and
a !act-finding function. 11 (13)

Mr. HOod went on to say that even it is true that the
obligation is also laid on the Committee "to submit propos•
als as it may deem appropriate for the solution of the Palestine problem," but, since there is neither unanimity on
any particular solution nor any decisive majority in favor
of,r.any particular course", the representative suggested that
the whole question ot Palestine should be reviewed and determined by the General Assembly.
Abdur-Rahman

----~R=e-p=resentative

of India (Asiatic views)

In a special note handed to the General Assembly, the
representative of India

ad~cated

that independence is the

natural birthright of every people of the world.

The denial

of this right is the •erious menace we have in the world
today and the strained relations between the Arab world and
the Mandatory today could be easily traced to these same

lOS
causes.

As to the BalfC'ltr lJecla.ration, it wae made improp-

erly and unjustly:

Abdur-Rabman stated that it had no legal

or moral validity not legal "as the British Government had
no power to make it at the time when it was made", or even
subsequently, •as they did net acquire any sovereignty over
Palestine"; and not moral "as it wae in contravention of the
promises already made to the Arabs, who had given all the
assistance required of them in pursuance of such promisee
and which was admitted
"invaluable".(l4)

b,y

the General Assembly to have been

Thus it is possible to conceive that Lord

Balfour either knew nothing about the promises which had already been made to the Arabs or had altogether forgotten
them under the pressure of the war when it was passing through
a critical juncture, and argued on behalf of the government
to view the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine with favor.

Justice M. Abdur-Rahman of India support-

ed his statement by a speech made by Lloyd George in the
60mmon~ in June 1937.(15)

"It wa.e one of the darkest periods of the war
when Mr. Balfour prepared hie Declarations. Let me
recall the circumstances to the Houee. At the time
the French Army had mutinied, the Italian army waw
on the eve of collapse and America bad hardly started
preparing in earnest. There was nothing left but
~itain confronting the most powerful military combination the world has everJ'Seen •. It was important
for us to seek every legitimate help we could get.
We came to the conclusion, from imformation we received from every part of the world, that it was

(14)

IbidL, p. 50.

(15)

Ibid., p. 52.

.
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vital we sheuld have the sympathies ef the Jewish
cemmunity. I can assure the Committee that we did
not come to the conclusion from any predilections
or prejudices. Certainly we had no prejadices. Certainly we had no prejudices against the Arabs because at the moment we had hundreds and thousands of
troops fighting for Arab emancipation from the Turks.(12)
Thus the Indian representative concluded that the Balfour
Declaration "has no legal or moral validity 11 so it is illegal and ±mmoral.
1947 a.s the

11

He described the period between 1921-

reign of terror" during which England had kill·

ed hundreds and thousands of Arabs and hundreds of houses
were destroyed.

During such a disturbed state of affairs it

was impossible for the Arabs to

d~elep

their land and take

part in peaceful pursuit which goes to develop a nation.
While the Jews, whc were siding with the government, continued the Indian Representative, lest no time in trying to consolidate their position, and with the
ry and particularly those of America.

h~lp

of the world Jew-

What to say "of sec-

ondary and higher education even the elementary education
was ignored". "There are no vocational institutions and
nothing appears to have been done during this time towards
training persons fer social service.

While millions t>f

pounds have been spent on security measures and on the ar.med
police. ••

The fact, however, remains that the )'Ia.nd.atory

:Po~

""rer cannot be held to have succeeded in preparing the people
for self-government and thus vielated the article twenty-two

(16)

Ibid., •· 52.
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o! the Covenant ef the Mandate." (17)
As to the "Displaced Persons" the duty o! finding

suitable places for these persons, advocate4 the representatiye, rests on the whole of the world and not only
on Palestine,(l8)
In conclusion, "Independence to be granted to Palestine as a whele, and a federal Palestinian State should
be formed which should be composed of both Arab andl Jews. (19)
Views of the Repre§entative o! Yugoslavia (Communist views),
In a letter sent

~~

the chairman of the Special Commit-

tee on Palestine the Representative of Yugoslavia reminded
him that when deciding the procedure to be adopted for the
writing of the Commdttee's report to the General Assembly et
the United Nations, it was resolved that a single report
would be prepared and submitted.

While on the other band

two different points of view had taken shape and were submitted to the General Assembly the Majority plan, favoured
the partition and the Minority plan, favoured the creation
of an independent federal state of Palestine.

(17)

Ibid,, p, 61,

(18)

Ibid, p, 75,

(19) India was a British colony, and the Indians, who were
striving at that t~e to achieve their independence ~ a
common feeling witlt::,the Arabs and they well know what does
it mean to be subjected to another nation.
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This difference of opinion had arisen from a different
appraisal of the historical, political, national and economic, aspects of the problem under consideration.

"In aocc.rd-

ance with that decision I have, not being able to agree with
the majority plan," declared the. representative of Yugoslavia,

"reserved the right to submit separately my views on

the main

featur~s

of the historical background of the Pales-

tine question, the appraisal and

for the solution of

pr~ses

the problem." (20)
The Palestine problem arose, stated the representative,
frem two different promisee, one to the Arabs and anether to
the Jews.

Aside from the newly created situation in the Near

East where Great Britain had become the dominant power.

In

countries which were under her mandate or protectorate, Great
Britain created a strong base for the realization of her imperial, political and ecenomic interests.
"Great Britain from 1922· did not endeavor to prepare
Palestine for independence.•

"She carried out her policy

without the agreement of the interested Palestine parties,
imposing this policy upon both Arabs and Jews.n(21)
Simio (the Yugoslavi~Representative) advocated that
'

England had failed to bring together the Jews and the Arabs.

(20) .Annexes! Appendices and Maps to the ;re1,1o;rt by the IJN
Specia! Commi tee on Palestine to the General Asaembly,(London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947), p. 79.
(21)

Ibid., p. 81.

r

112

She had kept them separated, just divide and rule.
"In 1922 the .Arab representatives announced their readiness to accept Jewish settlement in Palestine and to coop*
erate for the progress of the land."(22)
"In 1930 a society was founded called the Worker's
Brotherhood with the purpose of erganizing Jewish and Arab
workers in a common union.
came from the people

The initiative for the founding

th~selves.

This meant that conscious-

ness of the need for unified.action and close co-operation
among Arabs and Jews had strengthened.
ed to temporary failure.

This attempt was doom-

The authorities forbid the organ-

ization to continue its activities and suppressed the publication of its newspap~r."(23)
In

~943,

515 Arab and Jewish workers participated to-

gether in strikes.
In 1944, the number of strikers participating in such
conm~n

strikes grew to 1,250. In 1945 to 2,350; 1946 to

30,000 and in 1947 to 40,000.

These strikes are not merely

of economic but of political significance as well.

Demon-

strations having as their slogan "unity of Arab and Jewish
workers means victory" accompanied the strikes.
During the uprising itself, and especially during the
(22)

Ibid,, p. 83.

(23)

Ibid., p. 85.

I
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the Second War, new forces came into being within the framework of the Arab National Movement.

These new foroee were

re:presented in the "League of the National Liberation &f Palestine," working against the mandatory

auth~rity

and for re-

&l)proachment and cooperation with . the democratic Jewish for ..
ces.

"These new forces", continued S1mic, "formed expression

also into the creation of a unified 'Arab

Front~.

The Arab

Front gathered about itself those Arab politicians who considered that close cooperation with the Jews was vital for
a successful etruggle for independence."(24)
The mandatory kept the Jews and the Arabe apart even
in schools, the representative declared, "as regards education and public health, we could not help but be struck by
the extremely low percentage of budgetary expenditure under
the above two items."

The representative quoted:

"In 1922·

1923 the :percentage was 4.86 education and 6.2 :public health.
In 1936-1937 it decreased to 3.99 in education and 3.3 in
health.

In 1943-1944, 3.09 education and 3.3 :public health.

In 1944-1945, 2.9 education and 2.7 public health.(25)
In social legislation, the representative stated "we
are ·obliged to note the absence of progressive social legislation.

Such elementary rights of the workers as the right

(24)

Ibid., ~· 86.

(25)

Ibid., P• 88.
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to for.m trade union, the right of assembly and strike,_ the
limitation of working hours, minimum wages, compenstaion in
case of discharge, payment for absence due to sickness and
annual leave,

ar~

not provided for in the labour legislation

of Palestine.n(26)
Again Simic accused the mandatory of being a failure.
"The disparity between the standards of the Jewish and Arab
workers", he state4, is frequently referred to as one of the
main causes of friction between Arabs and Jews in genetal."
"Indicative of the a.bsence of any J.'OSi ti ve policy on the
part of the government to remove this disparity is the fact
that it has failed to eliminate it even among its owm empleyers of whom there are some 80,000 and when there is the
additional glaring disparity between British empleyees on
the one hand and Arab and Jewish empleyees on the other (of
the 121 offieals whose salaries amount to more than ene
thousand pounds a year -$4,000.00 -

113 are British, only

four are Arab, only three are Jews, while one is listed under the heading "others 9

---

and many similiar instances

might be quoted).(27)
Thus in analyzing the various possible proposals regarding the future government of Palestine egery one should bear
(26)

Ibid., P• 89.

(27)

Ibid., p. 89.
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in mind the fact that Palestine consists of tvm peoples the Arabs and the Jews and according to the representative,
the main object of the committee is to reconcile them.

"An

essential premise on -v;hich our considerations of the proble m
and solutions should be based is the unquestionable fact that
Palestine, within its present frontiers, constitutes an
economic unit.n(2$)
Mr. Simic ended his letter stating "on the basis of such
considerations, fundamental principles and premises, bearing
in mind existing realities in Palestine, and prompted by a
sincere desire to achieve a just and lasting solution of the
Arab problem and of correctly settling relations between.Aral:s
and Jews in a free and independent Palestine, their common
state."(29)
The United States Attitude
On September 17, 194 7, when the r egular session of the
General Assembly met at Lake Success, United States Secretary of State George C. I1iarshall declared that:
"The United States gives great weight not only
to the recommendations which have met with unanimous
approval of the Special Committee but also to those
which have been approved by the majority of the
committee."(30)

{28)

Ibid., p. 102.

(29)

Ibid., P• 102.

(30)

Joseph Dunner, The ReJ2ublic of Israel,

.Q.l2..

£ll., p • 78.
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The Russian Attitude
The greatest surprise came from Russia; for the first
time in the United Natious history the U.s.s.R. sided with
the United States on a major issue by favoring the partition
plan.

After considerable discussion the United States and

Russia decided on a plan similiar in many respects to the
majority proposal.

A commissien ·of five members was pro-

posed to supervise the transition to independence, but it
was not provided with either a military force, or the machin..
ery of administration.

A further reason is suggested by the

tone of Russian speeches at the United Nations, which seemed
bent on establishing the "principle" of partition.

They

pleaded the right of a minority to separate itself from the
majority and from its own state.
Voting
The final act in the partition of Palestine was played
out at the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall
of 1947.
On

Oct~ber

11, the United States
delegation declared
it.
.
.

self, with a few reservations, in favor of the plan for partition as submitted by the UN'e Special Committee.
port-<.was based on two a.eeUliJ:I)tions:

Its.,.eu;p-

That Arab opposition

would be negligible, and That the proposed Jewish State could
be made a "going concern" -- despite the consensus of expert
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opinion that neither aee~tion was eound.(31)

After its

decision was made, the United States delegation proceeded
on the principle that other countries shQuld be allewed to
ma.ke up their own minds.

This principle was modified. how•

ever, when it became apparent that if it were followed the
partition plan would be defeated.

A straw vote taken in the

united Nations on Saturday, November 22, showed 24 States
supporting the partition, 16 opposed, and the rest abstaining or undecided.

The American Delegation was told at that

point that the United States was committed to partition and
that it must go threugh. (32)
By Wednesday, November 26, when the vote wa.e taken in
the Committee, the result was 25 to 13 -- one vote gained
for the partition, three lost to ite opponents, and the abstention increased by two.

That was still not enough for

the two-thirds majority needed fer passage.
Here the Zionists took the fight into their bands.
Ral~ing

a group of influential Americans and selecting

their targets with care, they exerted all possible influ•
ence, floods of telegrams and letters, and politics and economic pressure.

•

Six countries which had indicated their

(31) Victor H. Berne:tein - Spee·ch Senate, Vol. 93, part 9, P• 10985-6.

Coqgressio~l

Records,

(32) Kermit Roosevelt, The·Fartition of Palestine, The Middle East Journal, Jan. 1948, p. 13.
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intention of voting against partition were the chosen targets:

Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines, China, Ethiopia and

Greece,

All except Greece were either won to the voting f0r

partition or persuaded to abstain,
These countries had many sound reasons for voting against
partition,

.Aside from moral scruples about "self-determin•

ation" and the possible injustice of impesimg partition en
a country against the will of a majority of its inhabitants,
Haiti has a sizeable number of Syrian citizens.

Liberia,

China, and the Philippines have 1arge numbers of Mesleme
among their population.

Ethiopia and Greece wish te be on

good relatione w1 tk.: their Moslem neighbors, who strongly
oppose partition.(33)
The del.egates of" thoa.e .. six nations, and their home governments as well, were swamped with telegrams, phone calls,
letters, and visitation,

Many of the telegrams, particular-

ly, were from Congressmen, and others as well invoked the
name and prestige of the United States Government.

.An

ex-

Geverner, a prominent Democrat with White House and other
connections,

~ersonally

telephoned Haiti urging that its dele-

gation be instructed to change its vote,(34)

(33)

He spoke

Ibid,, p, 14,

(34) ·Congressional
P• 11656,

Record~(,

Vol. 93, Part 11, Nov. 28, 1947 1

l
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firmly and might be

~resumed

to speak with auth&rity.

A

well-known economist also clese to the White House, and acting in a liaison capacity for the Zionist erganization, exerted his powers ef persuasion upon the Liberian delegate.
Both states reversed themselves and voted for partition.
After a good deal of "pressure politics" the final vote was
cast with thirty-three for the partition plan and thtrteen
against it.

Ten abstained from voting.(35)

A significant feature of the United Nations decision is
that votes fer partition were cast entirely by Christian nations, while those against it, with the exception of Cuba and
Greece, came from non-Christian states.
When the final vote for partition was announced, the
Zionists became delirious with joy.

Street dances and mass

meetings were held in Tel Aviv.
The Arabs were disappointed.
various Arab States encamped along

The regular armies of the
P~lestine's

the .Arab League is reported to have

frontiers, and

.:~treeo.zmnended

that they

will occupy the country when the British leave it.
On March 15, Great Britain signed a new twenty-year
treaty of mutual defense and friendship with Trans-Jordan
and that Brigadier Glubb Pasha and his staff would remain in

(35)

For mare detail see:

UN Bulletin, March 15, 1948.
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command of the Legion.

After the bnglish troops left Pal-

estine, the Arab State Armies moved to capture Tel Aviv.
Three vleeks later, Glubb and his army (Trans-Jordan army)
were five miles east of 'l'el Aviv.
miles north of Tel Aviv.

The Iraq Army was

VJ

ight

The Syrian Army and the Egyptian

Annies were on the north and south.

England gave the signal

to Glubb to retreat and stop fighting.

'l'he Iraq Army which

is under English control was told to stop fighting.
After three months, more than 40,000 volunteers entered
Palestine.

Hundreds of airplanes from the United States,

Yugoslavis, and the U.S.S.R. were sent in.
The Zionist, seeing the armies of Iraq and Trans-Jordan
retreating, attacked the Egyptian and drove them out of many
cities.

They drove on to the north-east until they reached

the boundries of their state which were drawn by the United
Nations Commission.
Another reason for the retreat of the

Ira~

and frans-

Jordan armies is the hatred between Abdulah and Elmufti (the
president of' the Arab Higher Col;!).mittee of Palestine).
wanted to rule the Arab State of Palestine.

Each

Egypt and Syria

sided with Blmufti and were left to fight alone.
vvhen the second truce started more than $50,000 Arabs
fled to the neighboring states as refugees.

Thus Jewish

refugees stepped into Palestine while, $50,000 Arabs stepped

r
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out to be refugees, 50,000 of whom died for lack of food
and clothing.(36)
Another victim of the Partition Plan was the
As~assination

of Bernadette.

Count Folk Bernadotte of

8weden, official United Nations mediator proposed modification to the committee on Palestine in his final
report to the United Nations.

Three days after he was

assassinated by a Jewish Terrorist.

Under this plan all

the Negeb would go to the Arabs and all of Galilee to
Israel.
A final settlement of Israels frontiers has not yet
been agreed upon, but after intermittent fighting in
late 1948 and early 1949, Israel and its two chief
antagonists, Egypt and Jordan, signed armistice agreement on February 24, and April 3, 1949, respectively.
These were accomplished through the high efforts of
Dr. Ralph .6unche of the United States, the successor of
Bernadette.

(3b) Interim Report to the .Fifth Session of the General
Assembly, by the Director of the United Nations Relief
and vvork Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,
Fifth Session Agenda, Item 20 (B) October 19, 1950, p. 10-lL
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CHAPTER V

OBSERVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
.ABOUT THE COML•D:TTEE' S DECISION OF PARTITION
Kere in

Washin~Jton

- and in the temples of the United

Nations Brotherhood on New York's Eaet forty-second street ••
stated Lehrman in the

c~entary

of December, 1953 - It ba8

become a diplomatic maxim that like oil and water, the Arab$
and the Israelis do not and ca.met mix. (1)

Mr. L.ehrma.n has

uncovered, after admittedly dogged search, knowlegeable observers who believe that Frenchmen and Tunisian may yet lie
down teaether or Italians with Yugoslavs, or Pakistanis with
Hindustans or even Soviet Russians with Americans, each araed
to the teeth but willing to leave bad enough alone, shortterm or

~be,

lenger.

But. Israel and the Arab States -never!

The Palestine Conciliation Commission, Lehrm8llccontinued,
has made no real progress whatever in four years toward liquidating the existing state of war.

The reason it has made

no progress is that the most serious residue of that war has
not been treated urgently and separately as the urgent and
separate problem it is - namely the plight of the 880,000
Arab refugees.

The refugee camps are hotbeds, net enly of

anti-western emotions that will take years to subside, but

(1) Hal Lehrman, "The Arabs, Israel and Near East Defense,"
C.mmentaty, December, 1953, p. 563.
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• f active Communist propaganda as well.

And until it is

solved, other Middle Eastern political quarrels can't be
resolved.

They can only be quelled, as the British are

now quelling ene in Egypt.
Another view as to the outcome ef the Partition Plan
is that of Mr. Geerge McGhee, Assistant· Secretary of the
State Department for the Middle East. "Let me speak very
frankly on this question," said McGhee .))efore the committee
on Foreign Affairs, "The Political less of the Near East to
the Soviet Uhion would be a major disaster comparable to its
loss during war.

The Middle East may be ori tical to our na-

tional interests in time of war, but it is vital to us in
time of peace.•{2)
To the Assistant Secretary the Middle East is one of
the most dangerous spots teday.

He pointed out that the

main reason for the unrest is the refugees' problem.

Seeing

the danger, tor this unsolved problem he analized the situat.ien as:
1.

Js long as the refugee problem remains unresolved,
t.ha"delioate equilibriUm effected by the armistices
is endangered.

2.

AIJ long as this problem. remains unsolved, attainment

of a political settlement in Palestine is delayed
and a major source of friction between Israel and

{2) McGhee, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, 8lst Congress - 20th Session; u.s.
Printing Office, Washington, 1950, p. 9.
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the Arab etates is perpetuated to the detriment of
peace in the entire Near East.
3.

As long as this problem remains unresolved the

refugees themselves will continue to serve as a
natural fecal point for exploitation by Communist
and disruptive elements which neither we nor the
Near Eastern Governments can afford to ignore.(3)

The Middle East's political disorder, according to
MCGhee, is the presence of three quarters of a million idle•
destitute people - a number greater than the combined strength
of all the standing ar.mies of the Near East - whose discontent increases with the passage of time.
without

a~

Straight relief

bQpe of solution is merely perpetuating and ag-

gravating a bad condition.

The morale of the people is con-

tinuously lowered and speaking frankly, the Assistant Secretary says that there is no means provided whereby the problem can be ultimately liquidated.(4}
To the present writer it is a stalemate and the American
policy-makers are privately confessing their failure while
they do not quite know what to try next.

The same helpless-

ness has filtered through the mess and to well informed and
concerned public opinion, including that of American Jews.
Students of history, culture, and religion are watching
with the greatest of interest and concern the outcome of the
Partition Plan.

The presence of Israel is a unique phenomenon

(3)

Ibid,, p. 9,

(4)

Ibid,, P• 15.
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in the history of mankind.

I de not know of a single ether

instance in the world where there is such radical existential dtacontinuity acroee national frontiers for it must not
be forgotten that Israel is not as yet at peace with her immediate world.

Her Arab and Meslem environment has not yet

recognized her.
roundings.

She has no dealings whatsoever with her sur•

Besides this radical political and economic es-

trangement- there is profound intellectual and spiritual
chasm between Israel and the rest of the Near East.

Twe en-

tirely different economies, two entirely diffeJtent religions.
two entirely different languages, two entirely different mentalitie•, two entirely different cultures, two entirely different civilizations, face each other across this chasm.
Thus Israel is only geographically part of the Near East, and
thus her fundamental problem is not how to establish herself
but to integrate herself, economically, politically, and
spiritually in the life and nature of the Middle East. Self•stablisbment by force is fairly easy - at least it is possible; but self-perpetuation by force is, in the nature of
this case, absolutely impossible.

Another inquiry is whether

the concentration in one state of the factors at onee ef
language, race, religion is not a challenge to the modern
concep~ion

of the state, which is free of the necessary de-

termination of

a~

of these factors, and certainly of the

three of·them taken together.

There is no ether state in

126

the world today - nor has there been for centuries - which
is nationally characterized by a race, a language,

~nd

a

religion none of which nationally characterizes any other
state.

Israel alone is Jewish, Israel alone is Judaic.

No

state is alone Moslem or Christian or protestant or cathoiic.
No state alone is Syrian or I•:ongolian or Negro.

And no state

(except Israel and perhaps Ethiopia) has a national language
of its own unconnected (in the sense of interaction) with any
living language.

'l'his unique concentration of the three

factors of race, language and religion is thus a challenge
to the modern conception of the state. ( 5)
The world is viewing and ·wondering ho·w a completely
alien s"cate that is suddenly thrust upon by the Partition
Plan and that is not vmnted by its immediate environment
can survive, expecially if this state has created for others
the very problems - Arab refugees - it meant to solve for
its own people.

To these there has recently been added a

more tangible and perhaps more serious factor of disunity in
the physical e:xistence of Israel on the only land bridge
which connects the north-eastern and the

"~:~estern

parts of

the Arab world.
I think the Zionist idea, reinforced by an organization

(5) See My Mission In Israel, by James G. McDonald (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1951) and the .F'orrestal Diaries edited 'Qv
I!Jalter I11iLiis (New York: Viking, 1951) - they are of special
interest to the student of this subject.
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and sharpened by the suffering of the Jews in recent years,
has won a world-wide sympathy and su:pport.

Whether the Zion-

ism in the next crucial :phase of its development is resourceful to create genuine, internal relations of confidence and
cooperation between itself and the Arab Nationalists or the
Moslem Arab World in the midst of which it ha.s chose:n to
plant itself is altogether beyond my ken to prophesy.

Some

writers, whatever their motive, have hailed the Partition
Plan and have depicted Israel as destined to reconcile East
and West.

But how can one reconcile two things by being out-

side of them?

The West is unthinkable apart from Christ-

ianity and the East apart from Islam.
neither in the one oor the other.

Israel is grounded

Lebanon - little and frag-

ile as she is - is the only country, not only in existence
today but perhaps throughout history, where East and West
meet and mingle with each other on a footing of equality.
The vigorous Moslem citizens of Lebanon bring:·in the intesral
contribution of the East, while the Christian citizens are in
deepest spiritual and historical communion with the West.

If

this situation can endure there is a wonderful possibility of
creative confrontation.
The political Zionists had from the beginning a program
of strong nationalism, a program with grave implications for
those of the Jewish faith living in other countries.

They

hoped that a Jewish State in Palestine would become the center

12S

of

~ewieh

all

~ews.

activities, claiming the loyalty and support of
The activity of the political Zionists has pene-

trated western political, social, and religious life more
deeply and effectively than many of us realize.

Parties in-

serted planks in their platfor.ms supporting Zionism and the
Partition Plan.

Well known church leaders endorsed it, many

of them not realizing all its implications.
~ave

Many Christians

given generous financial support to the cause, hoping

thereby to alleviate the intense suffering of Jews in Europe
and hoping, also, that this would prove to be an effective
way of combating anti-Semitism.

Many sincere and earnest

Christians have their support and -te ·:Zionism and the Plan ef
Partition because they believe that the return of the Jews
to Palestine is the fulfillment of prophecy.

Other well

meaning, sincere Christiane have felt they could not support
political Zionism.
After years of growing tensions between Arab Nationalism
and Zionism with some tragic mistakes on the part of Great
Britain, with no;_ stable foreign policy on the part of the United States in the Near East, with bitterness being engendered
as political Zionism increased in power, with the Jews in
European concentration camps, dying, desperate, finding all
other doors closed to them, clamoring to go to Palestine finally on November 29, 1947, the United Nations by a vote of
33 to 13 partitioned Palestine.
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Zionist nationalism has succeeded in establishing the
State of Israel, which was recognized immediately by the
United States.

Jewish immigrants began at once to pour into

the tiny state.

What can we say of its future?

The Jews

are hard workers, astute businessmen, clever financiers,
good organizers.
vigor.

~ne

new state has shown signs of great

But the population is heterogeneous and generally

secular and materialistic.

There are many political par-

ties, some of them reactionary or radical, others liberal,
sane, steady.

The influx of great numbers of imnigrants

has crested grave economic problems.

At the present rate

of immigration it is estimated that by 1953 only one person
in four will have been residents in the area prior to 1948.(6)
Thus Zionism, one of the most subtle and persistent of
nationalisms, has, with the assistance of the United Nations
succeeded in creating a political Jewish State.

But the

flight of some 850,000 refugees has created new economic,
social and political problems for the Arabs around Israel.
It has brought division in Arab groups, has caus&4 frustration
and bewilder.ment among Christians and has aroused feeling of
bitterness and animosity among Arabs.

The presence of one

million refugees is a disgrace and a great reminder of their

(6) Glora M. wysner, Near East Panorama,(New York: Friendship Press, 1950), p. 91.
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defeat and weakness.

The assasination of King Abdulah,

three revolutions in Syria, a military government in Lebanon and Egypt - all of these happened as a result of the
Partition Plan and the flight of the refugees.

England an•

ticpated all of these crisis and troubles and is expecting
many more to come.

Let it not be forgotten that His Maj-

esty's Government, who carried on the Zionization of Palestine, rejected the partition plan recommended by the UNSCOP
and again played her game of politics with the United States
"Pull me, push you" knowing that the Partiti•n Plan was a
going concern in the United Nations and that the United States
~ad

completely pledged herself to the Partition Plan, His

Majesty's Government rejected the plan on the grounds that it
was contrary to their mandate policy and to the promises
given to the Arabs in the past.

Two main reasons of the re-

jedtion of the partition were given by His Majesty's Government:

First, political: "Palestine is the center of communi-

cations of the Arab world and it has common frontiers with
four Arab States.

There is no doubt that the forcible creation

of a Jewish State in the heart of the Arab world introduces
a new, highly disturbing threat to peace and security in the

Middle East. tt (7)

(7) UN Official Records of the 2nd Session of the General
Assemblz. Ad Hoc Committee, Anea, Document A/AC 14/ :32 and
Addition 1, November 11, 1947, p. 29.

f

_.,,
1 ).J..

The second:
problem.lf

"Partition is no solution for minority

His Majesty's Government cannot justify the

partition on the ground of a."minority status".

11

The ex-

istence of a Jewish minority does not invalidate the establishment of a unitary state in Palestine.

There have been

and there still are, minorities in many countries.

Some

minorities existed originally as part of the indigenous
populations while other minorities were created by immigration.

The United Nations cannot subscribe to the prin-

ciple that a racial or religious minority, whether arising
from natural development or created as a result of immigration, can exist upon the breaking up of a
shatter the political, geographical

~nd

ho~eland

or

economic unity of

a country without the consent and against the wishes of
the majority.n
Government,

11

If it is adopted, declared His lVlajesty's

it \'lill constitute a 'dangerous principle'

and thu£ become a source of 'internal conflict and international disorder'. 11

Beside; that nv;e have to respect human

rights and fundamental freedomstt such scheme is "undemocratic and untenable."($)*

($) Ibid., p. 294-295
*(The writer would like to invite the attention of the reader
to the fact that His lVIajesty' s Gov' t. is accusing the UN of
over-stepping the primary principles and fundamentals of hunan
rights by imposing the partition plan "without the consent and
against the wishes of the majorityrr. 1'his is to His Majesty's
Gov't. "undemocratic and untenable!!. Y.lhile it is an international
crime to the UNSCOP and the UN to ignore the self-determination
right, it is not so to His I<Iajesty's Gov't., 1,",~hen she announced
the Balfour Declaration, promising to give a land with people
to people without a land. It is not so, not to consult, but to
impose by bloodshed and terror the rules of immigration on a
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To the Arabs and the Middle East this defeat and those
refugees are not a new phenomenon.

It is another ring added

to that long chain of the East-West conflict:
Greek vevsus Persia
Rome versus Carthage
.'Persia versus Rome
Crusaders versus Saracen
Ottomans versus Eurppe.
While on the field now we view the face-to-face clashes and
conflict of extreme Zionism versus fantastic Arab-Nationalism.
I'iusa Alami, an Arab refugee and a member of the ArabsPalestinian Higher Conu11ittee in Egypt, is preparing the Arabs
for a second round.

\'Jriting in the Ivliddle East Journal he.

declared that "Palestine and self-respect of the Arabs must
be recovered.

Without Palestine there is no life for them.

This is the first phase of a long war."(9)
With the establishment of a Jewish foothold and base in
the I:Iiddle East the Arabs are faced with a new danger.
The ambitions of the Jews are not limited as in the Partition
Plan or Palestine alone, but embrace other parts of the Arab
world.
stated:

In a message to his people last year, lvlr. Ben-Gurion.
"Prepare to achieve our final g:Jal in the construction

of the Jewish State, the gathering-in of the Jews of the

majority to see 45,000 Je\'fS in 1915 ~ ,~)00,000 Jews in 1939. A
small vmnder, someone might ask hi~ Haj. Gov't. if the right of
self-determination is respected in Africa and Asia? And if it
is not undemocratic and untenable?
Ivlussa Alami, "'The Lesson of Palestine, 11
Journal, October, 1949, p. 386.
( 9)

J>i~iddle

East
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world, and the fulfillment of scriptural promises.n(lO)
The Zionist program dates back to the days of Herzl, and
it is based on the colonization of Palestine and the
revival of the Jewish Kingdom as it was in its golden age.
Palestine then will become, then , the base for exploiting
all the Arab Middle East and extending the economic interests of the Jews.

In their definition, Palestine included

present day State of Israel, Jordan, and a large portion of
Syria, Lebanon and Egypt ••• The dream of a greater Jewish
State between the

~ile

and the Euphrates.

This program which

they are implementin,?.; step by step will have as its next step,
says the Arabs, to take all of Palestine, and then they will
proceed according to circtunstances which they themselves
will create.

To this they will b ring all their pm,rer,

influence, wealth and abilities at home as well as in London
and Washington.

This is the danger 'l;,rhich faces the Arabs,

and which obliges them to change their way - the way of
China - if it is necessary to protect their country to bring
back the lost sheep.

The'Arabs, to meet this challenge,

needs unity and modernization and here again they meet opposition, open or hidden, from two sides.
accordinr~

(10)

These t1vo sides,

to Alami, are the British and the Je11S.

Ibid., p. 387.
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As for the Jews, they have their ambitions,
they . fear
.
the Arabs, and they want to preserve the opportunity to im·
ple.ment the remaining parts of their program.

It is very

important to the Jews that no Arab force, capable of recovering Palestine or constituting a danger to their state, be
created in neighboring territories.

They are afraid that

this force will be created through unity and modernization,
and here the Arabs have to watch closely to the fifth column
in their countries (the Jews).
As for the British, it was they who divided the Arab

countries.

They are satisfied with this and with the fact

that the Arabs $hgUld be distracted from true unity. Partition, backwardness and rivalry further their interests
and aims.

The British are those who plunged the Arabs into

this disaster.

They are trying, and will try, to delay their

progress toward unity and modernization.

The English are

strengthening the existing regimes with their regionalism,
partition and bad governments, and to distract the Arabs from
thinking ab6ut their crimes against them by waving in front
of tltem loa.J,UJ and welfare :projects.
The Arabs believe that Israel is a stranger among them
and was forced on them to prevent their unity and it is a
thorn in their side.
"The disaster has shaken us,"

concluded E'l-Alamy,

profoundly and wounded us deeply and opened the door to a
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great danger.

If the shock wakes us up, brings us to-

gether, and impels us to a new life from which we can derive strength, the wound will heal, the danger will be
averted, and Palestine will be covered.
tunes will be a blessing.

Then the misfor-

But if not, woe to the out-

come. 11 ("11)

(11)

Ibid,, P• 405.

.-
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CHAJ?TER VI
THE COMMITTEE•S DECISION!
THE "ARAB EAST" AND THE COLD WAR

In Power Relationships:
The only groups among the Arabs and the Jews that favored fartition and reconciliation, are the Communists.

While

the weakness of Communist appeal among both Arabs and Jews
in the past suggests that neither group finds itself attracted to the ideologies and practices of modern communism, the
current strategy and tacties of world communism have supplied
the elasticity for an expansion of communist influence.

~

throwing its anti-religious e"gans overboard, communist
labor leaders in Arab countries have been able to find followers muc;h more readily then in the past.

Kurds, Armen-

ians, Jews and other nan-Arab minorities have been made the
targets of spedial propaganda drives.
framework that

comm~nist

It is within this

efforts in Palestine must be viewed.

Jewish communists, are among also, the most vociferous
advocates of cooperation with the Arabs.

They are opposed

to Jewish ''national production" which would discriminate
against Arab workers.

In this t}!ey follow the line of other

left-wing groups, notably Hashomer-Hatzair.

They are also

opposed to the advocacy of a Jewish State or commonwealth
over all of Palestine, the so-called "Biltmore Program."
They are thus able to retain and bridge to the Arab minority

inside Israel, and in many respects are not at least outinfluence.~'

vlardly a moderating

The entire area is characterized by paralyzing fears
and by racial, political, and. social tensions.

Russia on

the north has caused Turkey and Iran to be gripped by fear
of being engulfed, vJhile communist ideology is knmvn to be
penetrating many areas, although it has always met with
strong resistance among orthodox Iv1oslems.

The thousands of

Palestinian refugees have created added political unrest,
insecurity, and economic chaos;

on the other hand, the

establishment of the State of Israel as recommended by the
Ul·iSCOP and voted by the United Nations, has hot lessened
instability, or has it decreased the problem of the area,
The new state has many internal problems with

~;v-hich

to v-1res-

tle, while at the same time it tries to develop a foreign
policy that

will~in

for it confidence, cooperation, finan-

cial and moral support. ·It is surrounded by hostile and
bitter neighbors.

The whole area - once knovm as Palestine -

seethes with political and religious conflicts that involve
all the world, and their solution ·is essential to "':orld
peace.

But

11

the United States u declared Dr.

~1/ysner,

"is

more deeply involved economically and politically in the

Arabs in Israel have four communist representatives
in Parliament. ·

~~The

r
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Near East than in the Far East or even in Europe,"(l2)
The people

•~

this area today are receiving wave after

wave of propaganda :from East and West.

They are told by the

West that they are backward, under-developed and in need of
European tutelage and protection.

They are told by the East

that they are exploited, enslaved and
revolt against Western domination.

despise~,

and should

In fact, they are receiv-

ing no genuine friendship or sympathy or understanding from
either side.
In spite of these strong currents, they still stand adamantly for their faith and heritage.

It is true that they

are more inclined towards Western thoughts, but they refuee
to be the vassals of the West.

Although opposed to the ma-

terial creed of the East, they fedl impressed by its support
of their human dignity and national aspiration.
"I have complete :faith in the wisdom of our people,"
said .Ahmed Azam, the Secretary of the Arab League, "but I
fear that they may, under that dual pressure, become indifferent and disinterested. 11 (13)

The consequences of such

a state of mind in the Middle East, as an eternal center ef

spiritual ideas, will have tremendous repercussions in Asia

(12)

~sner,

op. cit., p. 77,

(13) Ahmad Azam, "The Middle East and the Cold War," The
Uhited Nations World, (New York: United World Corporation,
March, 1951), Vol. 5. No. 3, p. 44.
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and Africa.

While the East, said Azam, under able l ea.d-

ership that combines ideological with material energies, is
penetrating deeply into Asia and Africa, and the West, With
no real moral leadership while attempting to harness old
concepts of imperialism to new concepts of nationalism, is
but confusing the peoples of the

~fiddle

East.

The West is

trying dangerously to harmonize nineteenth-century tutelage
with the twentieth century's ideas o·f sovereign rights and
the principles of self-determination.

While maintaining a

masterly attitude of superiority over these

~fiddle

Eastern

peoples, curiously enough the West is paradoxically attempting to secure the voluntary cooperation of those long-subjected peopl.es.
This confused approach cannot appeal to the hearts and
minds of the Arabs and Moslem peoples. .The only resistance
to commbnism that is being shown at present by the masses of
the peopl.e in the }fiddle East stems from their religious
faith.

It is high time for England, France and particularly

America to reconsider their attitude towards the nations of
the }fiddle East and to try some note which will find response
in the hearts and minds of 70,ooo,ooo Arabs and 300,000,000

MOslems, extending from China to MOrocco.

Failing this, the

West will lose the support of these peoples in the ideological contest; and the East,

th~Qugh

a persuasive, strong
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and well directed mental penetration may ultimately gain
the upper hand,
Abed El-Ra.h.man Aza.m Pasha, the Secretary of the Arab
League, stated lately:

"All the imperialistic powers have

lost their chance to assume the moral leadership of the
Asiatic and African peoplee.•tl4)
"The only country in the Western camp '"hich can still
have a chance of an appeal to the hearts and the minds of
the oriental masses in this country~ia the United Sta.tes."(l5)
"Its past history and relations with the oriental world
ie an example of fa.ir-mindedness and human good relations.
They have known the United States through the last fifty
years as good businessmen, teachers, doctors, and missionaries.

They recognized America as a nation which stands for

.freed.nm•and fair-play, and in spite of

r~cent

blunders, the

I'fiddle East has not lost faith in .American good will.n(l6)
Ben Horin, who

~ent

sixteen years in the 11iddle Eaat,

stated in his book, The Middle East:
"The future of the Middle East ma.y now depend on the
United States more than any other World power. Unlike

(14)
fP

I

United Nation World, United Nation World Incorporation,
J p e 45

oi t

I

I

(15)

Ibid,, p, 45,

(16)

Ibid,, p. 55,
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Britain, America never displayed selfish desires for
the exploitation of colonies. But the United States
doesn't have a real policy in the Middle East. She
is just a follower and endorsee anything England
wants. (1.7)
When Ben-Horin came back from the Middle East he oarried with him a message:
"It is a message from the Middle East to the greatest
democracy on earth. It is a message from peoples who
once shaped faith and civilization for humanity at
·
large, and who are today in a state of misery and war.{lB)
If the

Un~ed

States wants to make sure that peace and free-

dom will rule the world, it must
the trouble.

CD

me nearer to the scene of

It must not look at the world and its involved

problems through the glasses of any other nation, but through
its own spectacles.
Thus America is in a good position to exercise considerable influence on both sides (Arabs and Jews) to accept
any

kind of settlement; and acceptance may grow into per.man-

ent peace.
I belteve it is up to Israel, and to her advantage, to
take the initiative.

The Jews, not withstanding their ancient

connections with the land, are now the newcomers.

MOreover

(17) Ben-Horin, The Middle East. (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1949), p. 87.
(18)

Ibid., P• 89.

the Arabs can get along better without them then they can
get along vdthout the """rabs.

Though both could gain in-

calculably from friendly cooperation, provided Israel will
make the effort.
Walter Zander v\'arning his people, stated:
"If military success encourages Zionists to continue to ignore the Arabs, the end result can only be
disaster. :i>iilitary success vlill bring only te.mporary
respite; and until we succeed to secure the good will
of the Arabs, a dark and portentous shadmv remains over
the national home." ( 19)
All friends of Zionism should unite in urging that
truth upon the new state.

As Count Bernadette wrote shortly

before his assassination:
Above all the Jewish State needs peace. A new
organism of limited resources, its hope for development must very lar,gely depend in the lon~T run on the
cultivation_·of :peaceful and mut.l,lally::trust±ng relations
vvith the neighboring Arab States v.rhose overwhelming
numbersdwarf into insignificance any population total
to which the Jewish State may aspire. 11 (20)
11

I believe, myself, that integration must be the solution
for c{ewish and other minority problems.
do the job alone.

But the Jews cannot

And for the tragedy of Palestine, it

should not be forgotten that the United Nations bears the
heaviest responsibility.

(19)

Kermit

( 20)

Ibid.

~\oosevelt, Q.Q•

cit., p. 188.
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APPENDIX 1
DOCUMENTS:
I.

BRITISH PROMISES TO THE ARABS

EXTRACTS FROH THE CORRESPOliDENCE BETWEEN SIR HENRY

HCMAHON, H.M. HIGH COMMISSIOlmR IN CAIRO, AND THE SHERIF
HUSSEIN OF MECCA.
No. 1.

Cmd. 5957.

FROM THE SHERIF OF lfECCA TO SIR HENRY }ICMAHON, HIS
MAJESTY'S HIGH CO}rniTSSIONER IN CAIRO.
July 14, 1915.

Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any

ex~

ception have decided in these last years to live, and to
accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice; and whereas they
have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support

t~em

and aid them to

the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions ••

~

And

whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest also te prefer
the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned
Government, which is known to both nations and therefore
need not be emphasised;
For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit
themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of
Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval,
through her deputy or representative, of the following

...
158

fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose,
until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual
negotiations:
Firstly:

England to acknowledge the independence of

the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 370 of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik,
Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to the
border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to
the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the
exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the
west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.
England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate
of Islam ••••

No. 2.

FROM SIR H. MCJ.'fAHON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA.
August 30, 1915.

We have the honour to thank you for your frank expressions of the eincerity of your feeling towards England.

We

rejoice, moreover, that your Highness and your people are of
one opinion-- that Arab interests are English interests and
English Arab •••• With regard to the questions of limits and
boundaries, it would appea.r to be premature to consume our
time in discussing such details in the heat of war, and while,
in many portions of them, the Turk is up to now in effective

159

occupation ••••
No. 3.

FR0}1 THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR H. MCY..AHON.

September 9, 1915 •
••• As the limite and boundaries demanded are not those
of one person whom we should satisfy and with whom we should
discuss them after the war is over, but our peoples have seen
that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by
these limite and their word is united on this:
Therefore, they have found it necessary first to discuss this point with the Fower in whom they now have their
confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustri-

ous British Empire ••••
lro. 4.

FR011 SIR H. MCMAHON TO THE

SHERIF OF MECCA.
October 24, 1915 •

••• I have realised, however, from your last letter that
you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance.

I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Gov-

ernment of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and
it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their
behalf the following statement·, which I am confident you will
receive with satisfaction:-The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of S,yria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Home, Ha.ma. and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab,
and should be excluded from the limits demanded.
With the above modification, and without prejudice to
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our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those
limits.
As for those regions lying within those frontiers

wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to
the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the
name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and made the following reply to your letter:
(1)

Subject to the above modifications, Great Brit-

ain is prepared to recognise and support the independence
of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded
by the Sherif of Mecca.
(2)

Great Britain will guarantee the HOly Places

against all external aggression and will recognise their
inviolability.
(3)

When the situation admits, Great Britain will give

to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish
what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government
in those various territories.
(4)

On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs

have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain
only, and that such European advisers and officials as may
be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.
{5)

With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra,

the Arabs will recongise that the established position and
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interests of Great Britain necessitate special adminis•
trative arrangements in order to secure these territories
from foreign aggression, to :promote the welfare of the loM
cal :populations and to safeguard our mutual economic int erests ••••
Ifo. 5.

FROM THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR H. MCMAHON.

November 5, 1915.

I.

In order to facilitate an agreement ••• we renounce

our insistence on the inclusion of the vilayete of Mersina.
and Adana. in the Arab Kingdom.

But· the two vila.yete of

Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab

!!!·

ayets, and there is no difference between a MOslem and a
Christian Arab:
No. 6.

they are both descendants of one forefather •••

FROM SIR H. MCIWiON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA.

December 14, 1915.
'

I am gratified to observe that you agree to the exclusion of the districts of Mersina and Adana from boundaries of
the Arab territories •••• With regard to the vilayeis of Aleppo and Beirut, the Goverrunent of Great :Britain have fully
understood and taken careful note of your observations, but,
as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them
both, the question will require careful consideration and a.
further communication on the subject will be addressed to you
in due course.

~
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No. 7.

FROM THE SHERIF OF l'IECCA TO SIR H. MCJ.WION.

January 1, 1916.
As-regards the northern parts and their coasts, we
have already stated in our previous letter what were the
utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done
so to fUlfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired
by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God.

It is this

same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may
possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and
the agreement made between them during the present wars and
calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent mini$•
ter should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this
war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our e,yes
from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and
its coasts •••• It is impossible to allow any derogationstha.t
gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those
regions.
II.

EXTRACT FRQlv1 THE REPORT ( DATED !-!ARCH 16, 1939) OF A

CO)llfiTTR .SEI' UP TO CONSIDER THE ABOVE CORRESPONDElrGE. Cmd.

5974.

Both the Arab and the United Kingdom representatives
have tried (as they hope with success) to understand the
point of view of the other party, but they have

~een

unable

to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the Correspondence, and

they._:fe~l

obliged. to l,"epqrt to the conference
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accordingly.
The United Kingdom representatives have, however, informed the Arab representatives that the Arab contentions.
as explained to the committee, regarding the interpretation
of the Correspondence, and especially their contentions relating to the meaning of the phrase "portions of S,yria lying
to the west of the districtw of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and
Aleppo", have greater force than has appeared hitherto.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom representatives have informed the Arab representatives that they agree that Pa.le!tine was included in the area claimed by the Sherif of Mecca
in his letter of the 14th .Tuly, 1915-, and that unless Palestine was

e~rd4ed

from that area later in the Correspondence

it must be regarded as having been included in the area in
which Great Britain was to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs.

They maintain that on a proper con-

struction of the Correspondence Palestine was in fact tx•
cluded.

But they agree that the language in which i te' 'ex-

clusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable
as it was thought to be at the time •••• (The report here
~efers

ing

to certain other statements made to Arab leaders dur-

aifd after the war.)

In the opinion of the Connnittee it

is, however, evident from these statements that His Majesty's Government were not/free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants
of Pa.lestine, and that these statements must all be taken
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into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilit!es
which -- upon any interpretation of the Correspondence--His
Majesty's Government have incurred towards those inhabitants
as a result of the correspondence.
III. THE HOGARTH :MESSAGE
The following are the terms of the message which Commander Hogarth was instructed to deliver to King Hussein when he
visited Jedda in
"(1)

Janu~ry

1918:

The Entente Powers are

d~tar.mined

that the Arab

race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a
nation in the world.

This can only be achieved by the Arabs

themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.
"(2)

SO far as Palestine is concerned we are determined

that no people shall be subject to another, but
(a)

inview of the fact that there are in Pales-

tine shrines, Wakfs and Holy Placee, sacred in some cases to
MOslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in
other to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are
of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and
Arabia. there must be a speeiai regime to deal with these
places approved of by the world.
(b)

As regards the MOsque of Omar it shall be

considered as a MOslem concern alone and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any

non-~slem

authority.
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"(3)

Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in

favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inasmuch as
this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further
as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realization of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are
determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom.;of the existing population both economic and political,
no o·bstacle should be put in the way of the realization of
this ideal.
"In this connexion the friendship of world Jewry to the

Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews
have a political influence.

The leaders of the mGWement are

determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and co-operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is
not to be lightly thrown aside."
IV.

THE DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN ARAB LEADERS (June 1918) •
His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of

the seven with the greatest care ••••
The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four
categories:
1.

Areas in Arabia which were free and independent

before the outbreak of war;
2.

Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the

action of the Arabs themselves during the present war;
3.

Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied
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by the Allied forces during the present war;
4.

Areas still under Turkish control.

In regard to the first two categories, His Majestyts
Government recognize the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas,and support them.
in their struggle for freedom.
In regard to the areas occupied b,y Allied forces ••••
it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that
the future government of these regions should be based upon
the principle of the consent of the governed and this policy
has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's
Government.
In regard to the areas mentioned in the fourth category, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government
that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their
freedom and independence and towards the achievement of this
object Bis Majesty's Government continue to labour ••••
V.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF NOVElffiER 7, 1918.

The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in
prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition
of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of
the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of

n~tional

governments and administrations de-

riving their authority from t~e initiative and free choice
of the indigenous populations.
In order to carry out these intentions France and Great
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Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous governments and administrations
in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and
in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing and recognizing these as soon as they are
actually established.
Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these
regions any particular institutions they are only concerned
to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the
regular working of governments and administrations freely
chosen by the pepu+ations themselves.

To secure impartial

and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local
initiative, to favour the diffusion of education, to put an
end to dissensions that have too

lo~~

been taken advantage

of by Turkish policy, such is the policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories.
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APPENDIX 2
THE TEJ:U.fS OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE*

Article l.

The Mandatory shall have full powers of

legislation and of administration, eave as they may be
limited by the terms of this mandate.
Article 2.

The Iw!a.ndatory shall be responsible for_

placing the country under such political, administrative
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of
the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and
the development of

self-gover~ng

institutions, and also for

safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the

in~

habitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
Article 3.

The !-1'andatory shall, so far as cireumetan-

ces,per.mit, encourage local autonomy.
Article 4.

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be rec-

ognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the
Jewish population in· Palestine, and, subject always to the

.

control of the administration, to assist and take part in
the development of the country.
The Zionist organization, so long as its organization
and consti tU:tJ._on are in the opinion of the l.fandatory

*

See Annexes, appendices and maps to the Report by the UN;
Official Documents.
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appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency.

It shall

take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's
Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are
willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
Article 5.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for see-

ing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to,
or in any way placed under the control of, the government of
any foreign Power.

Article 6.

The administration of Palestine, wnile en-

suring that the rights and p6sition of other sections of the
population are not prejudices, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in
co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article
4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including state
lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.
Article 7,

The administration of Palestine shall be

responsible for enacting a nationality law.

There shall be

included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate
the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take
up their permanent residence in Palestine.
Article 8.

The privileges and immunities of foreigners,

including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.
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Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1, 1914, shall
have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a
specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at
the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established
in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been
agreed upon between the Powers concerned.
Article 9.

The };Iandatory shall be responsible for see-

ing that the judicial system establiehed in Palestine shall
assure to foreigners, as \<1ell as to natives, a complete gu&l!·
antee of their rights.
Respect for the personal statue of the varioue peoples
and communities and for their religious interests ehall be
fully guaranteed.

In particular, the control and adminis-

tration of Wakfe ehall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the foundere.
Article 10.

Pending the making of special extradition

agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties
in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall
apply to Palestine.
Article 11.

The administration of Palestine shall take

all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country,
and, eubject to any international

~bligations

accepted by

the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public
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i

shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the
ground of race, religion or language.

No person shall be

excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious
belief.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools
for the education of its own members in its own language,
while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be
denied or impaired.
Article 16.
ercisi~g

The

~~ndatory

shall be responsible for ex-

such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bod-

f.et(crf'' all faiths in J:lalestine as may be required for the

maintenance of public order and good government.

Subject to

such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to
obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies

o~

to discriminate against any representative or member of them
on the ground of his religion or nationality.
Article 1?.

The administration of Palestine may organ-

ize on a voluntary basis the

fo~ees

necessar,y for the preeer-

vat ion of peace and order, and also for the defense of the
country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those
above specified save with the consent of the MandatoXY. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air foroes
shall be raised or maintained by the administration of Palestine.
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NOthing in this article shall preclude the administramain~

tion of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the
tenance of the forces of the

l~ndatory

in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use
the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement
of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and
Article 18.

s~plies.

The Mandatory shall see that there is no

discrimination in Palestine against the national of any state
member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the

l~nda

tory or of any foreign state in matters concerning taxiation•
commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil
aircraft.

Similiarly, there shall be no discrimination in

Palestine against goods orginating in or destined for any of
the said states, and there shall be freedom of transit underequitable conditions across the mandated area.
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of
this

mandate~

the administration of Palestine may, on the

advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs
duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as
it may think best to promote the development of the natural
resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of
the population.

It may also, on the advice. of. the Mandatory,

conclude·a·specfal customs agreement with any state the
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!

territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic
Turkey or Arabia.
Article 19.

The lt:f.a.ndatory shall adhere on behalf of

the administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded
hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial
equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navi•
gation and postal, telegraphic and wireless oommunication or
literary, artistic or industrial property.
Article 20.

The Mandatory shall co-operate on

of the administration of

be~lf

Palestine, so far as religious,

social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of
any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants
and animals.
Article 21.

The I>1a.ndatory shall secure th'e enactment

within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure

t~e

execution of a law of antiquities based on the following
rules.

This law shall ensure:.equali ty o.f' treatment in the

matter of excavations and archaetlogical research to the
national of all states members of the League of Nations.
(l) ".Antiquity" means any construction or any product
of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.
(2)

The law for the protection of antiquities shall
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(8)

The proceeds of excavations may be divided be-

tween the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department.

If division seems pos-

sible for wcientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a
fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.
4rticle 22.

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the

official languages of Palestine.

Any statement or inscript-

ion in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be rep~ated

in Hebrew and any statement or inecription in Hebrew

shall be repeated in Arabic.
Article 23.

The administration of Palestine shall re-

cognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestin~aa

legal days of rest for the members:. of such communi t-

ies.
Article 24.

The

~fundatory

shall

to the Council of

n~ke

the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction
of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to
carry out the provisions of the mandate.

Copies of all laws

and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall
be communicated with the report.
Article 25.

In the territories lying between the Jor-

dan and the eastern ?oundary of

Palestin~as

ultimately deter-

mined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of
the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application
of euch provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local oonditions, and to make

178

such provision for the administration of the territories
as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided
that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the
provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.
Article 26.

The

Y~ndatory

agrees, if any dispute what-

ever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of
the League of Nations relating to the interpretations or the
application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute,
if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted
to the Per.manent Court of International Justice

provid~d

for

by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 27.

The consent of the Council of the League

of Nations is required for

anw

modification of the terms of

this mandate.
Article 28.

In the event of the termination of the

mandate hereby conferred upon the

}~ndatory,

the Council of

the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may
be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under
guarantee of the League, the right secured by Articles 13
and 14, and shall use its infulence for securing, under the
guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine
will fully honor the financial obligations legitimately,
incurred by the administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants
to pensions or gratuities.
The present instrument shall be deposited in orginal in
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APPEliDIX 3

I.

The following letter from the United Kingdom Delega-

tion to the United Nations had been received by the Acting
Secretary-General of the United Nations:
United Kingdom Delegation to·the United
Natione, New York.
2nd April, 1947.
I have received the

"Hie

fo~lowing

message from my government:

Majesty's Govermnent in the United Kingdom re-

quest the Secretary-Gen.era.l of the United Nations to place
the question of Palestine on the Agenda of the General Assembly •t its next regular Annual Session.

They will submit

to the Assembly an account of their administration of the
League of Nations Mandate and will ask the Assembly to make
recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning
the future government of Palestine.
In making this request, His Majesty's Government draw
the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of
an early

settlem~nt

in Palestine and to the risk that the

General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recomm-ndations at its next regular Annual Session unless some
preliminary study of the question had previously been made
under the auspices of the United Nations.

They therefore re-

quest the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as

p~ssible,

a. special Session of the General Assembly for t.he-::~,:purpose of
constituti~g

and instructing a Special Committee to prepare
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of the General Assembly.
The following letter has been received by the Secre•
tary-General of the United Nations:
Embassy of Iraq,
Washington, D.C~
21st April, 194?.
I have the honour to inform you that I have been instructed b.y my Government to request you, in accordance with
Rule 18 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure for the General
Assembly, to include the following as an additional

ite~

in

the Agenda of the Special Session of the General Assembly
convening on April 28, 194?:
The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine
and the Declaration of its Indapendence.
(Signed) Ali Jawdat,
.Ambassador.
IV.

Request from the Syrian Government for the Inclusion

of an Additional item in the Agenda of the First Special
Session of the General Assembly.
The following telegram has been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations:
Washington,D.C.,22nd April,l947
I HAVE THE HONOUR TO I1""FORM YOU THAT I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED
MY GOVERl~M:ENT TO REQ.UEST YOU t IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 18
OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AS ADDITIONAL ITEH IN THE AGENDA OF
THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONVENING APRIL
28, 194?: THE TERHINATION OF THE 11A:NDATE OVER PALESTINE .AND
THE DECLARATION OF ITS IliDEJ?ENDENCE. PLEASE ACCEPT EXCELL<io.
ANCY THE RENEWED ASSURAlJCES OF Iff HIGHEST CONSIDERATION•COSTI K. ZURAYK, MINISTER OF SYRIA.

BY

v.

Request from the Lebanese Government for the Inclusion
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of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the First Special
Session of the General Assembly.
The following telegram has been received by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations:
Washington,D.C.
22nd April, 1947.
EXCELLENCY I HAVE THE HONOUR TO STATE THAT I AM INSTRUCTED
BY MY GOVERNMENT TO ~UEST IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE EIGHTEEN OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE PROCEDURE
OF THE GEl\fERAL ASSEN:BLY THE INCLUSION OF THE FOLLO\viNG .ADDITIONAL ITEr~ Il'! THE AGENDA OF THE FORTHCO£.ITNG SPECIAL SESSION OF Tlill GEUERAL ASSElwffiLY SCHEDul.ED TO OPEN ON APRIL 28,
1947 "THE TERMINATION OF THE :I-1ANDATE ON AND THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO PALESTINE" ACCEPT EXCELLENCY THE RENEWED
ASSURANCES OF 11¥ HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. CHARLES 1-1.ALIK,
MINISTER OF LEBANOl{ IN THE UNITED STATES.
VI.

Request by the Saudi Arabian Government for the In-

,clusion
of an Ad.di tional Item in the Agenda of the First
,,
Special Session of the General Assembly
The following letter has been received from the Secretarygeneral of the United Nations:
Royal Legation of Saudi Arabia,
Washington, D.C.
22nd April, 1947.
I have been instructed by my Government to request, in
accordance with Rule 18 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the
General Assembly, that the following item be put on the Agenda
of the Special Session which convenes on April 28th, 1947:
"The termination of the mandate over
Palestine and the declaration of its
independence."
(Signed) ASAD AL-FAQIH,
Minister.
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.APl?ENDIX 4
PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OR
THE SPECIAL COI~ft•IITTEE ON P.ALESTnm
I.

CHAIRMAN, VICE- CHAIRNAN, AND RAPPORTEUR

Rule 1.

The special Committee shall elect its own

Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur, or Rapporteurs.
Rule 2.

If the Chairman is unable to perform his

function, a new Chairman shall be elected for the unexpired
term.
Rule 3.

The Vice-Chairman acting as Chairman shall

have the same powers and duties as the Chairman.
Rule 4.

In addition to exercising the powers which are

conferred upon him elsewhere by these Rules, the Chairman
shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, shall
direct the discussions, ensure observance of these Rules,
accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and
announce the decisions.

He shall rule on points of order,

and subject to these Rules, shall have complete control of
the pr,eceedings a.t any meeting.
II •

LANGUAGES

Rule 5.

The Committee will conduct its work in both

English and French except when it may agree that the interpretation may be dispensed with.
Rule 6.

Witnesses who are unable to employ any of the
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official languages of the United Nations shall as a rule
provide their ovm interpreters.

If a witness who appears

at the instance of the Committee is unable to employ any
of

t~e

official
languages and to provide his own inter,

preter, the Secretariat shall arrange for the same.
III.

RECORDS

Rule 7.

As a general rule only summary records of

its public and private meetings shall be drawn up unless
the necessity for verbatim records in respect of a speci:f'icc
meeting or part of a meeting is recognized by the Committee.
Rule 8.

Verbatim records will be taken of all hearing

and made available to the members of the Committee.

The

Committee will decide in each case whether the testimony
and discussion will be circulated verbatim or in summary
form for the whole or part of the meeting.
IV.

PIJID.,ICITY OF l.fEETINGS, JilRESS COMl.flJNIQ,UES AND VERBAL
BRIEFINGS

Rule 9.

The meetings of the Committee shall be held

in public unless the Committee decides otherwise.
Rule 10.

Meetings of sub-committees shall be held in

public unless the
Rule 11.

sub-co~nittee

concerned decides otherwise.

Official press communiques shall be previGus-

ly approved by the Chairman of the Committee.

Press re-

leases and verbal briefings may be issued by the press
officer unless instructions to the contrary are given by the
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Committee.
V.

Conduct of Business
Rule 12.

Co~nittee

A majority of the

I~'lernbers

of the Special

shall constitute a quorum.

Rule 13.

No representative may address the Special

Committee without having previously obtained the permission
of the Chairman.

The Chairman shall call upon speakers in

the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

The

Chairman may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not
relevant to the subject under discussion.
Rule 14.

The chairman and the Rapporteur of the sub-

committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusion
Rule 15.

a:~rived

at by their sub-committee.

During the discussion of any matter, a rep-

resentative may rise to a point of order and the point of
order shall be immediately decided by the chairman in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.

A representative may ap-

peal against the ruling of the Chairman.

The appeal shall

immediately be put to the vote, and the Chairman's ruling
shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members
present and voting.
Rule 16.

During the discussion of any matter, a rep-

resentative may move the adjournment of the clebacce.
such motion shall have priority in the debate.

Any

In addition

to the proposer of the motion, two representatives may speak

1S7

in favour of, and two against, the motion.
Ru1e 17.

The Special Committee may limit the allowed

to each speaker.
Rule 18.

A representative may at any time move the

closure of the debate whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak.

If application is

made for per.mission to speak against the closure it may be
accorded to not more than two speakers.
Rule 19.

The Chair.man shall take the sense of the

Special Committee on a motion for closure.

If the Special

Committee is in favour of the closure the Chairman shall declare the closure of the debate.
Rule 20.

Resolutions, amendments, and substantive

motions shall be introduced in writing and handed to the
Principal Secretary who shall circulate copies to the representatives.

As a general rule, no proposal shall be dis-

cussed or put to the vote at any meeting of the Special Committee unless copies of it have been circulated to all representatives not later than the day preceding consideration
of amendments. or of motions as to procedure, without previous
circulation of copies.
Rule 21.

Parts of a proposal may be voted on separ-

ately if a representative requests that the proposal be divied.
Rule 22.

If two or more amendments are moved to a

r
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proposal, the Special Committee shall first vote on the
amendment f'urtherE'!st removed,in ·substance from the orig...
inal proposal and then on the amendment next furtherest
removed, and so on, until all the amendments have been put
to the vote.
Rule 23.

When an amendment revised, adds to or deletes

from a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first, and
if it is adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted
on.
VI. VOTING
Rule 24.

Each Member of the Special Committee shall

have one vote.
Rule 25.

Decisions of the Special Committee shall be

taken b.Y a majority of the members present and voting.

Ab-

stentions shall not be counted as votes.
Rule 26.

The Special Committee shall normally vote by

show of hands, but any representative may request a rollcall which shall then be taken in the English alphabetical
order of the names of the 11embers.
Rule 27.

The vote of each Member participating in any

roll-call shall be inserted in the record.
Rule 28.

If a vote is equally divided on matters other

than elections, a second vote shall be taken at the next
meeting; this meeting shall be held within forty-eight hours
of the first vote, and it shall be expressly mentioned in·: the
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agenda that a second vote will be taken on the matter in
question.

If this vote also results in equality, the pro-

posal shall be regarded as rejected.
VII.

SUB-COMNITTEES AND SECRETARIAT

Rule 29.

The Special Committee may set

up

sub-

committees.
Rule 30.

The Secretary-General or a member of the Sec-

retariat designated by him may make to the Special Committee
or any sub-commdttee any oral or written statement which the
Secretar,y-General considers desirable.
VIII.

LIAISON OFFICERS

Rule 31.

The Mandatory Po'\..rer, the Arab Higher Commit ..

tee, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine may appoint liaison
officers to the Committee who shall supply such information
or render such other assistance as the Committee may require,
The liaison officers may, suo motu, present at the direction

of the Committee such information as they may think advisable.
IX.

ORAL A1ID

Rule 32.

vlRITTEJJ

TESTI~1'0NY

The Committee may, at its descretion, invite

representatives of Governments or organizations, or private
individuals, to submit oral or written testimony on any relevant matter.
Rule 33.

Requests for oral hearing shall contain an

indication of the subject or subjects on which the witness
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desires to testify.
Rule 34.

The Committee may refer to a sub-committee

for •xamination and recommendation such requests to present
oral testimony as it deems advisable.
Rule 35.
time and

p~ace

The Committee shall in each case decide the
of the hearing of any Witness from whom it

may decide to receive oral testimony,

The Committee may

decide to advise any to submit his testimony in writing.
Rule 36.
avai~able

The Committee, on the basis of the time

to it, may limit either the number of witnesses

or the time to be allowed to any witness.
Rule 37.

The Committee may refer to a sub-committee

for study and report such written testimony as it may deem
advisable.
X.

AMENDMENTS AND SUSPENSIONS

Rule 38.

These rules of procedure may be amended or

suspended by a decision of the Special Committee taken by
a majority of the members present and voting.
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APPENDIX 5

I.

GROWI'H OF POPULATION IN P.ALESTil'ffi. (1)
Christiane Others
Jews
Moslems
1919
~,ooo
63,000
5,000
515,000
1922
83,790
71,464
7,617
589,177
1931
175,138
89,134 10,145
761,922
355,157
105,236 11,031
1935
836,688
].939
116,958 12,150
445,457
927,133
].941
125,413 12,881
474,102
973,104
127,184 13,121
1942
484,408
995,292
131,281 13,663
502,912
1943 1,028,715
136,000 14,000
525,000
1944 1,064.000
145,063 15,488
1946 1,076, 783
608,225
II.

RECORDED IIDUGRATION. (2)

X~

Total

1920
1921
1922
1923
].924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
19:37

5,716
9,339
8,128
7,991
13,553
34,641
13,910
3,595
3,086
6,566
6,433
5,533
11,289
31,977
44,143
64,174
31,671
1'2,475
15,263
18;433
5,611
4,2'70
3,052

1.938

1939
1940
1941
1.942

Jews
5,514
9,149
7,844
7,421
12,856
33,801
13,081
2,713
2,178
5,249
4,944
4,075
9,553
30,327
42,359
61,854
29,727
10,536
12;868
16;405
4;547
3,647
2,1.94

Non-Jews
202
190
284
570
697
840
829
882
908
1,317
1,489
1,458
1,736
1,650
1,784
2,293
1,944
1,939
2;395
2;028
1,664
623
858

Statistical Abstract, 1943; pp. 2·a.nd iii.
Sta.ti§t ical Abetra.ct, 1943, p. 12.

Total
648,000
752,048
1,036,339
1,308,l:l2
1,501,698
1,585,500
1,620,005
1,676,571
1,739,000
1,845,559
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III. BETWEEN 1919 AND TRE END OF 1937 THERE WERE 313 030
JEWISH IMMIGRANrS, OF THE FOLLOWilJG NATIONALITIES: (3~

NationalitY:

Ntunber

Poland
Germany

131,249
35,346
30,718
15,528
9,642
9,181
7,909
73,457
313,030

u.s.s.R.

Rumania
Lithuania
Yemen

u.s.A.

Othere

Percent
42
11
10
'5

5
3
3

23

10'0

IV. THE RATE OF NAT URAL INCREASE PER 1, 000 PEHSOl'fS IN PALESTINE IS SHOWN OlT THE FOLLOWING TABLE. (4)
Years

Moslems

1922-25
1926-30
1.931-35
1.936-40
1941-44

23.27

Christiane

Jewe

20~16

20.44

20~60

22~70
20~91

25~19

24.97
27,68
30.71

20.85
20.77
18.89

17;75
17.83

V. A COI-rtiARISON OF THE PALESTINIAN RATE OF NATURAL INCREaSE
PER 1,000 WITH OTHER COUNTRIES FOR SELECT YEARS FOLLOWS: (5)
Palestine
1921-25
1935-39

VI.

22.6
25.4

10.7
6.1

COtnWRIES OF RECEPTION FOR

Countr;y
.All eountri es •••••••••••••••••••
United States •••••••••••••••••••

Jh~SH

South Africa

India

17.4
14.9

11.4

REFUGEES (1933-43).(6)

No. Admitted
(in thouea.nds)
811
190

6~'7

Percent
100.0
23.5

(3) Royal Institute of International Affaire, Great Britain
and Palestine, 1915-1945 1• London, 1946, p.66.
(4} Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report, Washington,
1946,p. 24.
(5) Robert R. Nathan; et. al~, Palestine: Problem and Promise, Washington, 1946, p. 132.
(6) The Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, Washington, D.C., March 1, 1947. p. 98.
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Country
Number
120
Palestine. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • •
65
England. • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • •• •• • • • • • • • •
55
France •••••••• • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • •••
30
Belgium ••••• • • •••• • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • •• • • •
35
Holland ••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • •
Switzerland. ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16
12
Spain.~ ••••• • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • ••
70
other European Countries •• • • • • • • • • • •••
50
Argentina •• • • • • • • •• • • • • • •••
• •• • • • ••
25
Brazil ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • "* • • • • • • • • •
7
Uruguay •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• ••• • • • • •
12
Bo1i via. •• • • • • • • • • ••
••• ••• ••••••••
14
Cllile • •.••..•..•.....
• •• • • •••• ••••
Other Latin .American countries •• • • • • ••
20
China •••••••• • • • • • •• • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • •
25
South .Africa. • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
8
Australia. •••• •• • • • • ••• • • • • • • • •• • • •• • ••
9
Canada •••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • ••
8
Other countries •••• • • • • • •••••• • • • • • • • •
40

..

..

.......
J

..

...

••••

..

..

...

l?ercent
14.8
8.1

6.8
3.7
4.3
1.9
1.4
8.8

6.2
3.1
0.8

1.r&,
1.7
2.4
3.1
1.0
1.1
1.0
4.9
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APPENDIX 6
SECRET TRJ:ATY

PARTITIONING ASIATIC TURKEY

,c.
[This Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916, was disclosed
l>.y

memoranda published in 191? by the Bolsheviets, who re-

pudiated i1t.

:rt

represented a eompromiee of intereste be-

tween the British support of the Arab nationalist movement
and French imperialist

~bitions

in

S,yria~

Mfmprandum dated March 6, 191?.
A.a a reeult of negotiations which took place in London

and Petrograd in the Spring of 1916, the Allied British,
French and Russian Governments came to an agreement as regards. the future delimitation of their reepeotive zones

&f

influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, as
well as the formation in Arabia of an independent Arab State,
or a federation of Arab States.

The general principles of

the agreement are as follows:
1.

Russia. obtains the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond,

Van, B1tlis, as well as territory in the southern part of
KUrdistan, along the line MUsh-Sert-Ibn-Omar-Amadjie-Persian
frontier.

The l.imit of Russian acquisitions on the mack Sea

coast will be fixed later on at a point lying west of Trebizon4.
2.

France obtains the coastal strip of S,yria, the vil-

ayet of Adana, and a territory bounded on the south by a line
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Aintab-Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the
north by' a l.ine Ala.-Dagh-ZS.ra.-Egin-Eharput.

I

I

! .

I

3.

Great

~itain

obtains the southern part of

Meso~

pot.amia with Bagdad, a:pd stipulates for herself in Syria
the ports of Haifa and Akka.
~·

4.

agreement between France and England, the zone

between the French and the British territories forms a confederation of Arab States, or one' independent Arab State,
~he

zones of influence in which are determined at the same

t.ime.
5.

.AJ.exandretta is proclaimed a free port.

~th

a view to securing the religious interests of the

Entente Powers, Palestine, with the HOly places, is separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be determined qy agreement between Russia, France
and England.
As a general ~ule the contracting Powers undertake

mutually to recognise the concessions and privileges exieting in the territories now acquired by them which have existed before the war.
They agree to aesume such portions of the Ottoman Debt

sueh as correspond to their respective acquisitions.* I (

-------·-·-See-v. Henry Cooke & Edith P. Stickney, Readire in
Euro ·ean International Relations Since 18 • (ew York )
Harpers & Brot ers, 1931 P. 27. Taken from the
Manchester Guardian, Jan. 19, 1981
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